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CONTRIBUTIONS
TO
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

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CONTRIBUTIONS
TO
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

BY
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TRANSLATED AND EDITED
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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THERE are few educated men in this country who have not heard or read something of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and probably formed some indefinite notion of him as a philosopher, pantheist, or patriot. His translated works have diffused, almost universally, some impression of him as a bold speculator, and a man of intense power of abstract thought; but at the same time as one possessed of a stoical moral nature, and practical self-devotion to high purposes, such as we find few in any age or country. Many who open the title-page of the present work will no doubt be ready to say, "Johann Gottlieb Fichte I know and appreciate; but who is Immanuel Hermann Fichte?" This is the very inquiry I want to raise, and the very question I design forthwith to answer.

Immanuel Hermann is the only son of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, born in the year 1797, just at the time when his father was excogitating those startling speculations at Jena, which took the philosophical

mind of Europe by surprise, and seemed to promise at first to lay the top-stone upon the massive superstructure of the Kantian system. Those who have read the life, which the filial piety of the son has since dedicated to the memory of such a father, will not be at a loss to understand the influences under which his intellect was taught to expand, and the moral vigour which was infused into him from the time when his cradle rocked in the very room which gave birth to the "*Wissenschaftslehre*."

Fichte, while giving his son a decided bent towards philosophical thinking, provided for him a sound philosophical education at Berlin, where he had the advantage, at the same time, of listening to the almost inspired eloquence of Schleiermacher. The rising star of philosophy after Fichte's death (1814) was Hegel; for Schelling's philosophy of nature had already begun to lose its novelty, and to become trite (as such systems usually do) in the hands of his followers. To Hegel, therefore, the young Hermann repaired. But the mind which had been first drawn forth under the tutorship of so intensely practical and earnest a spirit as Fichte's; and the ear which had since listened to the exciting and soul-stirring speech of Schleiermacher could find little pleasure and little sympathy in the dry abstractions of Hegelianism. Accordingly the youthful philosopher abandoned the pathway of philosophy, and fell back upon his

scholarship. Both in Saarbrücken and in Düsseldorf he followed the profession of a public teacher with credit and success.

But time rolled on, the leaven of philosophy began once more to ferment, and the scattered opinions of the age to mould themselves into a new form, at least in his individual mind and consciousness. In 1832 he published a work, entitled "Ueber Gegensatz Wendepunct und Ziel heutiger Philosophie," in which he took a critical view of all the different systems then in vogue, and passed a very free and somewhat acute judgment upon them. This was followed in the next year by a psychological sketch of the intellectual nature of man, entitled, "Das Erkennen als Selbsterkennen;" and in the year 1836 a third part upon Ontology was added. These works, connected as they were with a name already become classical in the history of philosophy, procured him the appointment of Professor of Philosophy in the University of Bonn; from which place he removed to Tübingen in the year 1842.

Whilst holding the former of these professorships it was the fortune of the present writer to make his acquaintance, to hear him discourse daily in his lecture room, and to visit him in his domestic circle. The whole personality he exhibited was by no means that of a recluse, wrapped up in lofty and nebulous abstractions; nor that of a philosopher *by profession*,

whose business it was to make a plain matter difficult to the uninitiated: it was rather the aspect of a man who had to do with the great realities of human life, and to expound them to the ordinary intellect of mankind. To a remarkably clear method of expression and exposition, he added the great charm of a constant appeal to facts, never appearing to venture on the wings of pure thought beyond the point where the facts themselves could be seen, like solid ground, spreading themselves underneath. This advantage of course I could well appreciate; but it is needless to say that I then possessed, beyond such immediate appreciation, little idea of the point to which he was tending; at a time especially when the Hegelian philosophy was still enjoying full credit through most of the universities of Germany.

The philosophic tendencies, however, which he was at that period initiating, have since become sufficiently plain and palpable. They are contained in a series of works on speculative theology, ethics, and psychology, which have appeared at pretty regular intervals, from the year 1847 to the present date, and of which the crowning one, that is to complete the whole psychological system, is still in preparation. I need only say, at present, that in these works, which are partly historical and critical, and partly systematic and constructive, he has completely broken with the abstract *à priori* tendencies which for a long time had

ruled the mind of his country; that he has carried on an uncompromising warfare against the whole pantheistic system of thought as developed in various ways, from Spinoza downwards; and that he has shown the nonentity of all science which is not based upon facts that appeal *directly* to human experience. Since about the year 1840 Fichte has also been the principal editor of a philosophical journal ("Zeitschrift für Philosophie und speculative Theologie"), which has ably represented his point of view, and which, singularly, is the only one which survived the revolution of 1848, and has continued to flourish down to the present day.

On these grounds, besides others which will appear by and by, I reckon that Immanuel Hermann Fichte may be regarded as a man of mark, not yet certainly as noteworthy as his father, but still likely at last to stand side by side with him in the intellectual history of his country. Both his own merits as a thinker, and the recollection of what I am myself indebted to him, have given birth to the desire to make him somewhat better known in this country. The work which perhaps would represent him the most favourably in England is his "Critical History of Ethical Philosophy." The extended nature of that work, however, was alone quite sufficient to repress any wish I might have felt to present it in an English form, at least so long as my own practical

duties should remain as continuous, and my literary leisure as small as they are at the present time. Happening, however, a short time ago to be looking over some of the more recent German publications, I took up a little work entitled, "Zur Seelenfrage, eine philosophische Confession," which I then learned for the first time had just come from Fichte's own pen. The brevity of the treatise was the first thing which struck my attention; but on carefully perusing it I found that it contained an excellent summary of his own psychological views, placed in contrast with other systems, besides a number of deductions showing the bearing of his philosophy upon some of the most important psychical, ethical, and religious questions. I determined, therefore, to sit down and translate it; and will now explain, with the reader's permission, the more special reasons by which I was induced to do so.

I. I thought that this little work would be interesting, as throwing some light upon the singular development of modern German speculation, and the point to which it is now tending. There is, I think, no doubt whatever that the intellectual history of Germany, from the time of Kant down to the revolution of 1848, presents the most remarkable combination of philosophic thinking, which has ever existed in any one given era of the world; not even excluding the intellectual history of Greece from the time of

Socrates down to the death of Aristotle. Beginning, with becoming modesty, in the criticism of the powers of the human intellect, it gradually assumed a loftier tone, drew one province of truth after another into the vortex of *à priori* reasoning, brought the doctrines of psychology, ethics, theology, natural philosophy, art, and even history itself into the chain of its deductions, and threatened to change the whole surface at once of human knowledge and of human faith. That human knowledge should pass through such a crucible and come out unchanged could not be expected. There is always in every age a certain amount of dross mixed up with the pure gold of truth and reason, which is sure to be consumed when any severe critical process sets in. German philosophy, during the period we have designated, has doubtless performed such a destructive task. It has cast down many idols, separated many compounds, divaricated the matter and the form in almost every region of mental research, and thrown us all back once more upon first principles. But in the midst of this, its victorious career, it is arrested by an *actual* revolution, I mean the revolution of 1848; one in which men could no longer consent to be the sport of mere abstractions, but in which a strong contest set in of human passions, interests, hopes, and wishes; and now behold the fine webs of reasoning, the confident deductions of logic, and the demonstrations of what

must be the future of human thought and human history, break asunder like threads of gossamer, utterly powerless when once brought into collision with human life and human nature in their stern reality.

The purely abstract philosophy of Germany may be said to have been brought to a practical termination in the national movements of that stirring era; and now we look round once more after this overthrow, and find the old millennial questions of human interest and the massive problems of the human reason standing much where they ever have stood, like rocks with only a little of the forest cleared away from the sides, and showing but few additional fissures to admit the sunlight into their deep and unknown recesses.

Now in the works of Fichte we have embodied well nigh *the whole course of German speculation*, from its first rise and dissemination to its present actual result. We see a mind nursed up from infancy in the atmosphere of abstract investigations, passing through all the logical processes which the acutest analysts and system-makers could supply, proceeding from the cradle of subjective idealism to the objective philosophy of Schelling, gathering up in its way all that the dialectics of Hegel had to proffer, pronouncing its slow and steady judgment upon them all, and emerging at last into the world of experience, as that alone on which the lever of

science can be placed so as to produce any abiding effect. Metaphysics we see (through his experience) must return after all to the form of psychology; and psychology must link itself to the rest of the natural sciences. Borrowing from them all the light they can supply, it may at last avail to carry us a little further into the secret workings of human nature and the human soul. All this will be seen however better than I can express it in the little work now laid before the public in an English dress.

II. A second reason for selecting this little work for translation was, that I thought it might conduce generally to the interests of psychology. Psychological efforts in this country have almost all proceeded upon one of two principles. First, there is the old dualistic principle, which regards the soul and the body as two distinct essences, each having its own peculiar attributes, formed and developed by wholly different agencies, and adapted to each other for a time by some intelligent power distinct from and superior to both. This has been the ordinary view of the Scottish school of mental philosophy, and may be regarded also as having been for some time past the most current popular notion on the subject in our own country generally.

The very unsatisfactory nature of this theory has long become apparent to investigators, particularly to those who have regarded mental phenomena mainly

from a physiological point of view. The close connexion between the mind and body, and their mutual actions and reactions on each other, all point by the most indisputable proofs to a far more intimate and essential unity than the above theory supposes. Accordingly, an opposite tendency has for some time past set in strongly amongst the less metaphysical class of mental analysts, the tendency namely to regard all mental phenomena as strictly dependent upon physical conditions, and to set aside the question, as to the separate essence of the mind, as an inquiry wholly futile and transcendental.

The consequence of this state of things has been, that psychology has tended to become either trite and dull on the one side, or virtually materialistic on the other.

The dualistic hypothesis has become trite and dull, just because it explains nothing fully, adapts itself to none of the new phenomena which arise in the course of physiological studies, but having laid down a formal list of faculties leaves all the real difficulties of the question untouched and the real problems unsolved. The opposite and materialistic hypothesis, accordingly, has gained an amount of credit which is not really its due, just because in proportion to the impotence of the old doctrine, its peculiar claims have appeared so much the more scientific and imposing. It has thus managed to

come forward as the only theory which really grapples with the phenomena of the case, and the only one which can vindicate for itself any scientific value. I need only to mention the phrenologists, the school of James Mill, most of the writers on cerebral physiology, and the more recent efforts at elaborating a complete system of psychology such as those which are contained in the voluminous expositions of Alexander Bain, and the far more acute and comprehensive analyses of Herbert Spencer, to show how wide are the ramifications of this school. All these writers, though not professing materialism, yet regard mental phenomena as *so necessarily* and *essentially* springing out of physical conditions, that very little room is left to insinuate between them even the least savour of spiritualism, however indistinct and hypothetical.

I have already shown in a former work*, that we are by no means shut up to the alternative which these two systems present, that we may hold the separate existence of the mind and the body, and yet regard the former as perfectly pervading the latter, nay, as being the formative principle by which it is constructed, and adapted to our nature and use. In the same way it has been shown, in reference to the origin of our ideas, that we are not obliged to adopt either the theory of *innate* ideas, or the

* Elements of Psychology.

purely *experience* hypothesis, but that we may regard the mind as endowed with primordial instincts and tendencies, which *develope* into faculties by the regular process of growth in connexion with the outer world.

We regard it as a matter of no small importance that the whole method of psychological study should be raised above the level of the old alternative, to which I have just referred. So long as this continues to exist, we may safely predicate that no real progress will be made, but simply an antagonism developed, that spends itself wholly in mutual resistance. Here, then, I thought the present treatise might prove of some service. Fichte is a most uncompromising opponent of *mere materialism*. But instead of building his spiritualistic views in the air, or founding them upon abstractions, he insists upon the most rigidly scientific procedure; starts from the most complete induction of facts; and shows that these facts, if ALL taken into account and interpreted by the light of analogies drawn from nature at large, can lead to no other result than what he has here pointed out. If ever a sound and scientific effort was wanted on behalf of a rational spiritualism in our own country it is wanted now. A little more, and the opposite theory will have gained the intellectual outposts on every side, and would not then be long before it began to storm the citadel itself.

III. Another ground, upon which it appeared to me desirable to circulate the present little work in our own country, was, that it shows with such remarkable clearness the bearing which psychological inquiries have upon other important questions.

1. Let us take, first, the question of a conscious immortality. There are two extreme views respecting the nature of the Soul as an intelligent principle. The one extreme regards it as being simply a manifestation of the universal and absolute reason, localised and individualised by being brought into connexion with a bodily organism. According to this view it is really *the body* which forms the *individual*; while the Soul is purely impersonal and universal in its nature—a portion of the infinite thought of the universe. If this be the true statement of the case, the idea of a conscious individual immortality can hardly be entertained. That the thought itself, in which the essence of mind is here supposed to consist, is imperishable, is indeed obvious; but the body being dissolved everything which impresses on the mind an individual and personal stamp is gone, and it must return once more to the infinite, from which it proceeded, just as a wave appears for a time above the surface, and then is lost for ever in the boundlessness of the ocean of which it was but a part.

The other extreme regards the mind as consisting

of a series of phenomena necessarily connected with and springing out of a given nervous organisation. Here again, if the existence of the nervous apparatus be regarded as an *absolute condition* to all mental manifestation, then we have only to let this condition cease, and the very *possibility* of a continuous mental life is at once cut off. Once make a physical apparatus *essential* to the manifestation of mind, and the whole hope of immortality is compromised *irre- coverably*.

I know it will be said, that the fact of immortality is made known by direct revelation, and that the omnipotence of the Deity is not to be limited by any notions of impossibility which we may entertain. To which I reply, that nothing is more trying and unfortunate for our mental peace than cases in which the dictates of revelation are opposed to the most obvious indications of science. Our faith is not so strong that it can afford to disregard the intimations of science, even when they are adverse to it; or to neglect them when they are confirmatory. *Scientific* evidence will always prove stronger in the long run than *mere belief*; for, as we cannot admit truth to be at variance with itself, we must necessarily, in the end, relinquish our hold on that side of a contradiction, on which the grounds are most open to dispute. For myself, I must freely confess, that my own inward convictions of a conscious immortality

have involuntarily grown dim or vivid, almost exactly in proportion to the strength with which I have found the dependence or independence of mind upon physical conditions to be confirmed by scientific considerations. When the dependence indeed is made absolute, I cannot conceive that any mind much accustomed to logical consecutiveness can hold the doctrine of a life hereafter with any real tenacity.

2. The bearing of psychology upon the theistic argument, especially in relation to the Divine personality, need not be here insisted on, or explained. It has already been acknowledged pretty freely in our own country, and will be found illustrated still further in the following pages. Still more important, too, are the views which Fichte draws from his philosophy on the doctrine of Providence. The arguments indeed by which they are enforced, will be found amongst the most original and suggestive portions of the whole work.

3. There is one other point upon which Fichte has brought his psychological principles to bear with great effect, and that is, the explanation of what may be termed the *abnormal phenomena* of the human mind.

There is a great number of facts, widely observed, and many of them unquestionably established, which have never yet taken any place in a regular system of mental analysis, but have been regarded as bearing

a purely abnormal character. Amongst these we may reckon, not only some of the more remarkable forms of dreaming, but more especially somnambulism, hallucination, presentiments, mental sympathies and antipathies, hypnotism, clairvoyance, ghost-seeing, and all the varied phenomena of what is now called "*mediumship*."

With regard to these latter phenomena, they have now become so widely epidemic, both in England and America, as almost to demand some share of attention from the mental philosopher. For myself, the facts of the case have been for some years sufficiently interesting to become the object of somewhat close attention. I have had repeated opportunities of witnessing and examining the processes of spirit-writing, spirit-drawing, and all the other methods by which the denizens of another world are *supposed* to communicate their thoughts through the instrumentality of those now living on earth, and have thus gained ample means of comparing the *results*, with what I conceive to be both the ordinary and the hidden capacities of the human mind. The conclusion I have drawn from these facts and considerations is to my own mind perfectly unquestionable.

First of all, I must freely confess, that the arrogation of mediumship is not generally by any means a wilful deception. Many motives conspire to bring it about. There is the natural credulity of the

human mind, which yearns for some sort of intercourse with the world of spirits, and has been the mainspring of endless forms of superstition, ever varying with the race and the age in which they have appeared. There is, next, the prompting of personal vanity, which is flattered by the idea of being made a *special vessel* for spiritual communication, secretly plumes itself upon a kind of superiority supposed to be thus conferred, and in this way prevents the healthy suspicions of delusion which from time to time arise in the mind from having their natural weight, or bringing the intellect back to a sounder state. And more than all this, there are the *startling facts themselves*, of intelligent actions performed, and thoughts and sentiments dictated and expressed, with which the volitional powers have no conscious connexion. Such facts, to any one unacquainted with that new chapter of psychology which the investigation of the *preconscious regions* of mind unfolds, must seem strange and inexplicable indeed; and, combined with the other causes just mentioned, naturally enough bring about the entire delusion of which we are speaking. Moreover, I for one am not prepared to deny that all spiritual communication between this state of being and other more developed ones, is *impossible*. There may perhaps be facts well attested which are not accountable for on any other supposition; and it is but too

easy for those who are tending to superstitious views, to lay hold of a few really valid facts, and blindly carry out the analogy to cases in which other agencies, wholly different, are at work.

So much for some of the *causes* which have prompted to the belief in mediumship. With regard, next, to the facts themselves, the immense proportion of them come so manifestly under the category of preconscious and instinctive mental actions, that no one who has studied this sphere of mind with any degree of accuracy can for a moment fail to recognise them as such. The very beings who are supposed to communicate from the spiritual world are either historical characters, or persons who have had some kind of immediate connexion with the medium, both the one and the other clearly suggested by the mind's own thoughts or wishes. The *material suggested* uniformly coincides with the range of mental idea which the medium himself has cultivated, or been in some way connected with. I have never yet failed to see the stamp of his own individuality upon *everything* emanating from him as a supposed spiritual dictation. On the contrary, the stamp of the being's individuality, from which the communication is said to come, is either wholly wanting, or is only seen as a faint imitation. Who can believe, that poets who wrote with such freshness, and such harmony of measure on earth, would communicate positive doggerel from the

other world? Who can imagine that the lyric taste of a Schiller, for example, should sink down in a higher sphere to the most bald and commonplace versification? Or, to turn to another class of phenomena, who could suppose it possible that the great painters of Germany and Italy could guide the pencil of mortals now on earth, to make pictures which do not present a *single glimpse* of their own native genius, either in design or execution?

If a person has a real poetic vein, no doubt it will produce something truly poetical under such spontaneous impulses; if he be a veritable artist, he may draw something really fine and noble; if he be a philosopher, he may scatter unconsciously some gems of philosophic thought, and so forth; *but you will never get any thing from any one's inspirations which does not already exist potentially in his mental habits or culture.* I have traced the process of spirit-writing and drawing, from the very first nervous twitches in which it commences up to its more developed form, and venture to affirm that the whole thing is, to the psychologist, as palpably a development of the unconscious form of mental operation, as writing an ordinary letter is the result of our conscious mental activity.

Fichte is, as far as I know, the first scientific psychologist who has taken these abnormal facts into consideration, and given them a place in his

mental system. It was high time that they should be subjected to some regular and scientific criticism — that the conditions should be investigated under which they are each of them possible — and that some kind of rule should be set up, by which the different species of abnormal phenomena should be clearly distinguished from each other, and the causes secretly operating, in every case, should be sought out. In this little work, the foundations and commencements of such a criticism will be found; based, not upon mere abstract ideas, but upon positive facts, natural analogies, and acknowledged psychological doctrines. One end at least will be answered by this attempt, viz. that the whole mass of these abnormal phenomena can no longer be mixed together as though they all flowed from the same source, — that so long as natural causes suffice to explain them, those causes will be duly acknowledged, and that the hypothesis of spiritual suggestion will not be brought in, *until* the facts of the case render it absolutely imperative.

IV. I have now hinted at the principal grounds on which I formed the idea, that the present volume might prove interesting to English readers. There is one more motive, however, of a somewhat more personal nature, which I must not altogether pass over. It has long appeared to me, that the chief interest of philosophy is more and more concen-

trating itself in psychological investigations. In our own country almost all the original attempts which have been made to add anything of permanent value to our philosophical literature has been in this direction. The researches of the physiologist have greatly contributed to strengthen this tendency; and no one can read the contributions, which have been made by Drs. Carpenter, Laycock, Noble, Dunn, and Forbes Winslow, together with those of Sir H. Holland, and Sir B. Brodie, without feeling that there is a vein opened in this direction, which must be fruitful in bringing out many valuable results. These physiological researches have led to various attempts to systematise the whole region of psychology anew. The copious volumes of Mr. Bain and Mr. Herbert Spencer, before referred to, are examples of this tendency, and have doubtless (especially the latter) given us many fresh glimpses into the genesis and development of our ideas and faculties. While this has been going on in England, the schools of Herbart and Beneke have been recasting the whole process of psychological investigation in Germany, from quite another point of view. The attempt made by these two schools to trace the mode by which our ideas and feelings are elaborated, the development of the doctrine of mental substrata or residua, and the discovery of the principles by which they blend, combine, and carry on a whole

process of mutual action and reaction in the mind, form a new and most important chapter in the history of psychology. To this we may add, lastly, the investigation of the unconscious region of mental activity; an investigation which has enabled us to trace many of the more recondite laws of mind almost with the precision of physical science.

These things premised, I can now come to my fourth and personal reason for sending out this little work to the English public. It has for some time past been one of my most cherished intentions to gather up all these various threads of mental philosophy, to compare and concentrate their results, and at least to *commence* the work of building up the science of psychology upon a broader and deeper foundation than has been usually attempted in our own country. I should not venture to cherish a purpose which might to many savour so little of modesty, were I not convinced that the time is come when the data for such a task are already in existence, and that any one who has followed the course of these speculations attentively for the last fifteen or twenty years must necessarily come to the conclusion, that they are all tending to one broad and comprehensive system, the outlines of which are constantly becoming more distinct.

In publishing this little work of Fichte, then, I had a kind of secret hope, that some degree of popu-

lar interest might be awakened in the subject; that the importance of it might become somewhat more manifest, and that the thoughts of many might be directed to those questions which I hope in due time to discuss more fully, and to develop more thoroughly. To accomplish this end, I thought it quite worth while to intercept my regular course of psychological study for a few weeks, and send out these "Confessions" as a kind of pioneer in the pathway of popular interest.]

It may be of some use to those of my readers who are not accustomed to foreign phraseology in philosophical questions, if I note down very briefly some of the most important points which are brought forward in this little treatise. With such a guide at the outset there can hardly be any difficulty in following the thread of Fichte's ideas, and comprehending the conclusions at which he is aiming.

The following are amongst the main propositions which are brought forward and illustrated.

1. The human soul is a perfectly individual essence, distinct from the body; but so far analogous with it as to possess *extension*, and embody in its nature both time and space relations.

2. The soul existed *potentially* before it was brought under organic conditions; but only in virtue of those conditions can be raised into the region of consciousness. This proposition is supported by the

general theory of creation, of which it is, indeed, but a particular result.

3. Each soul has an original character of its own, distinct from the influence of the organism and the circumstances which surround it.

4. The soul is the plastic principle by which the bodily organisation is sketched out, and adapted to the wants of our intellectual and spiritual nature.

5. There is twofold life of the soul ; a preconscious and a conscious. The preconscious life is seen in the building up of the organism ; in all the instinctive actions ; and in all the involuntary workings of the intelligence. The conscious life of the soul is seen in all the ordinary and normal phenomena of our mental development, from sensation upwards to the highest conscious efforts of the understanding.

6. The preconscious life of the soul manifests the highest degree of energy, and exhibits phenomena from time to time which altogether transcend its ordinary and conscious powers. It can operate in this way *without organic conditions*.

7. Just as the conscious life of the soul links us by numberless relations to the sense-world ; so the preconscious life of the soul brings us into a series of relationships with the spiritual world.

8. The peculiar, original, distinctive personality of the soul, involves in it a complete proof of the Divine personality.

9. The facts of human nature and human history establish the truth and reality of a Special Providence.

10. The doctrine of Providence finds its consummation and only true explanation in the divine humanity of Christ.

11. According to all the analogies of nature, the Divine Providence must be applied and carried out by the instrumentality of intermediate orders of spiritual beings.

12. The soul is immortal; and death only its release from the present conditions of time and sense.

13. The crisis of our being cannot take place on earth; but man's moral probation must extend into the world to come.

14. The method of conducting these inquiries is purely inductive and analogical. The whole investigation is based on facts, and ends in the formation of hypotheses, by which those facts may receive a rational and self-consistent interpretation.

The key to what is most characteristic in the whole work is the doctrine of the *preconscious* states of the soul. The notion which has been usually entertained by psychologists is, that the acts of the mind are precisely co-extensive with the consciousness; and that whatever is done unconsciously, though apparently intelligent, yet springs from some objective source, and not from the mind itself. This doctrine,—that

the regions of intelligence and of consciousness are perfectly co-extensive, has of late years come into deserved discredit. Sir W. Hamilton many years ago pointed out the fact, that there is a process of latent thought always going forward more or less energetically in the soul. Dr. Carpenter designated the same phenomena under the term, *unconscious cerebration*. Dr. Laycock has brought them under the general category of reflex action, and shown that there is a vast variety of facts, both in the man and the animal, which spring *distinctly* from the reflex action of the brain. Almost all the modern German psychologists, particularly Carus, and the Herbartian school, have developed the same doctrine still more at large. We may regard the whole theory of the preconscious life of the soul, therefore, as having a large basis both of fact and authority to start from.

The phenomena of unconscious intelligence may be studied in the wonderful instincts of animals, where we see design, forethought, calculation, science, art, and adaptation of means to ends, all displayed in the most extraordinary manner, and yet, as far as we can judge, without any conscious self-realisation of the processes, as springing from their own intelligent activity. Some attribute these acts to the direct working of the Divine mind through the animal organism. But they do not see, that this theory, if consistently carried out, would reduce *all nervous*

action, both in the man and the animal, to a divine operation, and simply land us in a theory of complete pantheism. The only possible interpretation of the phenomena is, that a law of intelligence is really impressed upon the animal nature, but that it works blindly (*i. e.* preconsciously), and thus accomplishes its destined purposes even more *surely*, than if it were controlled by volition.

If we turn from the instincts of animals to the structure of the human frame, here we meet with new evidences of a preconscious intelligence being in operation. Some intelligent principle *must* exist there from the first moment the formation of the human frame commences, or it could not be adapted from that moment, according to a fixed type, to the nature and exigencies of its after life. We cannot say here either that it is a direct act of the Deity which builds up every cell, disposes every atom, and impels each *individual* physical process, any more than we can suppose it to be an act of the Deity which causes every impulse of the nervous system, produces every reflex action, and intervenes in every sensation. To separate one series of the processes which make up the whole sum of vitality from another, and attribute one part to a divine interference, and another part to the mind itself, is simply absurd. It throws our whole nature into the most inextricable confusion.

We are brought back, therefore, to the hypothesis,

that the spark of divine intelligence, which constitutes the soul of man, acts within us unconsciously from the first. The very fact that vital-force, nerve-force, and mind-force are all correlated, shows that they must really be one at their root. We may affirm accordingly, with Schelling, that all physical motion, activity, and life-effort is only an unconscious thinking; that unconscious activity to a vast amount underlies all our consciousness, and that it is by a natural course of development that the soul becomes raised from its primary condition of unconscious intelligence and blind activity into the higher state of self-consciousness and volition.

This same preconscious region, however, penetrates much further than the mere physical processes above alluded to, even into the very interior of our mental life. We find it not only framing the organs of the body, but also guiding us to their proper use. It reappears in all the various phenomena of reflex action, in the wonderful adaptability of the instincts, in the formation of habits, in those mental characteristics which stamp the individuality of the man, and which we well know are wholly spontaneous and unreflective; and last of all, in the highest efforts of genius, efforts which always spring up involuntarily from the depths of our individual nature. From all this we gather two things: First, that the real and special individuality of every single person reaches from the

very highest intellectual features of his nature, down through all the intermediate regions of intelligent and vital activity, to the first physical processes by which the body is formed and moulded. And, secondly, that our conscious intelligence springs out of a substratum of unconscious mind-force, which exists and acts quite apart from any effort of our own volition.

On this series of facts it is that Fichte bases his doctrine of man's double consciousness (*i. e.* the *primary* and the *sense* consciousness); and it is still further on the ground of the *mental unity* which lies at the basis of the whole, that he traces the workings of distinct faculties, such as the *fancy*, through all the steps of our conscious and unconscious life. Singular as it may seem at first, he thus connects the plastic power, seen in the physical processes, with the highest artistic genius; and places the unconscious reasoning of instinct under the same fundamental category as the highest efforts of scientific deduction. How the theory of unconscious mental activity is enabled to throw light upon the abnormal phenomena of the mind, is now tolerably obvious, and will become much more so if the following pages are attentively perused.

I must now, in conclusion, caution the reader against the supposition, that I am intending, in issuing this translation, to endorse all the views, sentiments, and theories which it implicitly or explicitly contains.


They are only put forward, even by the author himself, as hypothetical, and some of them I must confess (particularly the chapter on the space-relations of the soul) are decidedly open to grave objections. Moreover, it must not be supposed that the *arguments* and the *data* upon which the hypotheses themselves rest, are to be found in any complete form in the present little treatise. Those data are stated at length in the larger work on "Anthropology;" and the reader is supposed to peruse this statement simply as supplementary to *that*. This fact will account for the apparent haste with which he adopts many of the conclusions; and the rapidity with which he passes over points of great importance, that seem to need much more extended consideration. The work itself is, in fact, simply "A philosophical Confession," and as such I present it—clearly expressing my conviction, that it contains ample materials and incentives to thinking, though comparatively few ascertained and demonstrated results.

With regard to the translation, I must confess that I have taken considerable liberties with it. The origin of the book was really a controversial one. The objections made by Professor Lotze to many of the sentiments contained in the former work, called forth the smaller treatise by way of explanation and reply. There are many passages, accordingly, relating simply to controversial points which could excite no

interest in this country, and which I have, therefore, thought it better to leave out, including the author's preface. One whole chapter moreover, that on the space-relations of the soul, has been *changed*. I found it more conducive to clearness to insert an article more recently written by Fichte, in his "Philosophical Journal," in its place. In this article the subject, as it seemed to me, was stated more lucidly; while the frequent references to controversy, which run through the original chapter, are almost wholly omitted.

The translation, as a whole, is *free*. The peculiar style of writing philosophy in Germany is so far removed from our own accepted modes of expression, that I have often found it better to reflect the thoughts than translate the words. Had I more time at my command, I feel that I should have performed my office as translator much better. As it is, the labour has been both *short* and agreeable: and my sincere hope is that the perusal will prove, in both respects, equally so. If such perusal should stir up any amount of renewed thought upon these topics, my whole object will be fully answered.

Bowdon, Oct. 1859.




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MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

THE purpose of the following discussions, as also of the form in which they are written, can hardly be doubtful to our readers. It is not only allowable, but may sometimes prove altogether apposite (particularly in the case of questions which have a deep and universal interest), to exchange the strictly philosophic form for that of a free and personal expression of convictions. Such a form enables us to offer a succinct programme of our opinions, to give a general view of the decisive grounds and leading motives by which they are influenced or supported, and to show how they stand in relation to favourable or adverse criticism.

Such scientific outpourings of the heart often give more penetrating views, and bring the contending parties nearer to some preliminary agreement, than any long-winded discussions or systematic controversial writings could possibly do; not to mention that controversy is more adapted to draw forth the sting of renewed contradiction, than

awaken any impulse to mutual understanding. Moreover, controversialists should always consider, in the case of questions which by their very nature are not yet ripe for a final decision, that their real purpose and true advantage does not lie in checkmating their opponent, but in calmly considering the possible moves and counter-moves, so as to judge beforehand on which side the victory is likely to incline.

As the title of the work already indicates, these confessions are designed to reconsider the *essential conclusions* of my "Anthropology," and adduce new grounds in their favour. The essential conclusions I repeat,—and in so doing distinguish these from the collateral discussions, as also from the form and method of the whole work.

These conclusions I look upon as the main point. The subordinate hypotheses I am very willing to resign, if I only succeed, in saving the fundamental principles, and, in spite of the undeniable and confessed opposition in which they stand to the more common opinions on the subject, in finding them acceptance within the domains of science.

These few words will suffice to designate the scope and arrangement of the present work. To bring out the fundamental idea of the nature of the soul from all the surroundings in which a complicated and critical enquiry necessarily envelopes it, and state it anew upon its prominent and most decisive grounds; this will be my first and foremost endeavour. Having done this, it will become possible to cast a glance over the whole system of truth to which this idea belongs, and through which alone it can assume a deep meaning and a lasting value. Let us

attempt, then, to express in a few simple words what was before laid down in the more complicated form of a scientific treatise.

The human mind does not only possess *à priori* elements (primitive notions, primitive feelings, primitive efforts,) in its consciousness; but it *is* in its own peculiar nature and composition, an *à priori* existence, *i. e.* one whose character is impressed upon it *anterior to experience*.

This is not intended to affirm that mind exists originally in the form of a mere impersonal Pneuma, — or of abstract universal reason, as Hegel imagined it; for independently of the special psychological difficulties of this view, observation does not give us the very smallest intimation of any such uniform mental constitution in the fully developed man, but rather of the exact contrary—the most marked individuality. So far from that, we must regard the human mind as being, even in its primitive, pre-existent root, an individualised nature, a germ of personality, since the result of its actual life shows it really to be so; for it were a contradiction to suppose that individuality is added *on* to it from without, or that it is the mere fortuitous product of its connexion with external circumstances. This idea we have had to make good throughout all our discussions on particular questions. And if, at length, we found it necessary to attribute to the mind a kind of pre-existence, anterior to its own *conscious* life, the question naturally arose respecting the nature of such pre-existence, and the general analogy by which it could be confirmed.

And here the universal analogies of nature did not fail us. As certain as it remains impossible to deduce the

higher steps of existence in nature (those included in animal and vegetable life), from the mere development of inorganic materials and processes; and yet as certain as the more perfect species of plants and the higher animals are the latest, and man the latest of all (while yet it is equally impossible that we should attempt to explain the higher animal, or man, by means of a gradual process of development from the lower); as certain, in a word, as every species of plant and animal must be regarded as having its own commencement and its own ground of explanation, we are constrained to form, in relation to the whole range of natural science, a universal idea of *pre-existence*, of which the pre-existence of the human mind is only a particular expression and an individual result. Every distinct or individualised existence in nature (such as the species of plants and animals in the region of organic existence, and the individual mind of man in the region of spiritual being), must have eternally pre-existed, if it is possible that it should realise its individuality in time; for none of these individualities can be regarded as being indifferently of one stamp or another, just as we please, or as only having a temporary and fortuitous origin; but each in its kind is an integral part of a united whole, and must have been eternally planned in relation to the *particular*, as well as the *universal*, harmony of the universe.

Accordingly, we find that we are constrained to admit the incontestable notion of *pre-existence* into the region of psychology, and to co-ordinate it with those analogies of nature to which the geological history of the earth conduces us. Here also already exist, potentially, the future

species of vegetable and animal life, and that too in their entire individuality; for this it is which gives them their unalienable place in the eternal plan of the world. They acquire, however, *temporal* existence only when and so long as the *material* of life, and the outward conditions of its realisation, meet together (in the process of the world's epochs) with the original type. Just so it is with the human monad; it requires the organic process of incorporation, in order for it to become endowed with consciousness. As soon, however, as the material of life is afforded it, the whole process of realisation in time begins, first in the form of *Incorporation*, and then of *Consciousness*. In all this, be it observed, it is simply the original individuality of the mind which is developed, and comes to itself; inasmuch as that only can be unfolded in time, which is prefigured in the eternal unity and plan of all things.

This is the result to which a connected view of nature must unavoidably lead, while at the same time the necessary conditions of actual experience are not overstepped. Theological disquisitions are here altogether out of place. Some might affirm, and indeed have affirmed, that the later creations, called by the will of God out of "nothing," have been *added* to the former state of things. One might, by the same analogy, maintain (and it has been maintained) that each human soul is a new creation made for the body, which on its side is produced by the ordinary process of reproduction. To contend about such arbitrary suppositions is a bootless task, inasmuch as they lead us into the region of indefinite questions, where we are guided by no kind of actual experience. They belong to the province of

uncertain supposition and interminable speculation, which we do well to separate as widely as possible from the circle of attainable knowledge. If, however, such an hypothesis is upheld, with the especial view of subserving the interests of Theism, it has been more than once shown that such a purpose is wholly erroneous; nay, that this entire view must appear feeble and even repulsive in comparison with the great idea (confirmed as it is by the light of experience) of a creation that is complete, subject to no necessity of correction or addition, and which we now see actually spread out before us in all its minutest details.

We may still further urge, that my fundamental view, together with its necessary consequences, is no arbitrary supposition, on the ground of its approving itself to be the systematic result of the whole past history of Psychology. It is, in fact, only the last word, and the necessary consequence of a long but safe development, which the deep study of the spiritual nature of man has passed through. Not to mention Leibnitz, and the great mass of earlier thinkers, who obtained an insight into the pregnant Idea, that the human consciousness is the depositary of Eternal truths; how can we otherwise understand the last result of Kant's Idealism, and his unassailable proof of the fact, that in the human consciousness there is an *à priori* element, which precedes experience, and by means of which alone experience becomes possible — how otherwise, I say, can we explain the final result of this great discovery, than by showing that the mind must be the subject of some form of existence, previous to its experience-existence, and to its own consciousness of it?

Thus we see that Kant pointed, though in a general and indistinct way, to a region of transcendental pre-existence, involved in the very life of experience, and which is clearly evinced by his remarkable idea of a *homo noumenon*. It was the deep insight of Fichte, however, and his special merit as a great thinker, to unfold more clearly this transcendental province, and to point to it as the proper goal of all philosophical investigation. On this he planted his absolute Ego, out of which he undertook to deduce all the pre-conscious conditions of the finite Ego, *i. e.* of our actual life-consciousness;—a bold attempt to master the new discovered province at a bound, but one which undoubtedly left vast chasms to be supplied.

The great characteristic of his point of view is, that the individual or personal element within us does not reach into that transcendental region. The individual Ego, (*i. e.* the personal consciousness), is the product of a *limitation*, or separation of the absolute Ego, and thus falls into the region of the finite and the phenomenal. The pregnant error of all the following systems here shows its first trace; the error is, that of confounding (in the manner of Spinoza), the two ideas of the *finite* and the *individual*. How Fichte's doctrine in the course of its development broke through these limitations, and in the moral Ego attained to the consciousness of the true principle of personality, has been already shown in my history of Ethical Philosophy.

Hegel never advanced, in relation to this cardinal point, to any further result, but only developed more fully Fichte's fundamental view. In his philosophy the idea of a *finite essence* wholly fails, nay, is wholly denied. So much the

greater stress, however, was laid by him upon the idea of the transcendence and pre-existence of the soul, though without making use of this precise expression. His whole doctrine of the *absolute soul*, in fact, could only spring from this foundation.

Hegel's special merit arises from his having introduced the idea of the pre-existent soul, the absolute reason (as Kant had anew discovered it, and as Fichte had pointed it out in connexion with the growth of the consciousness), into *Psychology*, thus making the first attempt at a complete reconstruction of this science. To him modern psychology owes the clear enunciation of the principle, that the soul becomes, through its development, *for itself*, what it already *is*, in a pre-existent sense, *of itself*. He showed how the soul in connexion with external nature, and by its own peculiar conditions, first *comes to itself*, and unfolds its inner being into self-consciousness. In this doctrine we find, on the one hand, the supernatural constitution of the soul, and on the other hand, its *apriority* so expressly pointed out, that hardly anything more is required as a witness to the truth I have been attempting to expound.

All that is true and excellent here, however, is utterly destroyed by the tacit and wholly ungrounded assumption, that the individual element is the finite, the unreal, the perishable; that the real spirit, which comes to itself in the human consciousness, is to be regarded as an impersonal Pneuma — universal reason, nay, as the Spirit of God himself; and that the goal of man's whole development, therefore, can be no other than to substitute the universal reason

for the individual consciousness. Into what absurdities and contradictions Hegel has fallen by means of this fundamental principle, and how impossible it is to explain the nature of the human consciousness at all on pantheistic grounds, or, what is the same thing, to base a systematic Psychology upon it—all this has been already shown in my "Anthropology."

If Hegel found in the formula $Ego=Ego$, the presence of universal thought in the soul, and the consequent denial of its individuality; still it is not difficult to show the inaccuracy of the conclusion he has drawn, viz. that *because* the notion of self is common to us all, and the same *for all*, this empty and formal symbol should designate, or in the least, *exhaust* the whole concrete essence of our spiritual nature. It is not our present object, however, to lay stress upon the errors which Hegel owes to his fundamental principle; we have only to do with the great thought which he so clearly represented—that of the *apriority* and *eternity* of the substance of the soul, independently of any consideration whether this substance should be considered in the light of pantheism, or of individuality. Suffice it, that Hegel's pantheism has *indirectly* brought this advantage with it,—that it has exhibited the weak point of his philosophy, and enabled us to bridge over the gulph, from Hegelianism to Individualism, as a necessary result.

And here lies the great critical importance which we attach to Herbart's investigation of Fichte's fundamental Idea. Herbart has shown that the idea of the Ego is not a universal notion at all, and cannot designate anything

universal. It is formed simply upon the basis of the individual subject, and remains ever simply an expression of it. As many *Egos* as there are, just so many signs and designations are there of an *individual* soul. Herbart has, in fact, secured for ever, in behoof of Psychology, the principle of individuality. With regard to the more important idea of the *apriority* of the essence of the soul, there is no passage in the whole of the Herbartian psychology which could contradict or exclude it. On the contrary, this thought tacitly lies in the background of his whole doctrine, and only needs further development in order to bring it to a distinct and conscious expression. According to Herbart, the soul is a simple, indivisible, *real* existence; for its natural operation it requires no material from without; on the contrary, all its ideas are the manifold expression of the inward and peculiar quality of the soul itself. In perception, accordingly, we do not reflect the outward quality of the affecting object, but the peculiar mental state which is superinduced by the affection. This decidedly anti-sensational and truly idealistic result attributes assuredly to the soul the possession of a nature which, though placed in the midst of the world of sense, yet does not belong to it. If we add to this what Herbart, in speaking of the future condition of the soul, after the putting off of the body, affirms respecting the meaning of the term body, in relation to the soul and its experiences, we can hardly escape the conviction, that he would not have been opposed to an extension of his doctrine in the sense that we are now aiming at. Since, then, my philosophy has inherited the results of those who have preceded

me with the full consciousness of their worth and their signification, how could it fail to acknowledge the necessary conclusion to which they give rise? And if it has on that account gained the reproach of an overstrained idealism, and an almost ascetic depreciation of the body and the senses, those who are inclined to such speculations will now have the opportunity to consider where the force of their opposition really lies;—whether in the nature of the subject itself, which, they imagine, excludes such a view, on the ground of experience, or whether in the indolence of adopted prejudices, which refuses to pursue the theory into its ultimate results. For this at least must be conceded to me—that what I have maintained is not affirmed simply on the basis of a mere *à priori* theory, but on the ground of *real facts*, and for the sake of their due explication. The only alternative left, therefore, is either to give up the results of all past psychological study, and consider them as altogether worthless; or to enter into a searching criticism of the principles to which our philosophy has consecutively brought us. These principles, we repeat, are not arbitrary, but have been obtained by a consecutive development of the fruits of the past.*

* See Appendix, No. I.

CHAP. II.

ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

My treatise on "Anthropology" was intended to serve as the first and preliminary part of a complete work on Psychology, which should exhibit the *conscious* mind in all its phases. In what sense this relation between the two treatises is intended, and to what results the first one has given rise,—these are points which do not seem to be clearly perceived by some of my contemporaries. I must explain myself, therefore, somewhat further on each of these two particulars.

In order to explain the conscious phenomena of the soul (which is the proper aim of psychology), I hold that we must start from its unconscious state, or, what is the same thing, must go back from the soul as a developed subject, to its undeveloped and primary essence. This investigation includes two things: first, consciousness *actu*; and secondly, consciousness *potentialiter*; consciousness, that is, *actually* and *potentially* considered.

The real or actual consciousness is based upon a potential one, *i. e.* upon a middle condition of the soul, in which it already possesses the specific character of objective intelligence, but without being conscious of it.

It is from the conditions of this preconscious existence

that our *actual* consciousness must be explained, and out of which it must be progressively developed. This then is the first point in our investigation, — *the genesis of consciousness out of the conditions of a prior or preconscious existence of the soul.*

A *preconscious* existence, let it be observed, is not strictly a *consciousless* one; for the soul is never merely objective and physical in its constitution. This is one of the most fruitful and important results which our philosophy has established, in its critical as well as in its theoretical aspect. The faculty of consciousness is a thoroughly original and peculiar one, not to be explained either from any mere outward conditions, nor from the supposition of a double series of mental representations, the one reflecting the other: for this would only explain the reflection itself, not the peculiar condition of self-consciousness. The soul is, therefore, in regard to this original, inexplicable, and otherwise unattainable property of consciousness, a being *sui generis*; it forms, in the whole series of things, a step of existence for itself. This circumstance must appear so much the more significant, inasmuch as this original property of consciousness is not found in the *primary* existence of the soul. In its earlier stages, the soul is involved in a state of dreamy unconsciousness, out of which it can only raise itself by degrees. It is a further problem, therefore, with which Anthropology has to deal, to investigate the character of this *unconscious* mental condition, and discover the ground of it.

Once arrived at the point of consciousness, the soul, we see, becomes separated into a vast diversity of conscious

states; while, in the midst of all, it still retains its perfect unity, and is fully cognisant of it.

Accordingly, the *second* point in our investigation goes hand in hand with the first. When we seek to explain the actual human consciousness out of its preconscious conditions, these latter reveal at the same time the indivisible substantial essence of the soul; and it must become, therefore, an especial subject of inquiry—*how, out of that simple substance, not only an infinite variety of individual perceptions can be educed, but how those enduring distinctions can originate which are known under the terms intelligence, feeling, and will.*

The procedure we followed in investigating both questions could only take one course; that, namely, of starting from the facts which lie before us in *actual* consciousness, and from them of drawing our conclusions respecting those hidden conditions of the soul which are necessary to bring about such a result. We admit that this procedure is unavoidably of a *circular* nature. From the actual facts of mind in its conscious state, we draw conclusions respecting its preconscious capacities, and its whole substantial nature. In doing this we undoubtedly presuppose certain psychological truths, while we ought in strictness to furnish the necessary preliminary considerations for their investigation. This circular procedure is however no other than that which meets us in all inductive processes based upon experience, and is on this ground fully justified in the present case. Every theory has to substantiate itself in the same way—by an induction and analysis of facts; and only when it is substantiated, can it give up this heuristic

method, and proceed in the way of deduction to all the minor details.

In the present case anthropology is so much the more adapted to institute such preliminary enquiries, inasmuch as it can look *back* upon a considerable historical development, in relation to psychology generally, and reckon the conclusions, thus arrived at, among its own acknowledged results. These conclusions, we believe, may be summed up in the following three propositions.

1. *The human soul is an individual substance.*
2. *The capacity of representation which we must attribute to it, is a property originally belonging to it, and in no way accidental.*
3. *The soul is not however a mere instrument of representation,—an empty mirror, which has to be wholly furnished from without; but it possesses originally certain fundamental powers, whose operation is seen in that very process of consciousness by which they are first made known.*

By the first proposition we deny that pantheistic hypothesis, by which the human subject is represented as having no real substance of its own, as being a mere fleeting show,—a temporary manifestation of the infinite spirit, of whose substance it is but a part. The idea of the *individual* soul is maintained, and the monad-theory, in this particular case, is made good. That this idea of mind, however, is by no means the last and the highest; but that there is a still higher unity, which penetrates and flows through all individual minds,—this is a truth which our philosophy by no means overlooks. So far from that, it deduces from this very confession of individuality the most direct proof of the

existence of a higher mind. The grounds of this conclusion, of course, can only be given in a complete psychology.

The second proposition justifies Herbart's main conception, which, regarding the soul itself as a being at once simple and originally unconscious, separates the ideas from it, and treats them as independent elements, existing *within* the mind.

This explanation, we must admit, is indefinite and unsatisfactory; but the correction has already been made within the circle of the Herbartian school. Drobisch, the only writer who has developed Herbart's psychology on independent grounds, has succeeded in filling the gap. To him the soul is a being endowed with an original and inseparable power of representation and thought, but whose activity may, in certain cases of limitation, become a mere *instinct* for thought, in place of *thought* itself. Through this apparently insignificant alteration, the Herbartian psychology has gained the power of being essentially extended, nay, of assuming quite a new character. It has not only taken up into its principles that most fruitful idea of Leibnitz, I mean, the idea of *unconscious thought*; but has also approached the one grand and imperishable truth of idealism, namely, that no *opposition*, but only a distinction *in degree*, can obtain, between the subjective and the objective, the conscious and the unconscious world.

The whole of the preconscious state of the soul is essentially and specially a process of *thinking*, without, however, its thought as yet touching the threshold of consciousness. In this simple idea there lies nothing less than a new future for psychology, as also for the question respecting the rela-

tion of soul and body. My philosophy has chiefly aimed at giving a concrete and experimental development to this same idea. When, therefore, in the plastic and physical processes, it recognises an *intelligence* which develops organic forms in space, and which stands in manifest analogy with the art-instincts of animals, and the creative æsthetic faculty in man, we cannot but think that we are only giving back again, truly and pointedly, the actual characteristics which experience presents to us.

Let us look a little further into this point. It would be undoubtedly a most incomplete view, and one contradicted by experience itself, to regard the mental changes, which answer to the outward sensational impulses brought to bear upon us, as the mere result of an external, mechanical, and necessary influence exerted upon the soul; instead of regarding them as an expression of the original powers, and self-determining nature of mind, as it exists in connexion with the world. And this does not hold good merely within the province of self-conscious thought, or free activity; but the whole analogy can be followed step by step down to the unconscious region of our mental operations. The mind does not, even in this case, answer to the external impulses (as is the case in nature) with a simple and necessary change; it *reacts* independently and specially, and that too with design and purpose; or, as we should ordinarily express it, with a marked choice of means to subserve a given end. As, however, in the pre-conscious region of our mental operations, we do not usually speak of consciousness and choice, we can only point for an illustration of this mental state to the instincts

of animals ; and present those unconscious, but yet intelligent operations, as general illustrations of the instinctive activity of the soul.

That the whole of the morphological and organic processes, up to involuntary movements and habits, bear the common character of *instinctive action*, is capable of the most unquestionable demonstration from a series of experimental proofs. By such demonstrations we gain *the right* accordingly of localising those instinctive actions in the soul itself.

This thought, indeed, in its general aspect, is neither new, nor can it be regarded, in the face of the facts which so clearly testify to it, as being hypothetical or doubtful. The universal instinctive adaptation of organic processes is a fact so decisive, and so patent, that it affords us one of the surest starting-points for investigation. On the other hand, it is a point far less known and less decided — what instinct itself really signifies, and on what conditions it rests.

Instinct clearly supposes two things. It is, first, an *original* impulse of the soul, and, secondly, it is directed to something definite *out of itself*; which something, however, the instinctive soul (in order that it may be able to grasp it, and having grasped it to enjoy satisfaction), must comprehend *beforehand*, in a kind of dim anticipating perception. Accordingly, instinct may be defined as an *impulse guided by an à priori and unconscious thought*.

Since, further, experience shows, that the acts of the morphological and physical impulses are not conceivable without the constant operation of this same instinctive power,

we have considered ourselves warranted in expressing the whole truth of the case as follows:—*No organic activity is possible without the co-operation of thought, which thought unquestionably can only exist in the soul: inasmuch, however, as it precedes sensation (the principle by which consciousness is awakened), it must necessarily remain unconscious.* Thus the hypothesis of Leibnitz respecting dim perceptions, which he exemplified by the instinctive actions of animals, attains a further extension, and a confirmatory proof from experience.

In these original, but extremely varied, impulses, directed by a dim anticipatory process of thought, lies the special starting-point of the conscious soul; the indivisible unity of will, intelligence, and feeling, which soon after begin to appear in the consciousness, and to attain their special characteristics.

The way is now paved for comprehending the meaning of our third proposition: The mind is, in its fundamental constitution, an *à priori* being, furnished with a system of impulses and instincts, out of which it works itself gradually into self-consciousness, in order to create what we may term the *empirical* form of human life. According to this, mind must be regarded, in the most special sense, as existing prior to experience,—existing, that is, in all its individuality, *previous* to its own conscious states, and as being the producing cause of them. This proposition with its distinctive consequences, we take as finally established for our future guidance; and, so far as we can cast a glance upon the results of psychology, we may say, that these results fully confirm and substantiate it. There are two

questions, however, of no less importance, which still remain behind. These are, first, how we are to measure the extent of the pre-existent powers of the mind; and, secondly, whether the mind, as far as the constitution of those powers is concerned, shows itself as an individuality, or as an impersonal Pneuma. In a word, whether decisive grounds follow from these principles for substantiating the truth of either individualism, on the one hand, or of pantheism, on the other.

It will be desirable to moot both questions a little more clearly, and express somewhat more definitely, in both cases, the results to which our philosophy has led us. For want of this, attention has been directed too much to the collateral questions, and exception been taken to our adducing facts out of the so-called *night-side* of nature. It has not been sufficiently considered, that these collateral facts really aid us to sound the depths of that nature, out of which such remarkable phenomena can spring forth.

If, moreover, it has been the aim of our philosophy to get such an idea of the soul for a starting-point, as shall furnish an explanation of the entire breadth and depth of its conscious life, it was absolutely necessary not to draw the line of observation too narrowly, but to take in the whole extent of its being. The true essence of the soul is not to be measured by those common-place lists of the "facts of consciousness," which our ordinary psychology has given us; nor can we take the individual merely in his every-day state as the exemplar of the whole nature of man. We must take the mind of humanity at large in the fulness of its ideal life (theoretical, artistic,

ethical, and religious), and in the might of its preternatural activity, as the real starting-point.

In addition to this, we must weigh carefully even those facts which are rare and exceptional; on the principle that all which can manifest itself in any object of nature, even under the most rare and favourable circumstances, should be equally reckoned as belonging to its essence, as those phenomena which are more common and constant.

This is the more important for our whole theory, when we consider that the creative acts of the soul are exactly those which spring from a source lying within the region of preconsciousness. The inspiration of the artist, the spontaneous flashes of theoretical evidence, which suddenly seize the conclusion of a long series of meditations, and that frequently in a direction totally different from the pathway of reflective thought, and still further, the inward revelations of the moral and religious life,—these, we say, are by no means the designed and direct results of thinking, but have their origin in a region far removed from consciousness in its free and reflective state; a region which lies, in fact, quite *beyond* it, and is distinguished by the clear and undeniable feeling of a power which is wholly inaccessible to any control of the will. Inspiration is a far more universal idea than its theological acceptance has yet admitted; while the ordinary Psychology has wholly ignored it.

But this spontaneous inspiration, which seizes us so irresistibly, is precisely and specifically the origin of what is most *peculiarly human* in our consciousness. On this point

we must refer to the truth which our philosophy has already made good—namely, that the human mind would always remain entirely empty of ideal truth, and that it could not produce a *history*, if it did not possess any inspiration whatever, but depended wholly upon sensational and merely abstract ideas. The one fact of history brings with it the experimental proof, that the human mind is from its very root *preternatural*, and capable of supersensuous inspiration. What is greatest in it, is prepared beforehand in the region beyond consciousness, and is by no means the product of it. On the other hand, it is *this* which prescribes to the conscious processes their matter, their direction, and their termination.

We come now to the second, and equally decisive question—*Whether this region of preconscious activity lies beyond the essential elements of human nature, or whether it be not here, rather, that the root and origin of all that is individual and personal within us is to be sought?* Wherever speculation has penetrated to the scientific recognition of an *à priori* element in man, we find an answer to the first of these two questions, but not to the last. We need here only remind our readers of Fichte's absolute Ego, and later, of his absolute knowledge, as a manifestation of God; of Hegel's doctrine of the absolute *mind*; of Kant's silence on the whole subject, while he still acknowledged the *à priori* element in the human consciousness, without trusting himself to decide on the nature of mind as an independent existence. If our philosophy comes to a very opposite result, this can only rest upon the ground of a

somewhat complicated investigation, whose separate parts must be here, in due order, restated.

Every one must acknowledge that the most important questions here come together as into a focus. Here lie the fundamental grounds for maintaining the immortality of the soul; and here the explanation of the relations subsisting between the mind and body. Lastly; if we have to submit the doctrines of Pantheism to a thorough criticism, based not upon abstractions, but upon the teaching of facts, we can only do so by an appeal to the question, whether it is possible in any, even the smallest degree, to recognise in those preconscious and spontaneous movements of humanity, the presence and operation of an absolute mind; or whether this supposition, logically carried through, would not much rather lead to the most rash and untenable results. By no argument is Pantheism more manifestly struck to the quick, and disarmed, than by showing its insufficiency in relation to those facts on which it has hitherto mainly rested its claims. It is this very *à priori* province which Hegel attributed to the absolute mind, and in relation to which he was logically obliged to maintain, that through it the highest productions of human thought, law, art, religion, science, nay, the divine thought itself, clear of all human individuality, comes to a direct manifestation. The divine incarnation is to him a universal and continuous fact, for it is this alone which brings the spiritual principle into humanity, which principle remains with him entirely distinct from, and beyond the reach of mere individuality.

How in this view the deep truth to which idealism testifies has become grown over with error, need not be at present dwelt upon; the bitter fruits are sufficiently apparent on all hands. All we have now to discuss is, whether the psychological data of this view answer or not to the facts of the case, *i.e.* whether the spiritual principle in man really proves itself to be universal and impersonal?

The fundamental position from which our whole investigation on this point starts is this; that as the consciousness nowhere appears *in fact* as any other than individual and personal, so the essential basis out of which it springs must be individual and personal also. The substance of the soul, we argue, is an individual, and under no consideration a *universal*, essence; for as such it approves itself in its *conscious* existence, which is the direct witness and exponent of its hidden nature. The self-consciousness of this individuality is so sure a fact, and so fully identical with the certainty of the mind's own existence, that to accept the possibility of self-deception must be one of the most groundless hypotheses which has ever been propounded.

Whatever material, therefore, of an objective, universally valid, and unchangeable character might come into this region of the consciousness, still it would be at once taken up by the force of its individuality, and could only appear through that peculiar hue. In every thing which we can call inspiration, in every thing that presents itself in an *abstract* form, we see the action and the re-action of two mental factors; the one a higher and creative power, the other a lower and receptive. The lower element, however, in

these moments feels itself elevated, and the power of its individuality exalted, nay, carried away into the boundless, and by no means depressed or merged into the dull feeling of universality. This, and no other, is the result of purely psychological observation, when it subjects these states of consciousness to a close analysis; and psychology itself must reconcile itself with this experience, together with all its necessary consequences. It is this which has brought our philosophy to the conclusion, that Pantheism is wholly incapable of laying the foundations of a true objective Psychology.

That same mental nature, which during its conscious life shows itself as altogether individual in its character, underlies all conscious states, and is the precondition of their manifestation. The question, therefore, now comes, whether the soul in these preconditions of its conscious life shows itself *still* purely individual; or whether, in place of the operation of an individual nature, we can find simply that of general and uniform laws.

This question, it is evident, is identical with another, which we have likewise proposed, namely, whether the human body resembles a mere instrument externally fitted to the spirit, and similarly constructed in the case of every individual; or whether, at least in its general features and weaker manifestations, the peculiarity of each individual is not from the first, and originally, impressed upon it. If the former is the case, then the dualistic theory of the relative independence and separate adaptation of body and soul cannot, at least on this ground, be refuted. If the latter view, however, be confirmed, then the dualistic hypothesis

is virtually broken down, and a decisive proof of no unimportant character established against it.

In other respects, however, besides these, the vast importance of this question is not to be denied; as, for example, its consequences in relation to morals and pædagogy. If we are constrained to affirm the second hypothesis, a complete proof is afforded, that the principle of individuality reaches back beyond all consciousness and all experience. If it should turn out, on the contrary, that the nature of the soul, in its earliest and preconscious operation (which of course includes the physical formative principle), betrays no trace whatever of individuality, then the conclusion inevitably follows, that our individuality is purely of empirical origin, and that it has its ground in the accidental circumstances which operate upon the consciousness. We all come, in that case, into the world precisely alike, so that whether we admit each man to come into the possession of a certain *à priori* being, which is in every case exactly identical, or whether he be regarded as a mere *tabula rasa*, a mere receptacle of impressions; still that which makes us *unlike* each other, is simply the difference of the experiences which fall upon and affect the consciousness itself.

We must admit freely, that however strongly the higher philosophical culture of the present age, and its more sound psychological science has set its face *against* this view, still a general refutation of it has not yet appeared.

We must not, accordingly, leave out of view what part anthropology can take in the answer to these questions, although they may, perhaps, only find a final answer in a

complete psychology. For the principal object of psychology is to show what *within the consciousness* is the independent work of the soul itself, and what is brought into it by experience. The more in the course of these enquiries the province of the latter (experience) is contracted, the more does the *power* and the *reach* of the soul itself in its *à priori* activity become elevated; and the more are we compelled to acknowledge, that the multiplicity of our mental operations is not the result of fortuitous circumstances or outward impulses, but has its root in the pre-conscious peculiarity of the subject. Psychology bears on every side its practical testimony to the *à priori* nature of the human personality (of genius), inasmuch as it points out the traces of it which fall within the consciousness.

According to the law of progression and gradual development (which cannot be overlooked *anywhere* in nature, and consequently not in the development of the human mind from its unconscious to its conscious condition), the operations of the soul's distinct *personality* should be clearly traceable down to its preconscious existence, and the limit within which they are ever observable should be clearly assigned. And this is the preliminary task which anthropology may properly be called on to perform. The whole circle of these anthropological facts must necessarily lead us into the sphere of *physiological phenomena*; and the final distinction between the dualistic and antidualistic hypotheses may then be concentrated in this alternative: either the organic processes in relation to the production of form and in the mode of operation must originally be exactly alike for all, and our *individual* features be gradually de-

veloped in the after course of human life by the force of circumstances and by conscious mental operations; or, the soul itself must, from the very first, stamp the ground type of its own individuality upon the physical organisation.

And here we must not fail to observe, that the former view, however keenly maintained theoretically, cannot possibly justify itself on the ground of observation and experience. No one will deny that even the earliest childhood exhibits certain determinate features, as though in the bud, which features come out more clearly in constant progression, and in the end fully represent the mental individuality, the main character of the man—which character accordingly must have been already tacitly and pre-consciously present even in the very first bodily traces.

On the other hand, the advocates of our theory will hardly be so one-sided as to affirm, that the mind builds up its own body fully and completely, as though out of nothing. We affirm only that it acts as the *formative* principle in the organic material, and must in other respects accommodate itself to conditions which exist independently of it. We cannot speak therefore, in truth, of any direct opposition between the two theories, but only relatively of their greater or less justification. Accordingly *both* advocates would do well, guided by the hand of experience, candidly to approach each other, instead of setting up for themselves *exclusive* claims. The question we have now raised, namely—How deep into the first processes of organisation, and how far into its details, does the individual principle extend? is of common interest to both. Only by such an

investigation could those definite points be ever fixed, which might lead all enquirers to a reconciliation.

We must, however, admit, that in the present state of our psychological knowledge it is impossible, in the way of *direct* observation, to come even to an approximate certainty upon this question. According to the dualistic as well as the antidualistic theory, the nervous system must be considered as a special organ of the soul; and the point as to whether this organ consist essentially in a relatively small portion, *i. e.* in certain parts of the brain, or in the undivided unity of the whole nervous system, is of no particular consequence. The uniformity or individuality of the bodily organism which we are now discussing, could only be sought within the nervous system, and that in its finest differences and most interior operations.

However minutely microscopic anatomy has begun to investigate the brain and nervous system, still it is not yet in a condition to satisfy this question; just as little as in physiology, anything definite has been able to be decided in reference to those inward operations which take place in the nerves during their activity. We only know, in relation to general anatomical principles, that whilst that portion of the nervous system which subserves the operations of the senses and the will (nerves of sensation and motion) betray, at least to a superficial view, a constant and uniform type, at all times and in all individuals, it appears to be very different with the nerves of the sympathetic system, as also with those parts of the brain in which it is admitted that the intelligent processes are carried forward — we mean, the cerebral hemispheres.

Any observations made, too, upon the difference of the sympathetic nerves, even if they were perfectly clear, would fail to offer any safe guidance at present, inasmuch as we are not yet fully acquainted with their purpose and functions. The difference, however, in the convolutions of the cerebrum, both in number and size, is most decided among different races and different individuals, and not only this, but it is also different at different periods of life in the same individual. Equally decisive is the well-ascertained fact, that the amount of intelligence developed stands in direct relationship to the number and magnitude of those convolutions.

But these facts do not give any *decisive* proof for the hypothesis which attributes the formative principle to the soul: this argument still remains against it, that it is the gradual influence of the *conscious* life which here shows itself, and which never ceases (voluntarily or otherwise) to exert its influence upon the bodily conditions. The final question, therefore, still remains, viz. in what light we must regard the *involuntary* influence? and this is exactly the point where the two theories have to join issue.

Here, then, is the point at which I may hope to come to some kind of understanding with Lotze's latest explanations. In these explanations he has far more decidedly than in his former writings acknowledged, that amongst the various things which, according to the laws of universal mechanism, contribute to the building up of the body, the soul must be included; nay, that it must be perhaps reckoned as a qualifying element; and that, as being the most important of all, it must govern the rest. Of this expression, however, we will not make too much. It contains only an

extension of his own theory of *adaptation*, not any real approach to our own. In the organic changes which Lotze has here in view, the soul is never the direct source of action (although he speaks now as before of "the plastic influences of the soul upon the body"), but only the *occasional* cause.

Lotze distinguishes, again, more decidedly than before, those changes in the organism, which form one of the inherent laws of its growth and self-sustaining power, and those which lie within the soul, that is, in the circle of its spontaneous and unconscious operations. In relation to the latter, he admits that the soul does really co-operate as a qualifying element in the structure of the body. Nevertheless, as to the real cause of these changes in the body, he affirms that it is not the soul, but that universal physico-psychical mechanism, which bids certain changes of body to follow upon certain determinate mental alterations.

On this physico-psychical mechanism, for my part, I cannot lay any particular value. It forms but a very imperfect ground of explanation, so long as we deny that the soul itself is able to impress its own inner changes by a plastic power upon the organism; so long, in fact, as the indefinite and useless abstraction of a physico-psychical mechanism is inserted between both.

For what, in truth, can the idea of *physical mechanism* signify, when we look at it apart from its psychological side, or from the admitted fact, that the soul is an important factor in the whole question? It can mean no other than the whole complex of those mechanical, physical, and chemical laws, which co-operate in all organic processes; so that, to use Lotze's own words, "the organic, being united

the old and apparently discarded doctrine of vitalism, through the force of facts, again into vogue, only in the form of a vitalism in the *cells*. According to Virchow, the cells are vital unities; and still significantly he adds: "We must now give up the prudery of seeing in the processes of life nothing *mechanical* result of the molecular powers inhering in constituent parts of the body."

Now draw a parallel between Lotze's views and in the following terms: Lotze has acknowledged the fact, that the soul possesses an extraordinary power; but he has not yet fitted on his general theory this confession: for in the face of such an admission the theory of a mere general mechanism is not true, although it *may* have its due place in the whole. The plastic power of the soul operates with an equalising force upon the body; and the more powerful, *i.e.* the more decidedly it comes forth as *mind*, the more peculiar and characteristic is the organism in its form and expression.

The individualising formative element in the body manifests itself more than these general physical and chemical laws could ever accomplish; more even than the organic type, through which the human organism distinguished from that of the ape or the quadruped; more, than we can possibly explain by the participation of the *race*. The soul adds even to the peculiarity inherited from parents something *particular* which belongs only to the individual. However true therefore, it may be to decide how far this indi-

us that the old and apparently discarded doctrine of vitalism has come, through the force of facts, again into vogue, although only in the form of a vitalism in the *cells*. According to Virchow, the cells are vital unities; and still more significantly he adds: "We must now give up the scientific prudery of seeing in the processes of life nothing but the *mechanical* result of the molecular powers inhering in the constituent parts of the body."

I may now draw a parallel between Lotze's views and my own in the following terms: Lotze has acknowledged the decisive fact, that the soul possesses an extraordinary plastic power; but he has not yet fitted on his general theory to this confession: for in the face of such an admission, the theory of a mere general mechanism is not sufficient, although it *may* have its due place in the whole question. The plastic power of the soul operates with an individualising force upon the body; and the more powerful the soul, *i.e.* the more decidedly it comes forth as *mind*, the more peculiar and characteristic is the organism in physiognomy and expression.

This individualising formative element in the body contains manifestly more than these general physical and chemical laws could ever accomplish; more even than the general organic type, through which the human organism is distinguished from that of the ape or the quadruped; nay, more, than we can possibly explain by the particular type of the *race*. The soul adds even to the family-peculiarity inherited from parents something *particular*, which belongs only to the individual. However difficult, therefore, it may be to decide how far this indi-

vidualising tendency reaches down towards the primary morphological commencements of the organism, nevertheless it is always unquestionably *present*, manifesting itself sometimes more dimly, and sometimes more perceptibly. It must, therefore, be taken into account as well in the question of the universal relation of soul and body, as also specially, in relation to the character and degree of the formative power which the soul possesses.

On these experimental grounds I have been constrained to yield my assent to the old and now almost discarded doctrine, that the soul is at once *the real ground of our individuality, and the great formative principle*. This, then, is the first answer with which I attempt to fill up the chasm above pointed out.

But *how*, and according to what intelligible analogy, does the soul operate in these spontaneous activities? This is the second question, the answer to which will contain what I have to add to the doctrine just expounded.

The objection which has been made to this whole view, viz. that the soul does not know how to bring the formative principle into operation, neither is conscious of its own part in it, and that on this account such operations cannot spring from the conscious and thinking principle; this objection, I say, is entirely obviated by the inductive proof we actually possess,—that the soul must be regarded (on the ground of experience) as, in every case, an intelligent, but, in a great number of instances, an *unconscious* being.

The second objection urged against the view is certainly more *apposite*, namely, that in all those physical operations

which we now attribute to the individual soul, the organism must be *already* present, and the vital functions in full play, in order that it may have the power to exert any of these modifying influences; and that the changes, moreover, which the soul thus produces, when placed by the side of that fixed unalterable type which the body has impressed upon it, must be regarded as very minor and inconsiderable circumstances. The organism, it is further urged, in its fundamental constituents, must be *given*, i. e. the soul must find it ready made in order to impress on it its own individuality, to govern it, or in any measure, however small, to modify or change it. Here then a stand might be made against us, and it might be urged, that even, granted that we can recognise in those accessory after-influences upon the body, an immediate action of the soul upon the organism, still this does not at all justify the further doctrine, that the soul is (generally speaking) the formative principle in the organism. The fundamental constitution of the frame, it might be said, does not come from the soul nor depend upon it; but by the order of nature it is given to it as an inseparable companion, with a limited power in the one to exert a deteriorating influence over the other.

And here I must, in reply, make a few further explanations. There is one circumstance which does not appear to have been duly weighed. It is a common and essential *precondition*, which lies at the foundation of all the morphological and organic processes, as well as all the influence which the soul exerts upon the physical growth of the body, that there should exist a general type (*Raum-*

schema), according to which, all the parts and proportions are reckoned and predetermined, even to their minutest details, and to which the numberless organic cells, which make up the real constituents of the body, conform, so as completely to fill up the original scheme. Without such a self-realising and self-modifying prototype, the process of formation would not be conceivable. This has not, indeed, been altogether overlooked in early or in modern times, but has not, as far as I know, been brought to a clear expression, still less been carried out to all its further conditions and consequences.

To what *subject* then are we to attribute this geometric activity, which *conditionally* precedes all bodily organisation, and accompanies it in the process of all its changes? That it must have *some* subject; that neither a pure and subjectless type floating in the air, nor a universal law can here suffice, is plain from the nature of the case, which is wholly inexplicable without the supposition of a real substantive existence. Every one must admit, that if we grant at all the reality of such a type, according to which the body is organised, it can only be attributed to the central point, *i.e.* to a *soul*, which must be present, to form and to harmonise with an interpenetrating presence, from the very first commencement of the bodily existence, to the laying aside of the same in the hour of death. When we before compared the soul (not incorrectly, perhaps) to an individual providence, this individual regulative and preservative power could only be made conceivable on the ground of some such typical force. Such a force, however, for an individual being, cannot be attributed to any abstraction

termed the soul of the world, &c. ; it can only belong to a real essential and individual mental existence.

This *geometrising* activity leads us of necessity back to the general analogy of the thinking processes. It falls within the province of that dim preconscious power of thought, which we have been necessitated to acknowledge on many experimental grounds. Thought, however, can never exist without a soul, and so the truth of our former assertion,—that the morphological and vital operations are to be considered as essentially operations of the soul,—is at least so far justified, inasmuch as we are necessitated to admit a space- or body-producing process, as one constituent of them. It is, in fact, but one particular instance of the general fact of unconscious thought.

We found it necessary still further to discuss the more definite character of this space-constituting faculty, and, if possible, to find a general analogy, on which the idea could lean, and so lose that startling impression which we acknowledge, when viewed singly, it is likely to produce. On this point our philosophy has shown—that the space constituting faculty is only a part, a particular modification of *the fancy*, which, manifesting itself on the one hand dimly, on the other hand in more conscious forms, satisfying itself with subjective images, or objectifying itself in the organism, makes itself known as ever present by the most varied operations on all the stages of existence. In our Anthropology we have proved, in reference to this point, two things. First, we have shown the manifold and positive effect of mere ideas of the fancy upon the organism, so that there is no room, on the ground of positive facts, to doubt its

vast formative power in connexion with it, and we have thus gained an experimental and most richly illustrated analogy for the phenomenon. Secondly, we have shown that it is no irrational and inferior power, like the imagination, with its meaningless "associations of ideas," which here makes itself visible: it is in a peculiar sense, *the fancy*—intelligence in its instinctive operation, which shows itself already in these preliminary forms; but which also constitutes the bond between the conscious and the unconscious region of the soul, inasmuch as it can be traced downwards in regular succession from the highest power of artistic creation, through the intermediate steps of dream-life in its many forms of presentiment and of instinctive action, to the space-constituting intelligence of the soul, as seen in the organic processes.

This is the ground why I regard the sphere of the fancy as not exclusively confined to the region of æsthetic creation, but as including also constructive power, inspired with the idea of beauty, as well as those pictorial powers which manifest themselves in dreams, and in the peculiarities of the *plastic intelligence*. But now I am free to confess that there is a third point to which an insufficient degree of attention has as yet been given. The soul, and her power of fancy, in the whole of the processes just alluded to, can only be regarded as a *plastic* principle, giving form, and no more. This marks the outermost limit of its activity. It has neither power to produce the real substantial elements, nor to draw them near by any force of dynamic attraction, nor to effect any change in their *quality*. In a word, the creation of matter, and the change of matter—the *chemistry*

of all the processes (though a necessary condition to all organic life) is wholly foreign to mental influences. This rests upon general and independent laws, under the conditions of which, indeed, the morphological activity is brought to a conclusion, but which it is not able in any degree to modify or change. The soul is *the form*, and at the same time the formative principle of its body—its real prototype; but it can only realise itself by co-operation with a world possessing distinct elements of its own, and following distinct laws. Here, accordingly, we can freely acknowledge, with Lotze, a “physico-psychical mechanism,” that is, the subjection of the soul, in all its organic and conscious operations, to a mechanism not explicable out of itself. The non-ego, to use an old phrase, is met by the ego, the soul, as a second, real, and independent power. This power, indeed, the soul can subdue, and use for its own purposes, but only under certain definite limitations. This point, in the whole system of arrangements, must not be overlooked, for the traces of it are only *too visible*. The organism not only furnishes the soul with the necessary conditions of consciousness; it binds and limits also the power of consciousness itself; for in the freer states of the soul we can clearly trace the effect of the temporary suspension of these limitations.

In making this admission, I am not approaching in the slightest degree to the dualistic theory, or to that of occasional causes. The body and soul do not exist side by side with each other, according to the well-known doctrine of pre-established harmony, like two clocks, accomplishing independently of each other a parallel course; neither

does their unity consist in an artificial agreement, produced in them from without. It is the complete interpenetration of both, even down to the space-relations, which is the real ground of their harmony; and this harmony takes its start, according to our whole theory, and in perfect consonance with the facts of the case, from the soul itself. The final decision of the question, therefore, throws us back upon the original relation of the substance of the soul to space; and to this point we shall hereafter devote an entire chapter of the present treatise.*

* See Appendix, No. II.

CHAP. III.

PRIMITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AND SENSE-CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE previous chapter was intended to confirm the doctrine which our philosophy has attempted to expound as the basis of a true psychology. The human soul (so we have already expressed it) has not only elements prior to experience in its consciousness, but it is itself an *à priori* being furnished with definite impulses and instincts, and goes through a series of very effective, though unconscious processes of thought before it comes at all to the power of conscious thinking. What we have to understand under the equivocal word *instinct*, cannot now be doubtful. Those original impulses of the soul which are directed to a corresponding object, are all of an instinctive nature, because they carry in them an original prototype of the object itself. The consciousness can only *know* that with which it has certain conditions of existence in common; it can only *desire* and *love* that which it already possesses in a dim presentiment; it can only feel as agreeable or predicate as beautiful that which, by virtue of a primitive act of judgment, it must designate as in harmony with its own organic or spiritual nature. How far into details this parallelism between the mind and the world reaches, it is the province of *psychology* to show.

After we have established this general view, and shown that what we term consciousness does really contain in it certain *à priori* constituents (although regarded in the main they form but a comparatively small part of the processes which constitute our whole mental history), a second question presents itself, namely, whether during the ordinary sensational and intellectual processes it is not possible to detect, both underlying and constantly accompanying them, a peculiar and original element, which from time to time breaks through the world of sense, and presents itself suddenly to our view.

Only after we have exhausted this question can we affirm that we have measured the entire extent of the *à priori* constituents of the human soul. Perhaps, also, we may hope to penetrate in this way some little distance into the obscurity of certain relations and agencies, to which the human mind in its hidden nature may be open; and which may act upon the conscious region, without our feeling it, just because they lie beyond the horizon of the sense-world.

We have attempted (in the work on "Anthropology") to show the existence of such a region in the soul, and to establish the important fact, that the ordinary psychology only takes into account the one-half of the soul's existence, and *that too* the very half which cannot be wholly explained *out of itself*.

Accordingly it does not seem at all strange to me, that this portion of my investigation, being, as yet, a matter so little considered, should have met with the most decided opposition from those who represent the ruling opinions of

the day. I have been upbraided, even from very high quarters, for having occupied myself with phenomena, which do most assuredly form one part, though, perhaps, a subordinate one, in the preconscious region of the soul. Whatever these phenomena may be, still, *as undoubted facts*, they must be comprehended and not despised, explained and not decried. The evidences which they undoubtedly are able to produce, drawn too from all quarters, have prompted me, not only to grant the rights of existence to these suspicious phenomena, but to make some attempt at a due explanation of them. The criticism I have incurred did not come to me at all unexpectedly; and it could not fail to produce almost a comic effect, to hear objections again urged, which once had their effect upon my own mind, but which I have found, on closer investigation, to be altogether powerless.

What is it then which has induced me, in opposition to the authority of most scientific psychologists, to lay so great stress upon what may be termed the *magical* phenomena of the soul? Certainly it is not my agreement with the common notions respecting somnambulism, clairvoyance, &c.; on the contrary, I have urged the strongest grounds against them. The real reason is to be found in the following circumstances, grounded as they are upon unquestionable *fact*.

It is not to be denied that all the apparently abnormal phenomena with which men are seized, in somnambulism, in vision, in second sight, and in ecstasy, spring out of the same spontaneous and preconscious region, from which all involuntary impulses and inspirations take their origin.

Nevertheless they cannot, as a rule, and in their preponderating character, be reckoned as belonging to the province of genius and ideal inspiration. For this they are, for the most part, by far too insignificant. On the other hand, they cannot be explained, like the ordinary dream and everything connected with it, by any means easily and satisfactorily, according to the known laws of association, and from the bare reminiscence of outward experience. For if in second sight, events which really do afterwards occur, and that of a purely fortuitous character, are pictured to the mind in a kind of dream-like reality, so that the future appears to be present; if the clairvoyant, breaking through the limits of space affixed by the senses, really sees what is passing far away, so that what is distant comes as a dream into his immediate proximity; if, in a word, a manifest objective actuality thus presents itself in those spontaneously originating visions; how in all the world can one be satisfied with the common, flat, and unsatisfactory explanation—that nothing need be recognised in all this, but the natural working of the consciousness, nothing but the products of the ordinary laws of association, which *by chance* coincide with the truth. A more rational course, it is true, is sometimes followed. There are some who explain the presentiment of future events, so far as they come true, by the logical process of a calculation of probabilities, the premises of which are *tacitly* present in the depths of the consciousness;—a correct hypothesis, no doubt, in some cases, since we are often accustomed to judge of the future in this spontaneous way. Against those presentiments, also, which *do* come true, we have generally

set off numbers which do *not*; and no one, it is urged, thinks anything of them. Why, therefore, should we suppose that those which happen to come true, really contain originally any more objective validity than the others? We acknowledge fully the correctness of this explanation; we only maintain that it does not suffice to explain *all* the cases which occur.

A future event, of a completely fortuitous nature (fortuitous, meaning *that*, the causes of which we are wholly ignorant of), but which really occurs with all, even the very smallest collateral circumstances, just as the second sight has pictured it beforehand, cannot certainly be the object of an unconscious calculation of probabilities, nor indeed of any logical process whatever. For what is deduced logically, necessarily bears the stamp of generality; it can therefore never raise itself above the character of indefinite conjecture or presentiment, and can never give rise to "vision," properly so called. The clearer, therefore, and more intensely the spontaneous power of thought operates, the further will its product be removed from all concrete perception. It may see beforehand what is correct, but only in the way of a sagacious conclusion, not in the least degree in the way of a real picture. The two elements, namely, the abstract logical, and the concrete perceptive, are separated for ever from each other by a positive psychical law.

How, moreover, can one explain that other form of vision, in which some distant event, which is really taking place, or which has already taken place, is presented with all the force and truth of reality, on the principle of a logical con-

clusion? Here the premises, on the combination of which the judgment respecting a *future* event might possibly rest, are not at all at hand. It belongs to the actual and accomplished deed of the past, and must be known in the form of a *fact*, or not at all.

If now we consider the facts pointed out and all that stands in analogy with them, in their whole circumference (and there are numberless examples to be found in works devoted to this topic), it must be patent to all that the explanations hitherto given are quite unsatisfactory; as, for example, the general idea that they all spring from the store-house of our ordinary consciousness, and obtain importance only through fortuitous coincidence, as also the last and certainly most rational theory, that they are the result of spontaneous logical thinking. It is evident that the *principle of explanation* must be widened, and the matter judged of from a totally different point of view. But what point of view? This must not be decided too hastily, and hitherto we have only ventured to show the negative side of the question.

The form of consciousness which is common to all *vision*, whether objectively significant or insignificant, is that of *dreaming*. Every specific vision elevates itself to a dream-waking, *i.e.* to a mental representation which stands in a middle position between the sensations and ideas of the waking consciousness, and is analogous to the vividness and reality of the dream itself. On this account we must give, to dreaming, psychologically, a more universal significance than has yet been done. We must designate under the title of dreaming, all those states of consciousness in which

images come before the mind, without any immediate co-operation of the senses, and yet in the form of sense-perception, and that, too, whether our accompanying judgment attribute objective reality to them or not.

What then in the act of dreaming is of *real* or *objective*, and what of *subjective* origin? The old question respecting the significancy of dreams, it is clear, now comes back again, and can be solved only according to the general analogies of what it is that forms ordinarily the source of objective validity in our entire consciousness.

First of all, we must dispossess ourselves of the prejudice, that dreams *can have* no objective value, because they speak to us in *pictures*. We must convince ourselves that even sensational perception, to which we are accustomed *alone* to attribute an objective force, speaks only in pictures; that its language really designates the object which lies at the basis of the sense-impulses, in a way quite peculiar to itself. The red colour, which we see, for example, does not stand as to quality in any sort of analogy with the peculiar oscillations of the ether, to which it answers in the picture-language of the senses.

Why then, we might ask, should it not be the same with the value of dream pictures? We can very well suppose that there exists in them the pictorial representation of a very real *kernel* of truth; we can even imagine some special material of truth to be embodied in them, if facts can bear it out, without in the smallest degree giving up the character of the dream, or falsely exaggerating its ordinary signification. It all depends upon the unprejudiced investigation which we bring to the subject.

What now are the objective sources of this dream-consciousness, and of the manifold phenomena which it presents? Let us anticipate a little our psychological explanations, and give the main *result* in a few words.

First of all, we must remember that, as a consequence of our fundamental view of mind, that side of it which manifests itself in the universal form of dreaming must have just as much importance attached to it, and just as much psychological worth, as we ordinarily attribute only to the proper sense-consciousness. If we have proved that the mind has an *à priori* life in the midst of its empirical sensuous and conscious life, the traces of it must be discovered in those spontaneous dream inspirations. Dreaming turns the inner side of the mind, which is ordinarily concealed, to the light of consciousness; and thus it is the only form in which the *other half* of its being, the background of its waking life, can be imaged forth even in transient flashes. According to this view, there can no longer be any question of a false over-estimate of the one or the other form of consciousness. Both belong inseparably to each other; and it is from both halves, not from one only, that of our waking life (as the reigning psychology has hitherto supposed), that the whole nature of the mind is to be measured.

But there is yet another and opposite point of view, from which it is evident that our theory gives no occasion to over-estimate the phenomena of dreams. It is not *the matter* which is the most significant thing in these mental states, but the form, and the very existence itself of such a mode of consciousness.

That these things have a far deeper and a more universally human signification than is generally admitted, can be seen from the following simple observation:—That strong difference in the degree of mental culture which in the waking state separates individuals in the most decided manner, almost wholly disappears in dreaming. The most gifted, as also the most limited minds, the most cultivated as also the undeveloped (although every word and every judgment betrays the difference in a waking state), exhibit hardly any higher character in their dreams, the one than the other. So far from that, there is often developed, in the most trivial and contracted minds, a most original and intelligent dream-life, inasmuch as the unstirred treasures of the individuality now first come into play. We learn generally from this, that the mental distinctions which manifest themselves so strongly in ordinary life amongst men, are *essentially* very small and insignificant; and the old doctrine is confirmed, that man in his inward nature is far richer and deeper-grounded than ever appears in his ordinary state of consciousness.

Reverting to the question of the different degrees of the dream-consciousness, we must distinguish, as we before said, two fundamental forms of it—that which is brought about by our ordinary sleep, and a second form, which penetrates into our waking consciousness, and which we term *sleep-waking*. From well known and easily understood grounds, it appears that it is only in sleep, and while the sense-perceptions are for a time laid to rest, that the complete and regular development of the dream is possible. The same gradation and analogy exists, however, in sleep-

waking, so that for every progressive step in the dream-consciousness a twofold form can be observed, one that of sleep, and the other that of sleep-waking. The first, however, can always serve as a principle of explanation for the second, because the normal and properly developed form of dreaming is only possible in sleep. If I may be allowed here to put together, in a small compass, what can only be fully stated in a complete psychology, the following are to be regarded as the chief gradations in the dream-consciousness, viewed as a whole.

I. The first and most familiar, but at the same time the lowest form of it, is the ordinary dream,—the result of ideas which are experienced during the waking state, or the effect of sensations which come into the consciousness during sleep, both of which rouse the dream fancy to a sensuous representation. We may remark further, that even the ordinary dream is never the bare repetition of what we have experienced—no mere reminiscence of it; it moulds spontaneously that which is in itself *unpictorial*, namely, the inward states and feelings, into distinct “*visions*.”

Here, accordingly, dreaming appears simply as an accompaniment to our waking life; it is the spontaneous representation of it in a pictorial form; and we can discover nothing in it which flows from the preconscious region. But even in this form it presents us with a most significant fact—the fact, namely, that our dreams lie altogether apart from volition and reflection.

The parallel form of *dream-waking* to this step of the proper dream-consciousness, is to be found in what are termed deceptions of sense, or hallucinations. These are

in so far wanting in speciality, inasmuch as their fleeting visions do not give rise to actual *deceptions* of the senses (as in second sight, &c.). For, in all such hallucinations, we can detect their origin in a particular state of the nerves: that is to say, it is a peculiar nerve impulse, which determines the effect without any outward cause. This is a result the more possible, inasmuch as on the present accepted theory of perception, the percept itself is only produced by the reaction of the nerves upon the outward exciting object. It thus becomes quite easy to understand how an effect flowing from the soul can call forth a condition quite analogous to a real sensation. This kind of hallucination is, indeed, wholly spontaneous; it rests on inward conditions, deeply hidden within the soul itself; and, consequently, in the normal state of the consciousness can only be observed in the most transient manner. On this lowest step, dream-waking is simply the meaningless after-tone of actually experienced ideas, such as we often realise, particularly before going to sleep; its phenomena can thus be fully compared with the ordinary and non-significant dreams of our ordinary sleep.

To this category also belong *memory-pictures*, which are the gradual dying away of strong impressions. If to these pictures, moreover, the symbolising effort of fancy be added, then the germs of a vision, properly so called, become visible.

II. The second stage comprehends those dreams in which some subjective side of our inner consciousness reflects itself in a symbolical form. We may term these, truth-speaking dreams of subjective significance only, inasmuch as a

real germ of truth, dressed in the trickery of fancy, shines through them. Organic conditions, deeply rooted feelings and affections of the conscious mind, produce in us certain predominant dream-images, which hold up before us the mirror of our whole mental state. These occur for the most part in sleep; but in the case of very deep and powerful mental excitement, similar states of mind, according to the analogy already given, step forth out of the sphere of mere imageless feeling, and become strictly waking-dreams, in which the limit of what are termed *fixed ideas* is nearly approached. The passage between derangement of mind, and spontaneous imagination, is so slight, that no *exact limits* to them can be fixed. Each is a dream-waking, retained in a particular stage of its intensity.

But there are also inward powers of mind, which, though they do not realise themselves in a waking state, arise into activity during dreams, and thus help the consciousness out of the one-sided direction to which it is ordinarily bound down, and bring compensation and self-satisfaction to the spirit. In this sense sleep is not only physiologically a refreshment to the body, it is also a restorative power to the mind itself, which thus recalls itself from the divided activities, and involuntary one-sidedness of its waking state, and gives full play to its repressed instincts. On this account it is that we often observe dreams, which contrast most strikingly with the waking state, and produce in imagination what is so much wished for but denied in reality. This contrast sometimes rises to that specific double consciousness in waking and in sleep, of which Steffens and Schubert have both spoken. If such a dream-life gradually

insinuates itself under the ordinary waking consciousness, and if the material of such dreams can more and more displace the consciousness of real life; then an habitual dream-waking is engendered, which we must designate as a derangement of mind. But here the original disposition or tendency, which lies at the basis of the whole, may have been a correct and noble one. In religious madness, it is generally the deep feeling of the hollow and unsatisfactory nature of our whole sense-life and its interests, the overpowering impulse to escape this void, without at the same time being able to find the true source of the eternal in the temporal, which, if unwatched and left to itself, leads to derangement of mind. The feeling itself is justifiable, but its result is unhealthy. So certain is it, that in the spontaneous impulses of the mind, the most powerful contradictions stand side by side.

III. In all the cases now designated, the ground of explanation lies altogether in the circle of our natural experience. But the case is different with the dream-picturing of the third degree. Here certain objective relations of our inner life come into play, which in the waking state remain altogether unperceived, and which must, therefore, be termed transcendental. We may properly designate these dreams, therefore, as truth-revealing, in an *objective* sense. But here begins the doubt respecting their objective force; they have generally been classed simply with the phenomena before mentioned, because the key to their explanation was wanting. This key, we believe, is found in the established doctrine of a preconscious region in the

soul, which thus penetrates sporadically into its conscious life.

To designate this whole series of phenomena, we have proposed a term which may at any rate characterise the peculiarity of the whole class *negatively*, and at the same time, *by the very name*, remind us of the strange and exceptional character of the phenomenon. We term all such facts *magical*, and include under this term *all perception, or action, which does not take place through the ordinary medium of the senses; but in which another kind of perception and activity* (which has still to be investigated, and the mode of which is unknown), *must be admitted*. In these phenomena also the fanciful and symbolical by-play is to be clearly distinguished from the inner objective kernel, which alone can lay claim to significancy, and in some cases, indeed, to a deep truth. The common and "scientific" view of these matters does not keep these two elements apart; and thus imagines, when it has pointed out what is fantastic and visionary in the case, that it is right in throwing away the kernel also. Nothing is more superficial than this procedure; we must refer our readers however for the present to our treatise on Dreaming, where it is shown at large, from the example of medical dreams, how definitely in such cases it is possible to separate the objective contents from the subjective admixture.

It is essential that we should next investigate the *extent* and the *limits* of this stage of dream-waking. First of all we may characterise this class of dream phenomena as that wherein the hidden Rappports, in which other bodies stand to our own organism come to consciousness, and give us a

temporary impression of the object itself; whilst, in other respects, in spite of their real presence, they remain either wholly unperceived, or abide simply in the state of indistinct feeling. Of such *Rapports*, sympathetic and antipathetic, numerous cases may be mentioned, the most of which are at the time marked by unconsciousness, but on that account are by no means without effect upon our conscious life. Medical dreams (in which a very explicable instinct, and one which has long been acknowledged by thoughtful physicians, appears elevated to the form of vision) belong clearly to this province. Generally these preconscious relations are found in the lower organic region of the soul; they exist between the two sexes in their full power; between near blood-relations; between parents and children; and those otherwise connected by descent. Here, however, they very seldom raise themselves to the form of a dream-picture, although the possibility cannot be contested, that a close organic *rapport*, such as that between mother and child, *may* bring about a common feeling, and a common operation when at a distance—of which we have many examples, and that on the highest authority. But here the capacity of the mind is not extended, but only its consciousness *intensified*. Whether this may suffice to explain all cases of presentiment, we shall consider more fully hereafter.

The next class of phenomena we may mention as coming under this head, comprises those dream-pictures in which there is a material introduced into the consciousness taken from the province of *ideas*. We can call them ideal reve-

lations, but revelations, be it observed, which do not seize the soul in the form of clear vision, nor of evidence penetrated with distinctive thought, but which seize it rather with the intensive spontaneous force of the mind, and fully overpower its conscious freedom. In this region of spontaneity the fancy has full play — (for fancy itself is but intelligence in its preconscious spontaneous impulses); so that we must here always distinguish the pictorial dress from the objective material which employs it. In religious vision, *e.g.* the matter and meaning can possess truth, and that of deep character, while yet the pictorial mode of representation contains nothing objectively real; such representation usually guiding itself by the ordinary religious ideas, or by the personal culture of the visionary. Examples of this are by no means uncommon. The same thing might be seen without doubt in artistic visions, based upon æsthetic feelings, if more frequent examples only had presented themselves. If we take the legend that the Olympian Jove appeared to Phidias in a dream as sufficiently attested, the image of the highest dignity in human form could only appear to him in the type of his own race, simply because he was a Greek; while, on the other hand, the Egyptian or Abyssinian would have formed it in accordance with the type of his own nationality.

IV. Here, then, we come at last to the point where we have to determine whether *all kinds* of dream-waking can be explained from the premises already laid down or not. We have already alluded to the peculiarity of second sight, also to what has been credibly reported of a pre-

sentiment of distant or future events. That it is not a mental or an *ideal* element, nor any relation of a *general* character, whether of organic or mental origin, which could bring about these phenomena is evident, because the material of them is altogether real, special, and fortuitous. The analogy of a spontaneous calculation of probability, too, equally breaks down in cases of this nature.

What, then, is the common characteristic of these phenomena in distinction from those with which we have already been occupied? In their case, the supposition of an intensified consciousness, into which powers and relations prepared in our preconscious nature find their way, is quite *adequate*. But *here* our actual knowledge or information is extended; and that not with materials of deep and intellectual significance, but of an empirical and often worthless character. In second sight, a completely fortuitous event is often seen beforehand, exactly as it afterwards happens, and that with all the most characteristic features and in pictorial minuteness. This occurs as a frequently marked symptom of disease, a kind of monomania, and is inherited by certain individuals and families, especially in certain localities; so that the whole phenomenon assumes a purely objective character, and even the most obstinate sceptics in relation to the genuineness of clairvoyance, have not ventured to deny it as actual fact. It is true, they have not troubled themselves about the question as to what the inward conditions are, under which so remarkable a phenomenon could take place; and on that account they are far from seeing what an immense

admission they have virtually made, and to what further consequences it must necessarily drive them forward.*

And first let us observe that the whole series of other phenomena connected with dream-waking must at least *be possible*, if the reality of this one be admitted. For of a surety nothing more remarkable or more striking can exist than a prevision of such a character, that certain individuals suddenly and without their own co-operation, nay, against their own will, should be made into mirrors of future events, a kind of omniscience granted them, and their consciousness brought down to a state of the most decided *necessity*. If one admits the human mind to be capable of *such* a gift of sight, then every thing is admitted in full which is needful to explain all the other mental conditions.

If, then, we admit *the fact* above stated, we ought to consider, at least approximately, what are the conditions by which alone it can be brought about. A future and distant event, one thoroughly fortuitous, incapable of being guessed on the principle of probabilities, and flowing, indeed, from unforeseen circumstances, is pictured to the mind in second sight. It follows from this; first, that the province of our ordinary knowledge is really transcended; secondly, that the material of it goes beyond the conditions of sense-perception, the thing foreseen being not yet there; and thirdly, that it lies *apart* from any causal connexion discoverable by thought, the matter being altogether fortuitous.

* The principal facts of the case have been put together in an extended work by G. K. Horst, entitled "Second Sight; or, Remarkable Psychical and Physiological Phenomena." Frankfort, 1830.

Moreover, this kind of prevision does not always remain on the stage of mere presentiment. It raises itself sometimes to the form of a real distinctive vision, with all the conditions of the most peculiar, but at the same time *real* dream-waking, and with an almost entire absence of reconstructive fancy.

This circumstance is of extraordinary significance. The precise truth and perceptive reality of vision, even down to its smallest details, is on the one side the characteristic, on the other side the enigmatical element in it, which peculiarly needs explanation. Clearly the previous grounds of explanation are here insufficient; a new series of operations and relations appear to begin. In dream-waking of the kinds before mentioned, it was still possible to explain all that was characteristic in them from internal conditions springing out of the preconscious, but special nature of the soul. This possibility now ceases; a prevision so peculiar, and entering so much into detail, cannot possibly spring from the preconscious region. It necessitates us to draw the astounding but unavoidable conclusion, that a real and perceptive knowledge lies at the basis, which consequently can have its seat only in the consciousness of a personal mind, and from this mind be carried over into the consciousness of the seer.

Herewith we have a series of further consequences opened up, which carries us into a wholly unsuspected region, and one which has hardly been touched upon hitherto, still less considered from a scientific point of view. All that we have described is only possible under the supposition, of the *immediate* influence of one mind upon another; and

this would further necessitate us to admit a hidden fellowship of souls, underlying our ordinary consciousness and our daily communication through the senses.

It must be admitted, in reference to this theory, that the general premises we have laid down in relation to the nature of the soul, do not present any grounds against its possibility. If it is shown that the largest and most essential part of our mind is distinct from, and unexhausted by our sensational experience, it can hardly be supposed that this element stands alone, apart from all relations, and without any influence beyond its own invisible region. Such a supposition were in the highest degree improbable. As our mind has its root beyond the world of sense, so will it also stand, in a hidden and unsensuous way, in mutual communication with the real existences of this higher region, and that too with those who, like itself, hold intercourse with the world of sense, as also with those who are already removed from it.

It need scarcely be remarked, how unexpected a light spreads itself, upon this supposition, over emotions and relations in the human mind, which no one has been yet able expressly to deny, but for which no rational ground of explanation has been yet discovered. Here I believe such an explanation has been found, and in such wise, that no doubt can be thrown either on the reality of the general foundation, nor any limit set to the speciality of the facts. On the contrary, observation is directly appealed to, and it is demanded of observation, that it should search into the extent and the depths of what here becomes possible. For here, in fact, the richest gradation of phenomena shows

itself from the special prevision of worthless events down to the warning and prophetic voice of a Socratic *Daimon*, or to the most powerful and penetrating revelations of historical significance.

We must here, however, draw a warning limitation. It would be altogether unjustifiable and arbitrary, in the case of all such visions, to imagine that they are direct communications from the Spirit of God himself. We cannot deny on our side that we discover in this the germ of a most destructive enthusiasm. The supposition of the agency of mind of higher order than what is now to be found in the human consciousness is all that is necessary. The fact that such a mind knows the future beforehand, to an extent beyond what it is granted *us* to know, nay to foresee what to us is *accidental*, does not at all militate against its possessing a finite nature, nor transform it into a being incapable of ignorance and deception. That such a being may gaze over a higher region of causalities than we do, is *possible*; for what *we* deem fortuitous, is really only that, whose causal connexion escapes our vision, whether it may have its ground in the inextricable web of outward events, or in the hidden motives of human character. Chance, in fact, is only *appearance* (a relatively necessary appearance, it is true), which therefore may be dissipated by a more widely embracing view of the universe and its relations.

In what way, from quite another point of view, the admission of hidden influences upon the human mind becomes a necessary postulate, in order to render the possibility of a special government of the world, in relation to

human affairs, at all *explicable*,—this we shall have to consider in another place. We stand here confessedly on the threshold of a region hitherto untouched by science; the existence and justification of which, however, only the most stiffened empiricism can ignore. At present, it must suffice merely to open the door, and show the existence of this region to the enquiring view. Even in science, important extensions, and wholly new points of view, require time and habit to give them admissibility. If the discovery should be of such a kind, that all sorts of superstitious errors can link themselves to it, a twofold foresight ought to be exercised in its dissemination. Our age is neither so impartial, nor so free from perverted excitements, that such a warning is now at all superfluous.

CHAP. IV.

THE ORGANIC DOUBLE LIFE OF THE SOUL.

ONE question has hitherto remained untouched, in all the evidence we have brought forward, of the double mental existence in which we live. It relates to the change which takes place in the mind's organic relations, in passing from one state to another. We must assume *à priori*, that the more intense states of dreaming, into which the mind betakes itself when wholly removed from the influence of the senses, must depend upon some altered relation which it holds to its organism. Our philosophy has endeavoured to establish the probability of the following doctrine: That in certain, and those not rare conditions of the consciousness, the co-operation of the physical apparatus retires into the background, or is even quite suspended, and that there may ensue, even in the present life, a mental condition analogous to that of a disembodied soul. As this declaration does not seem less strange than the former one did to the reigning doctrines of physiology, it may be worth while to bring forward the series of facts, by which we have sought to substantiate this truth, in a somewhat altered form. M. Helmholtz, it is well known, some years ago made the discovery—that an appreciable period of time passes, while an act of the will propagates itself from the centre of

the nerve-motion to the periphery, and thus to the muscles; and that this time becomes relatively shorter, the shorter that portion of the nervous system is through which the impulse has to pass. The truth of this has been fully confirmed by observation. Not the smallest ground, however, exists for the supposition that this appreciable time holds good *only* for the nerves of motion; on the contrary, it is necessary to extend the analogy to the whole nature of the observed phenomena, and to admit, that all nervous operations, even those engaged in the sensational processes, are subject to an appreciable lapse of time. This is established for the department of sensation, still more expressly by another fact, which has been noticed in connexion with astronomical observations. Perceptions belonging to two different senses, such as hearing and sight, cannot come absolutely at the same moment into the focus of consciousness; but the phenomena of hearing are either not *perceived* at all, or follow an appreciable period of time after those of sight, which last circumstance can only be explained by the longer working which the latter feeling takes to act upon the sensory nerves. From these facts we can conclude, that there exists a relative lapse of time in those operations of the nerves with which the consciousness of sensation is connected. The visual sensation claims the organ of consciousness for a certain duration, and therefore excludes the possibility of perceiving sounds at the same moment. Inasmuch, too, as hearing comes later, we may conclude that the nerve impulse in this case is longer in its operation. Thus it is clearly proved, that the lower functions of consciousness,—sensation, and motion, are connected with a

certain lapse of time, and that, too, not because the process of consciousness itself stands in need of any duration of time (as we have already shown), but because the organic condition—the nerve apparatus, associates itself with it as a retarding element.

Who is to say, then, that the same thing is not true, and that in more marked manner, of the higher operations of consciousness—those which subserve the formation of ideas, and of thought itself? Individuals, in fact, are *observably* different from one another in this respect—that some need less time for the operations of thought than others; and that one can go through the same series of operations much more rapidly than another. To take a striking example: those celebrated calculators, who appear from time to time, only differ from ordinary arithmeticians in this one point, that they perform the calculations with unmeasurably greater rapidity than is usually the case. The declarations of Dase do not leave the least doubt that he really calculates, and goes through all the operations of reckoning only with the exercise of a most *exalted* mental activity.

In all these phenomena there is nothing, according to our ideas, the least extraordinary. As daily experience shows us that the vegetative processes in every organism require a certain lapse of time peculiar to each; that pulsation, breathing, even the processes of secretion and excretion, in relation to their duration, vary in different individuals; it can require no hesitation to extend this analogy to the operations of consciousness. We expressly maintain, and do not shrink from the apparent approach to materialistic ideas in so doing, that the retarding element applies

to the ordinary mental processes, simply because they are dependent on the co-operation of a nerve apparatus, which is subjected in its arrangements to a certain appreciable duration of time.

But here the question arises (and in this the point of the whole lies), to what have we to attribute the ground of this slowness in the processes of consciousness—whether to the nature of the mind itself, or to the organic apparatus, with the co-operation of which, at least in our ordinary life, every act of consciousness is connected? If our philosophy has maintained that it must be sought for in the latter, and not at all in the former, it has done so not on the ground of any *à priori* idea respecting the essence of the soul as elevated above time and space; it bases itself, on the contrary, upon the purely experimental consideration, that *there are* states of consciousness (and that many and various) in which this retarding power disappears, and where the ideas pass through the mind in an inconceivably rapid succession, so that we must represent it in these states as independent of time, that is, raised quite above the ordinary time-relations.

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We may allow ourselves, therefore, in remarkable analogy with the distinction already made between original knowledge and sense-knowledge, to set up two different forms of consciousness in opposition to each other; viz. the ordinary one, or that which develops itself in a slow and regular series (brain-consciousness); and another, which develops itself with infinitely more rapidity and intensity, the real character of which we have yet to communicate.

We must not overlook the fact, that these two conditions

constantly and obstinately exclude each other. During the experience of that inward vision, which we have designated as an intensified dreaming, the sense-perceptions are closed, and the control of the will over the body in general quite suspended. On the other hand, as soon as the sense-apparatus gains its rights and begins to react upon the consciousness, the vision-state, just analogously with dreaming, instantly passes away. This fact induces the conclusion, that a different relation of the soul to its own organism must lie at the foundation of these two opposed states of consciousness. If, therefore, in the ordinary or normal state we cannot doubt but that there is an inward and constant connexion kept up between the two, yet we are, on the other hand, necessitated, in the case of those conditions of consciousness which seem to be inaccessible to every sensational perception or action, to admit the suspension of these conditions, and to consider the bond between the soul and the organism to be at least relaxed.

This conclusion, taken in connexion with the other doctrines of our philosophy, is not to be regarded as one of those which merely presents itself for friendly consideration; it can claim almost a demonstrative power, so long as this general law of thought maintains its place—that causes must be analogous to their effects. The fact, that it does not contradict so much as extend and complete the doctrines which have been hitherto entertained, does not detract at all from its importance. All newly discovered truths have at first the lot of struggling against the old, but in the end they are always victorious.

Here, however, another weighty question arises, viz. in

which of these two opposed states the soul appears most in accordance with its own nature and constitution. Of course, we can have no doubt but that this nature and constitution, generally speaking, is seen only in the ordinary processes of consciousness and thought. If these processes are found to be more perfect and intense in the form of brain-consciousness, it follows that the soul is essentially bound in its activity to the body, and that it cannot exist in all its integrity without it. It follows, further, that its *disembodied* state must be one, in which consciousness only exists *potentially*, and not really. This is the manifest consequence of the views upon which the ordinary psychology rests, and if it does not acknowledge them, but hesitates to compromise a conscious immortality, this procedure is purely unconsequential. If, on the contrary, it appears, that in this abnormal state the conscious processes operate more quickly and intensely, the conclusion is quite admissible, that the nature of the soul is here more deeply revealed than in the ordinary states, and during its connexion with the body. This conclusion, we think, our philosophy has substantiated in a very comprehensive manner.

The brain-consciousness manifests itself as restricted; restricted, *i.e.* to the limited forms of bodily feeling, and the activity that is awakened by it. Here, accordingly, the relation is just the reverse. The sensations are the most vivid phenomena, and the most energetic of these states of consciousness, while the intellectual life becomes proportionally dim. This alone is sufficient to characterise the whole form of consciousness which springs directly out of organic conditions, as one in which the soul is *restricted*. And

even when it does gain its independence, as in forming ideas and in the processes of thought, we still detect the want of that liveliness and energy by which the sense-consciousness is characterised. The ideas float indistinctly one into the other, the memory is defective, and forgetfulness is the common sign of this dependence upon organic conditions. Only with great effort can thought elaborate itself, and form those general notions, which lose the vividness and distinctness of perception just in proportion as they become more abstract. In a word, the whole of this sphere of consciousness bears the manifest character of something which is removed from its original nature, and brought under the power of an element that is foreign to it.

On the ground of all these facts, and their necessary consequences, our philosophy has considered itself justified in laying down the following three propositions, with the recognition of which a new epoch must begin in the science of psychology. And we do not see how any unprejudiced mind can withhold such acknowledgment, inasmuch as these propositions do not contradict any of the results already obtained, either in physiology or psychology, but only extend and enrich them with a new province of facts.

PROP. 1.—Besides the ordinary states of consciousness demonstrably connected with the nerves and brain, there exist others also, the constitution of which leads us to the necessary admission, that the soul develops them out of itself while in a condition relatively or absolutely free from the influence of the body.

PROP. 2.—The latter states demonstrably distinguish

themselves by a preponderating vivacity, rapidity and intensity.

PROP. 3.—We must therefore conclude that the ground of the restriction, to which the ordinary processes of consciousness are subjected, does not lie in the essence of the soul itself, but in their connexion with the external apparatus which we term the body.

According to the facts already adduced, the body appears in a double relation to the mind. On the one side, it is a necessary organ for its coming into communication with other existences; for awakening self-consciousness through the sense-perceptions; and lastly, for developing gradually the process of thought, in its *reflective* capacity. In other respects it betrays itself in the most decided way as a *retarding* and *limiting* element, and shows that it is only when the mind is freed from its influence, that it can obtain its fully developed capacity.

The result of all this has been embodied by our philosophy into an hypothesis, which indeed is *only* an hypothesis at present, but which on further consideration will commend itself more and more decidedly to our acceptance, especially as it is only in this way, in all probability, that we can show a harmonious connexion between the most discordant phenomena, and make the most inconsistent facts intelligible.

The significancy and purpose of our whole sense-life and sense-consciousness, we suggest, may be this; that the mind, introduced by the process of birth into a bodily condition, and being awakened in this way to self-consciousness, may gradually make itself independent, during its arthly existence, of that bodily organ, and raise itself

above the necessity of it; so that it may thus prepare for itself a higher condition or mode of existence, which we may term the *pneumatical body*, the germ and capacity of which is prior to its sensuous life, and is the condition of its possibility. The abnormal phenomena, accordingly, which are designated by the terms ecstasy, dream-waking, and the like, are only the momentary and unexpected outbursts of this inner man, which is gradually forming in us, spontaneously called forth by the passing suspension of the normal relation between body and soul, in this its sensuous form of existence.

On this account it is that we have laid so much stress on the proof of the apriority and essential immortality of the human mind, and made it the starting-point for everything else. If this truth be once acknowledged, and gain acceptance in the universal consciousness of humanity, the greatest benefit must result which science could possibly confer. The perplexing enigma of our sense-life is solved, and the illusive power of death is broken. Why should we not rejoice in the limiting conditions of the former? and how can the latter terrify or startle us, when we have well considered that the present life is but the beginning and the fragment of one that has yet to be fulfilled, and in which it is already essentially rooted? How could it be to us, in fine, a matter of wonder that the present conditions and relations of the soul are so imperfect, when we know that they have only a preliminary and subordinate meaning, and express in the most special way the embryonic conditions of that mental life, which must here gain a title to its full maturity?

Such a knowledge must also beget a new faith, or rather raise the old eternally veracious faith of humanity to a new course of development, in which the two opposite tendencies of the present, namely, positive religion and humanism, will be fully reconciled. What religion designates *sin*, estrangement from God, and evil, humanism distinguishes, according to its milder philosophical views, as involuntary limitation, as an imperfection which has to be made good, and which will gradually cure itself either here or hereafter by the imperishable power of goodness that dwells within us. The difference between these two views has been driven in the present day to a most trenchant contrast. On the one hand we hear it said, He who does not believe, *i. e.* he who does not adapt himself to the unconditional acknowledgment of a religions formula must be damned, *i. e.* is cut off for ever from every possibility of conversion — a sentiment the irreligiousness and utter untenableness of which we cannot affirm too strongly. On the other hand the gospel of humanism has summed itself up in the characteristic words of our great poet,

“Wer immer *strebend* sich bemüht,
Den können wir erlösen.”

On which side, here at least, the judgment of science and psychological reflection falls cannot be doubtful. Still it is only the new aspect we have presented of the worth and meaning of our sense-life, that can justify and substantiate such a judgment. Had *this* state of existence a final signification, if the whole destiny of life were involved in it,

then would this dogma of positive religion stand firm in its irresistible rights, and the lot of the eternal future would be cast in this narrow span of our earthly existence. This, however, is a thought altogether arbitrary, contrary to all analogy, and grounded upon *nothing*. How could an earthly existence possibly be sufficient for this great result—an existence which, to the great majority of mankind, does not present sufficient impulse to raise them even to a state of full self-consciousness, still less to admit of their working out the whole extent of their nature, and bringing it to a final crisis? On this account the doctrine of "Hades," or a middle state, which the more enlightened theologians, even of the strict Lutheran school, have accepted in a modified form, is a relatively important one, and an absolutely necessary correction of the old opinions. The view which the New Church, however, has maintained appears to me still more rational, namely, that which regards the future existence of the soul as being, first of all, a slightly modified continuation of the present, and as forming for a time a continued preparation for the last crisis of all, for heaven and for hell. It is not our object, however, here to enter into theological controversy. We only affirm that the proper time is come to bring these most weighty questions to a free, and at the same time a higher development.

CHAP. V.

THE QUESTION OF METHOD.

WE must now turn our attention to another series of considerations. The idea of the apriority of the soul, and the assertion that it constructs for itself its bodily organ as an outward expression of its own inward nature, have been complained of as altogether strained and untenable. I have been warned not to screw up human nature to such a pitch, inasmuch as the relapse from that ideal height down to the common reality of things as they are, must be so much the more painful. I should feel the weight of this reproach to the full, if I could accuse myself of ever overstepping the limits of fact; for there is nothing which I more thoroughly despise than that common-place half-knowledge, which stops up the gaps in its own information by arbitrary assumptions. In truth, I can only feel that I have sought to transform the imperfect notions on which the ordinary ideas of the mind rest into something full and complete; and that I have done this by giving due attention to phenomena, and taking into account results, which most men have considered it more convenient to ignore, or to bring into discredit.

But it is exactly the credit I attach to them which is considered the head and front of my offending; and, con-

sequently, the aim of all our considerations lies in the decision we come to, as to what measure of trust may be accorded *generally* to the facts, upon which I have grounded such important conclusions. Here, also, I have set up a canon of judgment, which, according to my unaltered opinion, keeps clear of the twofold prejudice attaching to such things—that, namely, of either blindly over-estimating single and doubtful facts, because they tell in favour of a favourite theory, or of closing the eyes with equal blindness against that which instructs and enlarges our experience, whatever it may be.

This canon turns upon the comparison of analogous facts, and the conclusions to be drawn from them; a procedure which possesses a force, that in the present state of logical science has not been brought to light. John Stewart Mill, in his excellent work on the inductive logic, has characterised this mode of argumentation better than any one else, particularly in the chapter where he speaks of *analogical conclusions*, as cases in which we argue from the similarity of certain phenomena, “that they are to be subsumed under a law as yet unknown, but discoverable *from themselves*.” I shall attempt, therefore, to state the logical process which I have applied in my “Anthropology,” and show its conclusiveness.

The point which has first to be cleared up is the experimental proof, that there are certain states in which the soul maintains its own integrity, though freed from the co-operation of the organism. In proving this, two things were necessary; first, *facts* of whose actuality there could be no doubt; and, secondly, facts which really prove what

they ought, or at any rate make the supposition of it highly probable. (We need hardly repeat, that throughout the whole inquiry we have only to do with probabilities, not with demonstrations.) Each of these points has to be shown from the nature of the facts themselves. This it is, then, which forms the foundation (the first premiss) of an ordinary analogical argument. It presents the normal instance with which other similar cases are compared, in order by their comparative similiarity (second premiss) to conclude that they are exactly like this normal instance in their general character; *i. e.* in this particular case, that they support the hypothesis of the essential freedom of the mind from bodily conditions.

At the same time we must not overlook the circumstance, that in this mode of reasoning another collateral process appears, which we just now designated as the proof from *analogical series*. In this analogical proof, we start from positive facts, and then bring other facts into the series that are far less certain, so long as they are regarded without any connexion with the rest; particularly as no explanation seems to be possible for them in their isolated form in accordance with the present state of science.

Our judgment respecting their validity is wholly altered, on the contrary, when they are once brought out of their isolation, and co-ordinated into an analogous series, *i. e.* when they are supported by some normal instance, the certainty of which is unquestionable. They then participate in the certainty attaching to the series, because the normal instance covers the whole. And not only this, but they naturally support each other, because an unexpected

and unlooked-for analogy appears common to them all, which enables us to conclude that they all spring from one common foundation.

In this method of argument different opinions may exist on *single points*, but in general it must be admitted that it is the only safe method by which we can make any advance in the province of anthropology, where the evidence of *experiment* is denied us. And I must regard it as mere presumption, when any one, without going into the subject critically, only shrugs his shoulders at the whole procedure, and ignores the whole result.

A French natural philosopher * has lately given, exactly on the same method, an extended view of the essential phases of somnambulism and clairvoyance; which is remarkable on this account, that it links them to the simplest and most regular phenomena; and from these phenomena goes forward to explain the most strange and complicated facts. Here, too, one might not always agree with the *theories*, but the *method of inquiry* cannot be contested.

We must regard it as the strangest aberration, when our philosophers demand *experiment* to be applied to these psychical manifestations, and either subject them to a mathematically exact investigation, or else to exclude them altogether from the circle of scientific observation. The demand for a mathematically exact method of proof has become a mere puppet, which some hold up everywhere as a Medusa's head, where there is any question of a funda-

* Albert Lemaire. "Du Sommeil au point de vue Physiologique et Psychologique;" ouvrage couronné par l'Institut de France.

mental character, but which exercises its petrifying power only on their own judgments. Who is not ready to grant, that in all phenomena which present themselves to outward observation, whether physical or physiological, experiment is necessary as well as observation, in order to place a fact beyond doubt, and substantiate it in all its *essential* conditions? But in mental investigations we *cannot* make experiments, and therefore are confined to the two other sources of experience, namely, observation and testimony; viz. first, observation of one's self; and secondly, as this cannot embrace all physical conditions, the testimony of others to inward processes; in which case, when the testimony cannot be controlled by regular self-observation, recourse must be had to that canon of judgment which we have given under the title of *analogical* series.

In the same manner it is *unquestionable*, that mathematically exact calculations cannot in any way discover the inner causes and powers which lie at the foundation of a phenomenon; but only the outward conditions, and the accompanying circumstances under which those powers come into action. When physical science has calculated how many vibrations in a second it requires to produce that sensation of colour in our eyes which we term violet, it has not in doing so proved on the one side what that supposed ether is; nor, on the other side, has it in the least explained what regular connexion or relation obtains between the number of oscillations, and so surprising a conversion of purely quantitative relations into a specific *qualitative* perception. Accordingly, we have gained nothing but an exact description of the outward process,

which indeed may have the greatest influence upon any future explanation, but which does not in the least *involve* it.

When, again, in physiology it is calculated with what amount of leverage a muscle works, in order to move the limb which depends upon it, we are gaining no insight whatever into the *nature* of the muscular force, nor any explanation how it is possible that a given intensity of will can elevate the measure of it, without abstracting anything from itself: how, therefore, the will in working upon the muscular system can be regarded as a *source of power*, while on the principles of calculation the relation should be a constant and unalterable one. In a word, we cannot penetrate by means of calculation and exact investigation a single hair's breath into the knowledge of existences and inner causes.

To do this, there needs a specifically different, though not less experimental investigation, the conditions of which have long been fixed. There needs, first, a critical and methodical arrangement of all the facts characteristic of the object under observation, that is, an exhaustive induction, on which the conclusion respecting its essence is grounded, in the form of an *hypothesis*. This procedure, in both respects, has been aimed at in our work, in relation to the philosophy of the human mind; and it would have remained open to the reproach of having based itself upon an imperfect induction, if it had *not* drawn those suspicious phenomena into the circle of its investigation; suspicious only on this account, that they do not readily coincide with the reigning ideas. On this account, let it not be

taken ill, if we see in the blame we have incurred a real claim to praise, and are not in the least inclined to depart from the mode of procedure we have followed.

For who could overlook the fact, that it is exactly on these supposedly hidden parts of our mental life that the lever must be planted, in order to bring a new world of mental relationships to the light? We have never for a moment asserted that these states of consciousness are in themselves higher, or more valuable, or surrounded with that particular nimbus of holiness, or infallibility, which some, driven by an overweening estimation of them, have not been careful to disclaim. We have designated them expressly as abnormal states, as they must be admitted to be, in relation to that fixed mode of existence into which we are introduced by our sense-life. Nevertheless it is equally clear, that, as certain as these abnormal states are not anything fortuitous, but only expressions of a mode of existence which does not ordinarily come to light, we ought so much the more zealously to search for their characteristics. The most prominent points in this search are the following.

We have sought to render it probable, by means of the most extended inductive proof, that the more intense and fully developed states of dream-waking, clairvoyance, vision, second sight, &c., take place without the co-operation either of the sensory apparatus or the brain—an important experiment, both for physiology and psychology. The further question, however, remains, What is the characteristic of the intellectual life of the mind during these emancipated states? This point, also, our philosophy has

mooted, and prepared the way for a solution. Considering, however, that facts are here touched upon which are equally difficult in their communication as doubtful in their significancy, we have contented ourselves with bringing forward only what is most prominent and characteristic, inasmuch as this is sufficient to lead us to the more important conclusions respecting the nature of the soul. We consider ourselves, therefore, justified in demanding that these results should not be designated as mere hypotheses, that is, as arbitrary conjectures, but as *à posteriori* ideas, grounded upon induction and analogy, which have perfect right to lie at the foundation of an experimental science, such as psychology has now for the most part become.

The results themselves have been already sufficiently explained. Only three points remain, which deserve some consideration, because it is just in them that the novelty of our view is concentrated.

The present physiology and psychology stand firm in the opinion, that no thought, nay, that no process of consciousness whatever is possible without the co-operation of the brain, and that both thought and consciousness become confused, darkened, and at length extinguished, the more the integrity of this organic apparatus is injured.

We have shown that the case may be far otherwise. The intellectual life of the mind in its emancipated states is not extinguished or restricted; it is not even changed or weakened, or the consciousness of our personal identity destroyed; but the very opposite to all this presents itself, namely, elevated intellectual power, deeper self-conscious-

ness, and the personality more thoroughly enlightened by the consciousness of self.

By this fact, on the one hand, the materialistic assertion is refuted, that consciousness and thought are purely functions of the nervous system, and the product of organic action. If such an hypothesis were not absurd enough on general grounds, it would certainly have to be given up on the ground of its resting upon a very imperfect amount of experience. Consciousness is so little the product of the body, that it is only in states where the body loses its power that it is found in full strength and peculiarity. On the other hand, the well-known doctrine of Schopenhauer is also refuted, which, on the ground of consciousness being suspended during sleep, while the organic and unconscious processes are uninterruptedly continued, draws the rash conclusion, that the fundamental characteristic of that which we call the soul is simply blind impulse and will, while the intellect is only something accidental to it. Were it really shown that the deepest sleep were perfectly free from mental activity, and quite dreamless (against which many facts distinctly militate), still the conclusion based upon it would not be justified. Experience shows that *consciousness, intelligence, reason*, is the inalienable attribute of the substance which we term mind. It does not part with this character even in its state of real darkness, *i.e.* on the stage of preconscious existence. The organic power shows itself as anything rather than a blind impulse or bare will; it has the thorough impress of the most intense, though unconscious intelligence. Whence that remarkable double state of the conscious and unconscious

reason may spring, may be a question, and the question very variously answered; but we assuredly regard it in a light wholly contradicted by the facts of the case, when intelligence is viewed as something merely accidental. So far from this, intelligence ever remains as a distinctive agent, a hidden principle, nay, as the alpha and the omega, the starting-point and the aim of the mind's whole development.

The second main result which is confirmed by our point of view, may be thus expressed; that the mind during its present life is subjected to a twofold condition of restriction and freedom, while its essence, from the very first, shows itself in all its states alike, as being by nature intelligent and rational. The immediate is never to be confounded with the original; that which is first in *fact* is not to be regarded as necessarily first in existence.

From this, thirdly, another universal phenomenon is explained, namely, that the more the intelligence of our spiritual nature appears bound to this foreign material, and is occupied in the management of it by means of organic processes, so much the further removed is it from comprehending itself in consciousness, and from originating intelligent acts. On that account, the actual commencement of our being, in spite of its essential rationality, is like the very deepest dream-life, out of which the consciousness gradually raises itself through the impulse of sensation. Nevertheless the sense-consciousness (as psychology will show) is not in the least a product of sensation, in which the mind is wholly passive; but it is the result of a spontaneous *thinking* activity, developed out of the elements of

our sensuous impulses — which thinking leads it from step to step, to a complete state of self-control, to consciousness, and, lastly, self-consciousness; thus *proving* that it is a *rational* power from the very first.

The medium state, which pervades both the opposite extremes, and connects them inseparably together, is the fancy,—an unconscious faculty in its immediate application, but one which operates according to the types and fundamental characteristics of our inborn reason, *i.e.* with perfect design. From this it follows, amongst other things, that during the connexion of the soul with the body, our conscious states must be modified and coloured by the condition of the fancy in relation to the organism, a fact which has been termed, clumsily enough, the dependence of the soul on the body; while it should really have been represented only as the dependence of the conscious *portion* of the soul upon its unconscious activity.

This faculty makes itself known, first, and more obscurely, in the primary construction of the organism; here it proceeds continuously, but still only in its unconscious constructive form, to build up the individual body, and mould that physiognomy and gesture, in which the general impress of the individuality, which breathes through the whole, comes to view. We consider, therefore, that it is without any reason that some have objected to the appellation we have chosen, on the ground that the term *fancy* should be used only in its aesthetic signification, and should by no means be brought into connexion with that plastic organic activity, which belongs to the lower region of the soul. For not to mention the tacit implication which this objec-

tion contains, of the mind being a composite essence, according to our view of the *gradations* in existence (in which each step employs the properties of the one immediately beneath it as an element and means of its own development), the *soul*, which in its lower forms appears necessary in its operations, is changed when raised to the sphere of *mind* into a purely contingent existence. Man is an *intelligent soul*—not intellect and soul; therefore there is in him no separation of the two; and the *χωριστόν* of Aristotle is so far to be corrected, inasmuch as he held that the intellect does not proceed necessarily, in a regular course, from the lower psychical conditions, but comes into them from without, as a new transcendental and separate principle.

Certainly the position which Aristotle maintains, that the intellect in man is a *χωριστόν*, something which cannot be explained out of the lower conditions of the soul, is one of his greatest discoveries, by means of which he has become a real benefactor to mankind. But this agrees perfectly with our whole theory, which seeks to carry out that great thought of antiquity still further, and to place it by means of analogies upon a sure foundation. This it does, on the one side, inasmuch as it shows the soul as a *χωριστόν*, a something not to be explained by mere inorganic powers and processes; on the other side, inasmuch as it sees that the human mind is *not yet* the highest spiritual intelligence, but that it may become an organ of revelation, either through ideas, or through higher ranks of spiritual existences, up to the divine itself.

In this series of mental existences I have sought to retain the idea of continuity, for this view alone is consistent with

the objective constitution of the universe, in which there is no such thing as a gap in the series of phenomena. So it is in the present case: mind, as we said, is an intelligent principle from the very first. Inasmuch, however, as in man it is bound to a lower and organic element, and from this has to elevate itself to consciousness and self-consciousness, that middle condition arises, which, in accordance with the character of its higher operations, we have termed *fancy*, not *imagination*, which would give quite another turn to the whole idea. In imagination as also in memory the prominent character and material is purely empirical, and is closely connected with our sense-perceptions, as Aristotle shows, although he terms this whole representative faculty *φαντασία*. There is no point in which the ordinary psychology is more imperfect than in deducing the creative faculty in us from bare imagination, and placing them both upon the same level, so that the true *à priori* character of it is wholly overlooked, a result which has hindered æsthetics hitherto from being based upon any sound psychological foundation.

When, therefore, the artist sketches ideal forms with a free plastic consciousness, we cannot recognise any new faculty which applies to the *mind* in contradistinction to the *soul*. It appears to us to be (only on a higher stage) exactly the same power as that which throws out the type of the body, upon which body it spontaneously and artistically impresses the mental character, the feelings, and the habits. Spontaneously and artistically, we say, for assuredly it is a highly characteristic and artistic result, that the soul is able, perfectly true to nature and to the language of imagery,

unfailingly to *stamp* the exact form of the inward feelings and affections upon the body. And what does the artist ordinarily attempt, except consciously and purposely to do the very thing, which the fancy performs spontaneously with far greater success? On this step of the fancy, however, we see only its lowest though perhaps most energetic working, that, namely, which is engaged in the structure of the organism; for it will scarcely occur to any reasonable investigator, after he has admitted the co-operation of the creative faculty up to this point, suddenly to spring over into another and lower province of phenomena, or to take refuge in some *qualitas occulta* of organic power, which is merely another name for *vital force*.

In a word, either the specific character of the fancy as a creative power in the mind must be altogether denied, an assertion which will hardly be ventured; or it must be granted that this power, *à priori* in its character, and anterior to all sense-consciousness, reaches down to the very first commencement of our vital existence.

CHAP. VI.

ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF OUR PERCEPTIONS OF SPACE.

SINCE the systems which aimed at the attainment of absolute knowledge have died out, and the Kantian maxim, "*that we can only comprehend truth as it stands in relation to human nature*," has been re-introduced, it has become evident that all philosophical problems must be placed under the control of psychology. This is the essential character of all the German speculation which has sprung up since the times of Schelling and Hegel; and it is on this ground that we feel ourselves justified in asserting, that the old pantheistic mania has been completely overcome and shaken off; for no one, we are well assured, who has laid hold of the above maxim with firmness and intelligence, can give himself up again to the deceptive illusions of those systems. We do not mean that any particular psychological doctrine (whether that of Kant, Fries, or Herbart) has been *finally* established; but simply that the science of the human mind, and the laws of its intelligence, must be made the universal starting-point of philosophy.

And not only do strictly philosophical questions assume a new form when viewed in this light; but even the most

stirring questions of the present age—those which relate to the nature and origin of religion; to the relation between the divine and the human; to the possibility of a special revelation, &c.; all these, we hold, can only be solved at last by the aid of psychology, that is, by a close investigation into the depths of the human mind. I may regard myself, therefore, as fully justified in welcoming this new and independent development of psychological studies as a most significant fact for moral science generally, and hope to devote whatever of strength is left to me to its furtherance.

This turn, which our native philosophy has now taken, may have the effect of drawing us out of that isolation in which we have stood with regard to the two other great scientific nations of Europe. The English philosophy, since the decline of the Scottish school, has developed itself with some degree of individuality, and not without valid results. Meeting us now upon the common ground of psychology, it could not fail to be inspired with some degree of confidence in our researches, and allow them to exert an appreciable influence; while our "great systems," on the other hand, can never be any other than strange and uncongenial. With regard to the French philosophy, we gather from the more recent utterances of M. Cousin, that it is especially the doctrine of "absolute reason," which he has so much cause to suspect of error, and to which he feels inclined to attribute all our more recent and overwrought speculations. And we must indeed admit that the French philosopher has not wholly missed the mark in making these objections, but has with fine tact

pointed out just the very part of our systems which, since the time of Hegel, has been obliged to undergo the most complete revision.

This brings me, then, once more to the psychological difference between Professor Lotze and myself. So long as we continue to contend about the idea of the soul from secondary grounds, the struggle will go on indefinitely without any result. If we succeed, on the other hand, in bringing decisive facts, either for the one or the other side, then our *theories* must of necessity accommodate themselves to them. Such a psychological fact I believe to have been really discovered; one, by the due consideration of which the true nature of the soul is most clearly illustrated; and I shall attempt in the present chapter to expound this fact to the reader, and show the conclusions which flow from it.

The fact to which I refer, is *the original existence of space-perception in our consciousness*. Kant, who first established this fact, deduced from it decided conclusions respecting the subjective nature of human knowledge, inasmuch as he proved with incontestible evidence the *apriority* of the ideas of space and time in the mind, without searching any further for their *objective* ground and origin. To this we oppose *the fact*, that our space-perceptions (*i. e.* the necessity we are under of representing everything *real* to ourselves, under the form of an extended surface) have their psychological origin in an original *feeling* of extension, which is inseparable from the consciousness of our own existence, and which stands therefore upon purely objective ground. This, as we said, is the simple thought,

which we consider (viewed at least in this light) to be new, and 'at the same time important as to the general theory of psychology.

In our former treatises we have analysed the idea of perception in contradistinction to that of sensation, and have shown what there is in the contents of our perceptions *more* than mere feeling. This "more" was found to consist in the *time* and *space* element of the consciousness. Every external perception is at the same time co-ordinated with a general idea of time and space, with a specific "where" and "when," which idea cannot belong to the sensation itself, just because it is one of its preconditions, and necessary to its very existence as a fact of consciousness.

This negative idea of time and space lies at the basis of the proof, urged by Kant, of their *à priori* origin. The positive side of the question, however, he never unveiled; and it is just this latter point we desire now to moot. The fact from which we start is that already established by Kant, namely, that space (and time) is never the object of mere sensation, but is something added to it, by an act of consciousness.

We remark then, *first*, that if time and space are in no sense the result of bare feeling or sensation; nay, if it be shown that they must go before it as a condition of its existence, although *chronologically* sensation is the primary fact of all, and that which first wakens up the light of consciousness, then the question comes back the more pointedly, What then is the origin of these ideas in the consciousness? The direct answer to this question is obvious.

The conceptions of space and time cannot arise either earlier or later, but only contemporaneously, and in inseparable connexion with sensation itself. They do not arise, however, *out of* the objective stimuli, which are the basis of sensation; for were this the case they would be sensations themselves; consequently, they can have their origin only *in the mind*. It does not follow from this view, however, as Kant supposed, that time and space are merely subjective *forms* of sensation. It was quite correct in Kant to seek for their origin *in the mind*; but according to the psychology of that period the mind was apprehended as consciousness, and only consciousness, so that he could not deduce the idea of time and space from the mind in any other way than by making them depend upon its *conscious* activity. He thus regarded them as original *subjective* phenomena, altogether void of any objective foundation whatever. In this way space and time became wholly dis severed from the objective world, and a subjective idealism, with all its weighty results, was introduced, without any one being able to discover where the error in the premises really lay.

We, on the other hand, place ourselves from the very first upon a broader basis; to us the mind is a *real substance*, reaching much further in its states and operations than the limits of mere consciousness can mark out. If therefore we must, with Kant, seek the origin of these two ideas in the mind, and not in the senses, still we are by no means, in so doing, committing ourselves to the Kantian result, viz. that they can be nothing more or less than subjective forms. The very opposite conclusion, indeed,

lies open to us, that, namely, of finding the origin of both ideas in the *objective* or essential nature of the soul. This is, accordingly, the theory which we have now to establish more in detail.

The idea of time does not present much difficulty in any way. The mind is, objectively speaking, a being endowed with continuous existence, and one which maintains its identity in the midst of all its conscious changes. The original consciousness, accordingly, which it must possess of its own state is nothing more or less than a feeling of duration; for so we may express the undefined yet very *intense* consciousness which the soul must possess of its own self, as an essence remaining unchanged through all its changing phenomena. As such a *continuity* is wholly inseparable from our real existence, the feeling of it (more or less distinct) must be inseparable from the *consciousness* of our own existence, and must give rise to what we may term time-perception, a perception which is thus seen to be *à priori* in relation to all sensation, and which appears as a prior condition to the consciousness we have either of ourselves or others. With the first act of consciousness the mind begins to experience mental changes; but, as a being that consciously retains its identity, it connects the mental changes which it experiences together into a series, and thus, out of the mere consciousness of duration, the proper time-perception is at length awakened.

From this we can explain the fact of time being wholly different from a mere abstract idea. We can think of it *emptied* of all particular matter, without its being destroyed. We can abstract, indeed, from every *special* time-per-

ception, but we cannot do so from the fundamental perception itself, any more than we can from our own self-consciousness, they being both inseparable from each other. As, therefore, in sleep, or swooning, the perception of time vanishes with the loss of consciousness, so it is restored again the moment the consciousness reawakens.

With our space-perceptions the case stands very differently. Consciousness has not the same direct and immediate reference to space as it has to time. On the contrary, the activity of the consciousness is purely *intensive*, giving rise to ideas which may be more or less vivid, but which have no kind of connexion with *extension*; for it is self-evident, that the perception of space-relations, *i.e.* of an over and under, a right and a left, &c., cannot exist at all in the consciousness *as such*.

Nevertheless it is a remarkable circumstance, that space is just as *little* an abstract idea as time. We can imagine it emptied of all *content*, and the perception of it disappears just as that of time does in every state of unconsciousness; while the very first moment of waking calls up again that same world of extension, in which we always find ourselves embosomed. To our original feeling of *duration*, therefore, there answers an equally original feeling of *extension*, and that *wholly inseparable from the very consciousness of our existence*. The question comes, therefore, how the *unabstract* nature of our space-consciousness is to be explained.

Putting aside all other considerations, the very analogy of our time-perceptions suggests to us the idea of seeking the ground of our space-perceptions in the objective nature

of the soul. The mind can only be endowed with this original feeling of extension, on the ground of its being *ab initio* a space-creating (*i.e.* an incorporising) being. Without this supposition, it would be absolutely impossible to conceive how the mental image of extension could ever exist within us, since in the nature and activity of the *consciousness*, as such, there is not the least occasion, or even possibility of bringing forth anything whatever of this kind.

The psychological conclusion we have now stated can be fully borne out by general metaphysical considerations. Every real existence (and of course the soul amongst the rest) must be conceived of, as not only enduring in the midst of change, but also as involved in mutual action and re-action with other things. And the mind is only distinguished from *consciousless* existences by the fact of *their* remaining unconscious of this double property of time and space, while both properties become inseparably connected in the soul itself *with* the consciousness of its own existence. It was in this original and inseparable feeling of duration and extension, that Kant found (and that quite correctly) the *à priori* nature of our time and space-perceptions; he only failed in one point, namely, in terming *that* an intuition (*Anschauung*) which is only developed upon the more advanced stage of our perceptive or thinking consciousness.

We cannot help attributing a great critical significance to this whole point of view. To those psychologists who maintain the soul to be a simple unextended substance, we oppose this one remark—that under such a supposition it

remains impossible to explain this main contradiction, namely, how, in a being perfectly distinct from all space-relations, a space-perception can be produced which is simply and in an unabstracted form ever present in the soul itself? If we conceive a being unextended, yet still subjected to inward changes, becoming endowed with consciousness, then time-perceptions *might* indeed arise within it, but no space-perception; for there is nothing there which could ever occasion it. If, on the contrary, we were to attribute consciousness to an inorganic body (a mineral, for instance) which is extended indeed, but subject to no *internal* changes, then, by parity of reason, there might arise in it a perception of space, but none whatever of time, just because there is no *consecutive* series of phenomena.

Thus then the absurdity of the doctrine of the *unextended* nature of the soul comes anew to light; it is seen to stand in the most manifest contradiction with the fundamental facts of our own consciousness, inasmuch as it is perfectly *inexplicable* how an unextended being should be under the necessity of regarding itself, even involuntarily, as a being existing and working *in space*. On the other hand, we are naturally led to conclude from the original consciousness of our space-existence, that there must be a *reality* at the bottom of the idea; the more so, because it is an original, involuntary, and necessary one.

This general view of the soul becomes thoroughly established if we follow out the genesis of the space-perceptions in detail. That original and inseparable space-consciousness (the primary foundation of the whole) is composed, if

we carefully examine it, of two well-defined elements. First of all, it involves extension as felt by us in a state of *rest*, *i. e.* a consciousness that we are space-existences, and occupy place. This primary space-perception is afterwards still further developed, and more accurately defined by the consciousness of our own bodily motions, motions of which the soul becomes cognisant as something pertaining to itself, and by means of which it apprehends itself as a being operating in space.

These *two* conceptions of space mutually modify each other, thus making our knowledge of body and its various localities more determinate and familiar. In order to conceive accurately of any bodily movement which we may desire to make, we must have previously gained, to say the least, some *indefinite* conception of the body itself, as an extended substance. On the contrary, it is only through the diversity which *motion* introduces into our space-perceptions, that the general consciousness of extension becomes clearer and more defined. Thus, from the original indistinct idea of body generally, we gain, step by step, a well-defined notion of *our own* body and its parts, which of course would not be possible without the general conception of its *boundaries*, in relation to the circumambient space.

This necessary process includes one of the most important extensions of our entire consciousness. It necessitates us, namely, to *carry out* the idea of extension, first over the whole body, and then gradually further and further, until it goes off into the infinite itself. The commencement of the entire process, however, lies in the original

feeling of extension. *Only on the ground of our being endowed from the first with a space-conception of ourselves can we represent everything else under the same form.* What we call external objects, are primarily nothing else than a group of different sensations, which come into immediate connexion with the space-relations of our own body; consequently, must be localized first in connexion with it, and then afterwards regarded in the process of the development of our space ideas independently of it.

The conception of infinite extension, which we now begin to sketch out, has thus the very same commencement as all the other space-relations. It is *thought* by us, as the lengthening out of the radii which stretch from our own centre to the surrounding void on every side.

From this we may see how the conception of *place* connects itself in the consciousness with the specific phenomena of sensation. We have already shown how the perception of external objects in general can only arise by virtue of an original type of space within us. The material of sensation, in other words, only takes the form of extension by virtue of its being included in our own nature. This is not done, however, in a general and indefinite manner; but it is by connecting everything with our own extension that we come at the same time to *localise* it, that is, to place it in a given space-relation to ourselves. There is no external sensation, accordingly, which does not bear upon it a determinate "*where*." Nevertheless, this "*where*" is not *felt*, (as if an object of sense) nor can ever become so; but it is the product of that arrangement which the perceptive faculty gradually

introduces into the general idea of extension, in relation first to our own body, and then to the objects around us.

And here we find a most simple explanation of another question, which presents insuperable difficulties to every system of psychology that starts upon purely spiritualistic principles;—I refer to the *localisation* of our outward sensations. As the space-relation in this case cannot be *felt*, and as, further, there could be no occasion in an absolutely inextended substance to originate the idea of space, or any of its relations at all; whence, we ask, does the *possibility* arise of the soul representing to itself those very sensations which differ from each other only in *quality*, as holding specific relations in *space*? And how does it come to apprehend them in such a manner, that both sight and touch perfectly *agree* in the process and results?

The whole difficulty of the question, on the purely spiritualistic supposition, has been clearly represented by Lotze,—not so much for the sake of throwing doubt on the ordinary opinions, as for the sake of relieving the difficulty itself. Whether he has really succeeded in doing this, we shall see by and by. For us, we may boast, no such difficulty arises; and we have the right, perhaps, to regard this very fact as a confirmation of our fundamental theory,

We are obliged, on other and quite independent grounds, to presuppose an original space-perception in the soul, according to which it arranges and localises the parts of body, and with them the affections which the body experiences. A prick in the finger, while it is felt and perceived *as a prick*, and not *as a burn*, must at the same time be localised in a particular spot. The pain itself and

the local sign always go together, although they spring from wholly different sources in the consciousness. No objective feeling can exist for the consciousness, without its local sign ; and, *vice versâ*, no local sign can be determined in the body without its being occasioned by such an affection of the nerves, as brings some sensation directly to the consciousness. From this we clearly see how the soul is necessitated to combine, indissolubly and infallibly, the consciousness of every affection with the local sign ; that is, with the consciousness of the *spot* where the affection takes place.

The correctness of this explanation is confirmed by the result of facts at first apparently anomalous. The soul localises more uncertainly, as we can easily see for ourselves, when it is obliged to refer the feeling to a part of the body, of which it has no very detailed perception ; as, for example, the back, or any portion of the surface which is usually covered. Here it requires some *attention*, in order to localise a sensation *precisely* upon the indefinite surface of this portion of the body. But then, the soul is really performing, expressly and specifically, what it has been doing, in general, *all its life long* ; namely, bringing the original and indistinct perception of its own body to a more clear and well-defined consciousness. The child (even after the age of infancy) can only assign the spot where it feels pain very indistinctly ; the idiot whines at pain, but is not able to point out the limb that is attacked by it ; we are all more or less uncertain, when it is required to localise a pain which is experienced internally. On the contrary, we may retain the distinct impression of limbs which have been lost, and may still continue to loca-

lise impressions in them, according to our wonted habit. Persons who have lost a limb usually feel pain in it long afterwards—nay, according to J. Müller, all their life after. During amputation, the limb *below the part that is severed*, is the scene of the most violent pain. In cases of artificial noses being formed from the skin of the forehead, every sensation in the nose is referred to the forehead, and the error is only gradually corrected. All these are cases *strictly* in point.

The question, again, respecting upright vision from an inverted image, is wholly relieved of its difficulties by the principles we have laid down. The fundamental supposition of the ordinary psychology is,—that the inverted image upon the retina propagates itself to the central organ of the brain, and there affects the consciousness. Accordingly, there must be, on this supposition, a twofold object, the one mediate, the other immediate; the one, the object itself as it stands in space—and the other, the inverted image of it. As, however, the soul stands in immediate connexion with *the latter*, the real object does not exist for the consciousness at all, but only the inverted image; and the question still remains unsolved,—why this object is always perceived correctly, and in perfect harmony with the results of the organ of touch! That the previous explanations of this have been unsatisfactory, is freely admitted, and is proved, indeed, by the tendency now shown to deny that the retinal image has any direct influence on the mind. Lotze expressly teaches, that the retinal image has *no* influence on the soul; but that we arrange objects in relation to space *quite freely*, by our own independent

mental activity. Still, it must be admitted, that the soul is impelled to this localisation by means of its impressions from without. The ground of it, therefore, can only lie in some particular property, which the impression acquires, by virtue of the special nature of the point where it affects the body, and which we then *add* to the sensation itself. In this way, Lotze considers that those *local signs* are generated, according to which the continuous impressions are moulded into an extended image.

According to Lotze, the soul localises every thing only in accordance with its own bodily organism, a result which we consider to be perfectly correct, though from his point of view not fully explained. Two things are here wholly overlooked. On his premises, it is neither explained how the perceptions of space can first arise in a soul which is wholly devoid of space-properties, nor in what way it can attain the image of any particular *position* in reference to the body, on which the local sign can be grounded; for he expressly affirms that, for the soul, no space-relations can exist *immediately*,—that it is only cognisant of *qualities*; and that from the connexion and combination of these it *creates* all the space-perceptions, so as to gain the power of grouping its sensations afterwards, according to their space-relations. If, however, the soul possessed *originally* no extension, which it applies first to its own body, and then to external objects around, we contend that it must ever have remained impossible to create the type of the *extensive* out of a merely *intensive* series of phenomena. It is just here, accordingly, that we become conscious of the defect in the whole of Lotze's explanation.

We shall attain a clear view of the whole matter if we consider somewhat more closely the relation of the organs of sight and touch in reference to special objects. First of all, we must reject the common notion that these two are *space-producing* senses. To maintain this is to plunge once more into subjective idealism. We should call sight and touch rather the *space-developing* senses. Since the soul gains a dim feeling of extension in its first dawning consciousness, it must be this perception which is developed and drawn out into detail by both, but not *produced*.

Whether the sense of sight, when the eye is at rest, grasps the phenomenon presented to it in the form of extended space, has been much doubted. This question can hardly be settled by observation; yet there does not appear to be any very good grounds for affirming the contrary. The construction of the nerves of vision is manifestly intended to keep every impulse separate, and transmit it separately to the brain. The elements, therefore, of continuity in space already exist there. So long, however, as the elementary sensations remain perfectly alike, there could certainly be no distinctive perception of space; for this to develop itself on the field of vision, there must be various shades of perception awakened in the consciousness. These being once awakened, the position of the different impulses in respect to one another (just as they appear on the retina *objectively*) must become distinguishable subjectively by the consciousness at the very same time that it marks their difference in *quality*. Here, accordingly, we grasp the *first link* in the whole explanation. Every visual sensation obtains a *local sign*, just

because its space-relation to the rest comes to consciousness *on this very spot*. What the propagation of the phenomenon to the brain signifies, we shall see hereafter; and shall show that it subserves altogether another purpose.

Even on the supposition of the eye being in repose, therefore, we have the various phenomena of sight presented under the form of extension, which of course implies a space-relation between them, however indistinct this relation may be. If this whole supposition (as is probably the case) should seem unsatisfactory as a full explanation of the phenomena of extension, then we can bring forward a second fact, which takes away all doubt respecting the correctness of our general point of view. The eye is scarcely ever *absolutely* at rest. As only one point in the retina at a time is adapted to perfectly clear vision, the necessity of keeping up a constant motion in the eyeball is produced. By means of these continuous movements, the image undergoes a similar series of changes, and out of these single elements there is formed in the consciousness a notion of a connected field of vision, presenting a fixed arrangement of the objects of sight; particularly as the beholder, moving the eye backwards and forwards, passes over the series of images in different directions. The arrangement of them comes thus to be regarded by the consciousness as something objective, and wholly independent of the subject himself.

In this process every thing appears in its *correct*, not in its *inverted* order, both to the eye and to the consciousness; for the consciousness judges from the eye's stand-point, not from what lies *behind* it. The rays of light which

come from above fall on the lower part of the retina, while those which come from below fall on the upper part of it. Those coming from the right fall on the left side; those from the left on the right. But, for this very reason, they must be localised by the perceiving consciousness, according to the direction to which they come, and consequently must be seen *erect*, not inverted. For the very same reason, we estimate the objects of sight according to the size of the angle of incidence which the rays of light describe; not according to the smallness of the retinal image, which in truth does not exist for the soul at all, but simply designates *the direction* in which it localises the objects presented.

In all this process, however, we must not forget the fundamental supposition, under which the whole becomes possible. If the stand-point of the consciousness in vision is removed from the eye itself to some central organ in the brain, then we find everything again plunged into confusion; inasmuch as nothing can exist to the mind except the minute and inverted image upon the retina. Even if the theory of a central organ in the brain were not wholly untenable on other grounds, we should be justified in rejecting it on this ground only, namely, that it throws what is in itself a very simple fact into the most inextricable confusion.

The question will hardly be here urged—why any apparatus for propagating the sensations of sight to the brain should exist, seeing that the consciousness *completes* the act in the sense-organ itself, and, therefore, cannot need any communication with the central brain? The ground of this

necessity lies quite in another direction. We have given reasons for maintaining that in a normal condition, no act of the soul, of whatever character, takes place without being connected with some corresponding kind of nervous action. Accordingly, we must consider it as established, that the cerebrum is the organ of conscious intelligence, *i.e.* of *thought*. If it be fully made out (as we believe it is), that no act of sensation takes place in the human consciousness *quite alone*, but that it is immediately elaborated, by means of combining, judging, and reasoning processes, into perceptions and notions, this whole fact answers most completely to the results of anatomical observation. All the nerves of sense must have their root in the brain, that is, must maintain their connexion with the organ of intelligence, since, but for this, no act of perception or intuition could take place.

In explaining the space-perceptions which accompany the sensations of feeling and touch, we must start in like manner from the original feeling of extension, which the soul possesses more or less distinctly in connexion with its own body. And here the necessary point of connexion can be still more distinctly seen than in the minute surface affected on the retina. All the sensations of touch localise themselves in the manner before described, that is, in connexion with the bodily organism, while at the same time they contribute to make our perception of the bodily form more distinct.

Yet, here also, as in vision, there is an analogous relation between the organ at rest and in motion, *i.e.* between feeling and *touch*, properly so called. The feeling of pressure,

which extends itself over a large portion of the body, in addition to its general localisation in the body, and in addition to the specific sensation it includes of cold, warm, rough, smooth, &c., develops a more or less well-defined image of the parts as related to each other in space, that is, it originates the dim perception of *surface*. Even the sensation of a point on the skin can only be presented to the consciousness (as far as this sense is concerned) under the form of a minute surface; not as a boundary between different planes, such as the corner of a die. In the sense of feeling without motion, however, we have *only* surface presented; it stands in this way analogously with the organ of vision, which while at rest can proceed no further than the mere perception of surfaces.

If the organ of *touch*, however, in connexion with motion is added, then these surfaces can become bounded by the very act of motion on every side, and thus be determined according to their length and breadth. Here then, quite analogously with vision, the accompanying consciousness can combine the single sensations into a continuous magnitude, a well-bounded surface. From this surface a new direction in space can begin, and thus the third dimension is generated, *i.e.* the idea of thickness is added to those of length and breadth. If we suppose that the organ moves itself along a surface, which we should *now* call a horizontal plane, and then all at once the limb sinks down into a plane below; this must necessarily produce in the *mind* the notion of an entirely new direction of surface. This gives the idea of a third dimension, with its accompanying perception of *body*. The third dimension is not *seen*, but

felt, and is only afterwards referred to the phenomena of vision; then at last, by an involuntary analogical conclusion, it is conceived of as existing *under* all the surfaces which we see around us.

It is of considerable importance for our whole view to say a word or two more respecting the origination of the image we form of our own bodily organisation. This, too, we must maintain finds its root in that indefinite feeling of extension which is inseparable from our own existence, and which gives us the perpetual certainty of our own corporeity. Immediately with this, however, there is associated the indefinite notion of a surrounding space, produced by the *movement* of our own body and its members. From the conscious development of both these elements, the image of our own bodily frame is gradually produced in our minds. This is effected, first of all, by *touch* co-operating with *sight*; but the image only comes to perfect clearness by subsequent comparison with the bodies of other men, so that a perfect notion of our own is only arrived at comparatively late, and very gradually, and that without the localisation of other bodies, in the manner already described, being at all hindered. For the clear distinction of our own from other bodies there is need of a second element. The image of the surrounding space must have become clear, in order to develop the notion of our own body *distinctly*, in opposition to that of the world at large. Here again, just as in the former instances, there is need of motion, not merely of single limbs, but of the whole body. When the body moves and alters its relation to other objects around it, the consciousness of the

alteration connects itself with the whole perception of space which we have attained in relation both to ourselves and the world at large. Thus we come to the stage of the question which is realised in our ordinary perceptive life.

The gradual extension of the space-perceptions rests originally upon a constant interchange from touch to sight—a perpetual exercise in reducing the forms of vision to those of touch. In this way we learn at last to *see* bodies, first our own, and then those of the external world generally. We cannot but remind ourselves here of the constant experience we have, that the child, in the first dawning period of consciousness, attempts to *touch* every object presented to it. This it does, not only because it is the evidence it requires for the objective existence of the thing presented; but because the child has not yet gained a complete notion of the surrounding space, according to which it ought to arrange the object presented *in space* to its view. It must hasten, therefore, to *touch* it—that is, bring it into continuity with its own bodily frame—in which alone it learns to exercise personal control over any objective certainty.

On this principle is to be explained the well-known fact, that a blind man, when brought suddenly to sight, regards the process of vision at first as another kind of *touch*. He sees all objects of sight equally near; he believes them to be in actual contact with the eye. In other words, he judges what is *seen* entirely according to the analogy of what is *felt*; and that clearly for want of a notion, *grounded on sight*, of the surrounding space, in which the objects are to be localised. For the same

reason, the blind man when restored sees everything as surface and in indefinite groups, and it is only gradually that he learns from the varied colouring to distinguish individual forms. The patient operated on by Dr. Franz could not distinguish a ball from the disk, a die from a square, and the perspective view of a corner threw him completely into confusion.

The reason why we lay so much stress upon this gradual development, is obvious. It confirms in the most varied manner the general basis of our theory. Feeling, touch, and sight are only the more specific development of that original perception of extension in the soul, which is inseparable from the feeling of its own existence. By means of touch, and the feeling of motion inseparable from it, the soul extends its knowledge of space beyond the limits of the body. Sight, considered psychologically, may be compared to a touch which stretches itself out into the boundless, and develops at length a fixed perception of space, on which the power of thought can lay hold, so as to make it the basis of a science of geometry. The germ and necessary starting-point for the whole, however, is the simple primitive feeling of extension in the soul. Inasmuch as the soul regards itself as an extended being, it is enabled to designate other beings as extended also, and to localise them in relation to itself.

CHAP. VII.

GENERAL RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT.

THE foregoing considerations have borne the character of a confession, inasmuch as it has never been pretended that the views brought forward are as yet fully substantiated, or incapable of being corrected and extended. So far from that, we see in them merely the commencement of many new developments and far-reaching investigations, which alone can give to our efforts the stamp of complete certainty. The term "confession" has been used by me, however, in a still more special sense. I have designed in this chapter to give some account of my own personal history, intellectually considered,—all of which is very closely connected with the questions here mooted, as well as many others which lie beyond them.

Professor Weisse's critique of my "Anthropology," to which I have already referred, offers me the wished-for occasion for these personal recollections. He has there remarked, that of the two main Ideas which religious and ethical philosophy are accustomed to oppose to sensational and materialistic opinions, namely, the Idea of the Creation, and that of personal Immortality, I have always laid the chief stress upon the latter,—while the interests of the whole question really demanded an equal degree of atten-

tion to be directed to both. Acknowledging, under certain restrictions, the truth of this assertion, I must admit that Weisse has here pointed out a peculiarity in my whole investigation. This peculiarity does not arise, however, in the slightest degree from any personal preferences, but is the result of strictly scientific considerations, and stands in the closest connexion with my whole philosophical system.

No science, least of all philosophy, can go beyond the natural point of *human* comprehension. It is only when we know *man* aright, that all other knowledge can stand forth in full distinctness. Nothing can be regarded as surely attainable for the consciousness which lies beyond the limits of his experience. On this account, I maintain the Idea of Creation can only become, in a very subordinate sense, the object of speculative investigation. The Idea merely affirms, in opposition to the atheistic and pantheistic systems, the *theistic* relation of the finite to the infinite; but it can never become the problem of theistic speculation *to deduce* the finite from the absolute, or determine the mode of its first coming into existence. This question can only obtain any theoretical solution by means of a strictly *pantheistic* philosophy; and with such a philosophy every Idea of Creation, properly so called, is wholly inconsistent. From the theistic point of view it would only be a confused relapse into the old principle of the identity of the finite and infinite.

These assertions are, on my side, neither new nor paradoxical. From my first appearance as an author, when I raised the banner of Theism, I have always held the

speculation must go back again to the Kantian principles, in order to find a solid foundation. Kant did not destroy the great doctrine of the Immanence of the universal reason, and of *à priori* ideas in the human consciousness, but established it in a new and more solid form. By making the broad distinction between pure thinking and real knowledge (at which both Bacon and Leibnitz hinted before him), he gave the right value to philosophical investigation, and made it *fruitful* in the genuine sense of that word. We can only gain a knowledge of God (I do not mean as an *à priori* idea, to which it is uncertain whether we can attach any objective value or not, but as a *real* Being) in an indirect way, and by means of *experience*; this experience including not merely the marks of intelligent *purpose*, as exhibited in nature, but also the moral facts of our inward being, and the deeply significant characters which they bear upon them. It is our *moral* nature especially (that which is at once the highest and surest in us) which drives us to the moral belief in a supreme and holy being. All this Kant demonstrated, and by so doing has at least shown the starting-point, from which alone theological *problems* can be successfully investigated.

Thus, then, the question arises, how far it is possible for us to unfold the nature of that soul, in whose depths these highest problems take their rise, and where alone they can be intelligibly solved. In answer to this question, it will not do to give a meagre conventional idea of man and his inner nature; we must have a living experimental evidence of what he is before us, in order to give a true

direction to philosophical thought. On this point, therefore, some few words of *confession* may be allowed me, in order to explain what it was which first drove me to philosophy, and determined beforehand the path in which I should go.

In my early years, while yet on the threshold of youth, I enjoyed the great happiness of possessing, in both my parents, (ever the objects of my highest veneration,) an example and an experience which shaped my whole future life. *The fact* of a life spent in the world above sense, fraught with high and world-conquering powers, which gave indomitable courage in life, and the highest resignation in death,—all this came before me in the most imposing form, at once inspiring and rousing to further contemplation. That picture of a “Life in God,” in which I was allowed to take part, though, as it were, from a distance, has never forsaken me; it was to me the summit and crown of existence, to which every earnest mind might attain; and at the same time the key to the comprehension of my father’s philosophy, both in its scholastic form and its deeper meaning. In my father’s “*Wissenschaftslehre*,”—in his “*Way to a Blind Life*,”—in the lectures he delivered in 1812 on *Morals*, the scientific interpretation of his life itself came before me with the greatest power. Kant’s doctrine, also, of the “*Homo noumenon*,” had an imperishable effect upon me; since the very soberest of all thinkers there showed that he could not draw himself away from the power of that great fact by which, as he expresses it, man is placed in the midst of a supersensual order of things. My half-philosophy.

logical studies of Plotinus and the Neo-platonics, brought me now into connexion with *Theosophy*; while the love which my mother bore to the Christian mystics also introduced me into this rich world of mental experience.

Thus, then, by these involuntary mental influences (which I cannot value too highly), I was from the very first raised, *in fact* if not *in speculation*, beyond the mere pantheistic idea of God; as also beyond the natural faith-principle of Jacobi. Thus the fact of a Divine providence was revealed to me in the actual experiences of life. The task still remained to investigate this fact on philosophical grounds, and to gain from it a complete philosophy of the universe.

Here I must observe, that at this time (*i.e.* soon after the commencement of the present century), the sentimental theism of Jacobi predominated in the theological world, especially in the form in which Fries presented it, mixed up, that is to say, with a considerable element of Kantism. Amongst the younger philosophical thinkers, "Oken's Natural Philosophy" exercised a great influence, especially as in his "Isis" he had infused into his system a bold political tone. He stood as the chief representative of the then reigning Natur-philosophie. The originator of this school, I mean Schelling, was no longer active; Hegel was scarcely known; while Schleiermacher and Steffens exercised a good deal of power, but within more limited circles. It is not to be denied, indeed, that his (Oken's) independent style of thought, and the bold decision of his philosophical speculations, was naturally calculated to impose upon the youth of that age. Although many of his poli-

tical sayings compelled a tumultuous approbation, yet his philosophical dogmas made a bad, and sometimes even a comic impression upon me, on account of their unmeasured but empty pretensions. One might admit a certain *appearance* of logical connexion in his idea of God, as the zero out of which every finite existence springs, and into whose abyss it must return;—and of nature as the eternal producer without beginning and end; yet the whole was but mere scaffolding—an empty form—wherewith to cover the insolubility of the problems, for which his more successful scientific views could not compensate. We will not at present call up the ghosts of old controversies; still it may not be useless here to notice, with what poverty-stricken husks, both on the one and the other side, the aspiring youth of that time was nourished; and on this ground, at least, we may admit the great merit of Hegel, who, to say the least, put an end to this solemn trifling.

Under these circumstances, I betook myself to the prime originator of this whole philosophical method,—I mean, to Spinoza. But here I found, in the main, the same defects. To his doctrine of absolute necessity, which drew everything into a chain of fixed consequences, and destroyed all purpose and all freedom, I opposed the grand objection of Leibnitz, — that this doctrine does not at all answer to the real constitution of the world, which constitution bears plainly upon it the stamp of a whole system of means and ends, worked out according to the laws of intelligence and order; and that it is the notion of a relative, a moral, and an intelligent necessity, which can alone answer to the facts

of the case. How much that is grand and beautiful Leibnitz drew from this simple and convincing thought, is well known. I gave myself, therefore, next, and that diligently, to the study of this great thinker, then, strange to say, almost forgotten and despised.

But even in Spinoza's doctrine, the profound idea of an "*amor intellectualis Dei*" — the crowning-stone of the whole building — appeared to me to give the lie to his whole principles rather than confirm them; inasmuch as it threatened to pull down, at last, the blank conception of the impersonality of God, and the unsubstantiality of the human soul. In this idea, I found those great ethical and religious facts *again* making their appearance, and that in their purest and happiest form. Love is a feeling so rich, and which pre-supposes such a fulness of complete personality, that it becomes an unintelligible paradox to attribute it to an abstract and impersonal substance, or to affirm that the unsubstantial and finite *modes* of the absolute thought (for the human soul in this system is nothing more) could possibly be the possessors of such a feeling.

Such are the philosophical caricatures which must always be produced if we undertake to force the rich fulness of life itself into the limits of incompetent theories. Such theories cannot really be completed even in thought, still less can they satisfy the human curiosity as being an exhaustive explanation of the facts themselves.

My own education, which had ever impelled me to some definite results, had early protected me from the prejudice of imagining that there could be any particular depth or extraordinary wisdom in such nebulous propositions. I

set all such suspicious pretensions to depth of thought on one side, and have found abundantly since then the value of such a course in the study of Schelling and Hegel.

Still the question ever returned,—where the central idea was to be found, by means of which it was possible to get beyond the whole circle of these doctrines, and that, too, on scientific grounds. And here I must acknowledge, thankfully, what I owe to the influence of Heinrich Steffens. I found in him the same causes of dissatisfaction with the reigning philosophy—a similar struggle to throw off the yoke of abstract ideas—and the same impulse to solve the problem of the world as well as the soul out of the fulness of nature and the life of history. To him I owe it, next to Kant, Fichte, and Leibnitz, that my attention was directed to the right and complete Idea of Man as based upon *experience*. I refer on this point particularly to his “Anthropology,” which we must regard as his chief work. Man is, according to him, a being standing within the limits of nature, and yet above nature. He is a being, too, possessing perfect individuality, because the individual element does not find its primary ground simply in organic differences, but in the intellectual and moral constitution of the soul.

The doctrine of *Genius*, in a word, was first sketched out by Steffens, and regarded by him as affecting the whole character of psychology. This doctrine was hinted at in Schelling’s “Treatise on Freedom,” but without being distinguished from the opposite view with any degree of clearness. In Hegel’s philosophy the whole idea was *suppressed*; inasmuch as he took the whole ground-

work of genius out of the sphere of the human, and raised it into the region of absolute reason.

Around this cardinal point the whole of our present philosophy turns, as on a pivot; and upon the correct interpretation of it depends not only the much-needed reconciliation between faith and knowledge, but even the solution of social questions, and the great problem of the future.

The whole mental and moral culture which we now enjoy, is confessedly based upon the foundation of Christianity; for it is its power and operation which have essentially widened the scope of the human consciousness. The mighty spiritual fact of a new birth, of an irresistible reconstruction of man's self-seeking individuality, cannot be strange to any one of us; for every one who has grown up in the consciousness of the Christian church must have felt such tones and ideas, either in a weaker or a stronger degree, vibrating through his heart. But that powerful and penetrating testimony of Christ, which conceals within it the germ of a new epoch, and a new world,—namely, that the Godhead became *visibly* present to mankind in him, and that he has given us access to the Father; this testimony we have all heard, and if it be as yet unable to make itself fully comprehended as a psychological and speculative reality, ever operating in the world, yet is it a testimony which has a deep and wide reaching meaning in it, and which demands all our mental effort to comprehend and realise it.

Here then is the main point for our consideration. No philosophy, and no psychology, that fails to penetrate into

these facts, and show the grounds on which they rest, can be regarded as equal to the present Christian type of human society, and fully capable of explaining its highest mental phenomena. And this is no overdrawn claim; for he only who can satisfy *the highest fact* in our circle of knowledge, can be regarded as comprehending it as a whole.

But now comes the remarkable circumstance (one more-over not yet admitted as it ought to be), that the acknowledgment of these ethico-religious facts altogether goes beyond the limits of the reigning philosophical culture, and brings both the speculative subjective systems, as also those which affirm the identity of the divine and human, to a complete stand. A mere *subjective* seeking and longing for the Infinite is but a poor and empty experience; nay, it may be termed, historically, a retrograde and Judaistic principle; for God has *really* manifested himself, and is ever present as an *objective* power, both in the historical life of the church, and as a holy influence in the mind.

In the light of this fact, the well-known theory of the identity of the divine and human becomes altogether untenable; and the substantial individuality of the human mind is brought logically to view. If the human individual were merely a passing wave in the eternal process of the infinite mind, the fundamental fact of our moral and religious consciousness would sink down to a complete falsehood and a psychical deception. In feeling ourselves grasped, inspired, purified by the Spirit of God, we become conscious at once of our own being and personality, and that as one which has to be *subdued*, and is, consequently, wholly distinct from the divine will itself. This is not a

mere arbitrary reflection ; it is one which carries with it a psychological evidence. The whole process of self-renunciation and sanctification, so arduous to the human mind, would contain no reality and no value ; it would be a mere illusive phantasmagoria, if the pantheistic principle were a true one.

It is not necessary, however, to explain these points any further, since they have been already explained in various ways, and not, as I can testify, without effect. What I wish, however, particularly to remark is, that my own efforts are to be judged only from this point of view. To found a new speculative philosophy upon this principle is the main object of my three principal works, and they can only be understood in this light.

The "Speculative Theology" maintains a moral idea of God, and discovers in the moral and religious facts of human nature the premises on which it seeks to comprehend the nature of God, of man, and of the universe. The "Ethics" is intended to show that every self-made and purely human system of morals is *unsatisfactory*, not only in regard to theory, but also to practice ; and it consequently seeks to unite morals and religion in one indissoluble bond. The "Anthropology" will only complete the purpose it has in view, in the second or psychological part ; but its investigations are *so far* fundamental and preparatory, inasmuch as they are designed to direct the course of all speculation *to one point*, viz. the experimental knowledge of the human mind.

It will now be sufficiently evident why the idea of creation has always stood, to me at least, in the second

degree of importance; nay, why every theological cosmogony can possess but a very equivocal worth in my eyes. Schooled in the spirit of the Kantian philosophy, I have become deeply convinced that we can learn *nothing whatever* respecting these questions by any *à priori* procedure, or from any inner laws of reason; and that we must pursue the more modest pathway of drawing a hypothetical conclusion concerning the nature and operations of the universe from facts which lie open to our observation. It is quite competent for us, however, in the spirit of the Kantian philosophy, to give to the human soul, with its inward experience, the first and most important place amongst all the facts of this nature. But it is ever necessary to insist upon clearness and logical consecutiveness in regard to these relations. The idea of our being able to deduce any process of cosmogony from a central theological stand-point is purely delusive; so that, absolutely nothing which depends upon these suppositions, or is deduced from these premises, can be reckoned as the result of a true philosophy, but only as a misty deceptive *gnosis*, which has ever been the mother of destructive errors, just because it is only the appearance of science, and not science itself. However deep or expansive philosophy may become, this necessary limit, and the consciousness of it, must never be lost sight of.

Starting, then, from the positive facts of nature and the human soul, God no longer appears in our philosophy as a mere cosmical principle, nor a mind and personality *absolutely* considered; but as a being who manifests essentially the purest qualities of personality—a being holy and bene-

ficient. Nor can the most inconsiderate thinker detect here the slightest approach to Anthropomorphism, inasmuch as he must be met by the reflection, that the divine operation in man is seen exactly in this fact, that he possesses in his breast a spark of that holy feeling, by means of which the obduracy of his own selfishness is so melted, as to evince the superhuman power of the influence that operates within him.

The idea of creation presents itself quite in a new light, when once brought into connexion with these views. It is no single problem standing on a level with many others, but it summons the whole bent of speculative theology to throw light upon it, and to bear a united testimony to the existence of one supreme personality. This testimony is forced upon us by the necessity of admitting in the universal order and connexion of things intelligent agencies as their basis, and by the manifestation, which we have on every side, of divine beneficence in all the *finite* arrangements of the world. When, therefore, all the various crude theories of God and the world have one by one disappeared under the evidence of this one great idea, then the aim of the whole comes more clearly than ever to view,—that, namely, of exhibiting to us both a *Creator* and a *Creation*, in the true and genuine sense; and of showing us that there is a perfectly free relationship established between them, which is known and witnessed, not by means of uncertain and shadowy theories, but by the living converse of the divine and the human spirit in the depths of the human consciousness.

The philosophy we profess is not ashamed to confess that within this whole sphere of enquiry it can lay no claim to

absolute mathematical certitude, just because the *material* of enquiry goes beyond the region of formal or logical necessity, and contains a specific reality, which in *its facts* can only be investigated experimentally, and only explained hypothetically in its inner *causes*. Here, as in the experimental sciences, speculation can only draw *probable* conclusions, and frame hypotheses in the way of induction and analogy. In these hypotheses, too, we ever take into account the exact degree of inward probability, and endeavour definitely to fix the exact gradation of certainty, which we can give to our deductions.

If, then, the problem of our philosophy in this first respect, both as to matter and form, is strictly limited, yet it has, on the other hand, in reference to its endless details, a most unlimited sphere of action. It divides itself into a series of special investigations, which uniformly aim more and more at a general result, and which for this very reason do not exclude, nay rather expressly include, one leading fundamental thought—a thought which can never be said to be fully exhausted, because the material bearing upon it is of infinite extent. Philosophy, as universal science can never be *completed*; though, as *ontology*, it may be brought to a termination, and as metaphysics it has even now probably reached its highest point, just because the interest of the subject has always turned the human mind to the great question of the possible proof for the existence of a God.

I need hardly say how certain it is that speculation, when once released from the shackles of false methods and prejudices, must start on a new career; while, at the same

time, it turns back again to that free method of investigation, which was followed by all great thinkers, such as Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, and Kant, men who, though differing in their results, yet all display an intellectual relationship in this one respect, that they do not start from these *à priori* opinions and formulas, but from the induction and determination of individual facts. We shall attempt to show, even in the short compass of this treatise, what a close bearing psychological facts, thus treated, must have upon the whole sphere of human speculation.

First of all we may notice that, inseparably connected with this theistic view, is the faith in a divine providence; and that not in the sense of a mere superintendence of those general laws which lie at the basis of the stability of nature, and the historic life of man, but more expressly in the sense of a holy and benevolent superintendence of human destiny, in relation to the individual affairs of each separate person. This conviction is so surely the goal of theism, the ripest and most refreshing fruit of its whole course of thought, that it were vain to attempt to separate the one from the other, or abate the least particle of its force and meaning.

This doctrine cannot either be regarded, in any degree whatever, as the mere expression of a childish faith, or of an undefined wish, which further investigation shows to be groundless; but we are compelled to acknowledge that however strange it may appear to many brought up in the philosophical abstractions of the day, the idea of a special providence is the *necessary consequence* of the more general notion of a historical providence, and must stand or fall

with it. In the province of history there is nothing specially great or small; it is only our inclination and partiality which makes it either the one or the other. The great and the universal can only represent the unity of the whole plan of the world, in so far as *the particular*, in whose complications it is really involved, completely answers to it. If, therefore, there is an order in the universe (for which all the facts of nature are a guarantee), the *particular* must form part and parcel of it. It is providence in the smallest parts which alone can make good the whole. History, considered outwardly and empirically, is no other than the sum of those small events, in which the general plan fulfils itself. Accordingly, even those minute arrangements which often depend apparently upon our arbitrary actions or non-actions, must really be governed by this universal superintending power, without our being able to comprehend the nature of the superintendence, or needing any experimental certainty of it.

This fact, therefore, stands sure. The possibility of an individual providence in history must be assured, before we can trust the idea of a universal one,—not the reverse; for without the former, the latter would remain unreal and abstract; *i. e.* the particular, in which the very essence of history consists, must be abandoned to chance or caprice. Such a mere general providence we see actually existing within the kingdom of nature; and, on account of its generality, we hesitate to term it providence in a peculiar sense. In nature we find the *general* connexion of things arranged in the most definite way, and all the co-operating conditions reckoned on in the most wonderful manner, but

still only for the *general* result. This is done in the inorganic world, in order to preserve the equilibrium between the universal powers of nature; and in the organic world, in order to preserve the genera and species, whilst the *individual* appears left indifferently to chance. At any rate we do not find, in the arrangements of nature, any trace of special care for the individual. But for this very reason the case must be altogether different with man and his history; for, as has been shown on all hands, the individual holds precisely the same place in the world of mind, which in the world of nature is allotted to the *species*. On that account the law of his life is a higher one. He exists as such only *once*; and the idea, according to which he is planned, is not scattered, as in the animal, in numberless exemplars over the whole surface of nature. For the same reason also, and just because *new* minds are ever appearing, it is in the power of man to weave the web of history. For history brings forward continually *what is new*, and thus breaks in upon what would be otherwise the uniform course of nature. According to this conclusion, the human individual may console itself with this most bold and sublime, but yet most healing faith, that there watches over him a most special providence; *that he stands as an individual before the Eternal Eye, and is received as a personality into that same consciousness which embraces and orders all things.*

These convictions must be held not as overdrawn or illusive, but as natural, consecutive, and based on the analogy of facts, before we can draw near to the other great problems, or feel any interest in them. Every thing is

really included in the postulate of an all-embracing Providence, with which our speculative theology has already shown that human liberty is by no means inconsistent. On this question, therefore, we do not touch at present. If we wish, however, to gain a nearer view of the intermediate agencies by which that providence adapts itself to the separate concerns of the individual, we must confess that modern speculation has hardly ventured as yet into the province, or indeed hardly faced the problem itself. The general tendency has been to leave this part of our religious conviction to a humble, trusting faith; it has been regarded as vain curiosity to attempt to lift the veil which covers the secret relations of the eternal and the human, seeing that the most unhealthy extravagancies and most deceptive illusions have sprung from the attempt to arrogate any direct and express converse with what is inscrutable. Nevertheless, no one that seeks for clearness and completeness in his convictions can pass by the deep need which exists to gain some comprehensible point of view, although it may be necessary after all that this view should remain in the form of a mere hypothesis.

Still one can hardly doubt but that some thread of analogy, happily caught up, will be able at length to lead us (at least to some extent) from the known into the unknown, and throw light upon some portion of the general obscurity; for God shows himself in the laws of the universe to be ever true to his own plan, always linking one thing to another in regular succession, and bringing the greatest results out of the most unlikely operations. If we wish to comprehend the arrangement of single events,

we must undoubtedly investigate the manner in which the *greater* events of universal history are fulfilled.

The law and the form, according to which Providence conducts the universal affairs of the spirit-world, can neither be doubtful or uncertain. It raises up *great men*, or *great nations*, at the right time, and in the right place, who, with a power against which all human opposition is vain, loosen the trammels which stop the progress of history, and in the most unexpected way impress upon it a wholly new form. The divine element in history is recognised in those discoveries and free actions which no mere human wisdom could have thought out, but which appear suddenly in all their astounding and overwhelming reality. We may regard them, therefore, as, strictly speaking, *inspired*; inspired, inasmuch as that which no one ever aimed at or designed, nevertheless takes place by means of a higher might, which works through human freedom, and carries off the victory at last. But this superhuman power does not show itself as a magical, miraculous, and supernatural thing; it adapts itself rather to the flow of ordinary circumstances, and to the outward connexions of cause and effect.

For here that great and beneficent law of the divine economy comes into force, which not only connects every thing in the world's progress with human freedom, but which makes the very blessing which the divine power alone has brought into being, to be communicated and established by human agency. It is always *men* who labour in God's stead; *they* are the *angels* which he commissions, and by which he accomplishes his work in us. Thus, on one side

at least (that of man himself), it becomes fully comprehensible to us in what way the divine providence embraces the individual. It is, as every one may and does experience for himself, partly by the working of mind upon mind, and partly by an inward converse of the soul with itself, which it were wholly unsatisfactory to ascribe to the mere voice of conscience, that he is guided in his path. In neither the one form of influence or the other, do we detect any thing strange or unnatural. It is only in the human form, and by human methods, that providence works upon us, and that by the medium and not in spite of our own freedom.

It is a point, however, not so easily to be decided, whether it is God himself, the infinite, the all-embracing mind, who *immediately* treats with us, the earth-born and the finite, in that inward converse of which we have spoken, and who thus comes into direct relationship with our own minds. Why, in accordance with that divine economy which we term the beneficent government of the world, should not the principle of substitution still continue to hold good; and human guidance be delegated to the intermediate stages of the spirit world? That almost all historical religions (Christianity in all its earlier and less abstract forms included) have adopted this manifest and simple explanation, that it was the oldest and most extended faith of mankind, does not assuredly make it any the worse. We may say, indeed, as one of our deepest and most unprejudiced thinkers said on a like occasion, *Is then this hypothesis so ridiculous because it is the oldest, and because the human reason accepted it before the sophistry of the schools had distracted and weakened it?*

Let us come to a more definite understanding, however, upon the real nature of the case, and look at the problem a little more closely. By doing this, we shall have an opportunity of showing the subject in a yet more general point of view.

The present scientific view of the universe (for we must here candidly speak out our convictions), principally in reference to the insight it has gained into the astronomical and dynamical infinity of nature, could not do otherwise than shatter and cast into the background the old form of theistic belief, such as we find it in the Old Testament; and such as Christianity itself, by tradition, received it. The God of Science (the God, *i.e.* of scientific theistic convictions), is no longer the Lord of Zebaoth of the Old Testament, who has heaven for his throne, and the earth for his footstool; who also made upon Sinai a personal compact with the children of Israel, the keeping of which he demanded with zeal and anger. Nevertheless, the moral effect of this faith was deep and powerful. The proud consciousness of walking before the eye of God; the unbounded confidence inspired by the thought of being selected by him for his peculiar care, gave to that people an indomitable energy, on account of which it was alike celebrated and hated in antiquity.

The Jewish conception of the nature of the Godhead continued crude, contracted, and highly subjective; but the operation of the religion itself upon the mind reached amongst them to its highest point. Heathenism also, especially the Greek religion, was replete with a similar faith. The poems of Homer and Hesiod are full of confi-

dence in protecting deities ; nay, this was the very vehicle for that many-sided polytheism, which has been correctly paralleled with the invocation of saints in the Catholic Church. Both alike testify to the irrepressible impulse there is in the human mind to multiply the forms of divine assistance, in order to bring them nearer. And we must admit that our modern enlightenment, which has long thrown on one side all these intermediate agencies as a superfluous superstition, appears in comparison with that ancient trust in God, poor indeed ; and that we are on that account far more powerless *as men*.

But Christ appeared — broke down for ever the narrow limits of this mode of conceiving the Deity — and founded a new moral and religious world, by revealing a wholly new consciousness of the divine. This he did by doctrines such as these : God is our father ; God is the father of all men ; and he who has seen me, has seen the Father also. Here, then, the belief in a personal providence was established in a deeper and more inspiring form than in either heathen or Jewish antiquity ; for there was no longer any need of an offering in order to find access to the Godhead. Christ has brought the offering for us all ; God himself opened the way of access to himself, in and through him. This was testified by the enduring constancy of the early Christians. The first martyr, Stephen, in dying, saw heaven opened, and the glory of God, and Jesus standing at the right hand of the Father. This new, pure, elevated, world-embracing faith, was founded as on a rock ; but the *scientific* conception of the universe remained as before ; nay, in the scholastic age it was scientifically confirmed through the aid and authority of the Aristotelian system.

It was a perfectly logical and far-sighted policy, therefore, exercised by the Catholic church, in refusing to admit the Copernican system. It must have seen that one of the most important pillars of a living faith would be shaken by it. The Godhead was enthroned, by this system, in an immeasurable universe; and thus removed, to the believing consciousness of man, to an infinite distance. Nevertheless science triumphed, as it ever does, over faith; not over faith in its inward substance, but over certain theoretically false ideas, which had become arbitrarily united to it: and notwithstanding the sporadic efforts of a self-compromising orthodoxy, which occasionally strove to compel astronomy to reverse its decisions, their retrograde attempts have never been able to shake the firm foundations of science. So much the more need is there that we should look steadily at all the alterations which this widened view of the universe must introduce into the region of faith, and not shrink from its farthest consequences.

But here it must not be forgotten, that if the old notion of a God, who exists only for man and this earth, has been completely exploded, we have, as the result of scientific research, a far more sublime, and not less elevating view of the Godhead in exchange. If experience itself, if the very facts of geology lead us to the most irresistible convictions of theism, to the sublime idea of an all-perfect, eternal, and omniscient mind, such investigation of the laws and order of the universe widens our idea of the divine wisdom, so that even by means of science itself the impulse is raised within us to worship and adore. Science, therefore, in this light confirms the faith, that where chasms and dark

spots still remain, the divine wisdom will be equally operative even there.

But the most significant point yet remains. Providence *in nature* shows itself as being altogether general; it relates to the preservation of the universal, not of the individual. And yet, notwithstanding this, we continue to hold the conviction bordering on certainty, of an individual care exercised towards man and his destiny.

Here we cannot fail to acknowledge a decided difficulty—a difficulty, however, in relation to our knowledge, not in the objective constitution of things; for here, least of all, can the faith (confirmed as it is by the whole of our earthly experience) of a regularity and continuity in the laws of the world, fail us. Surely there must be here also a concatenation of divine arrangements, which reaches from the most general laws by which the universe is sustained, down to the special guardianship of the individual soul. Neither is it to be denied that the province of these operations is at the same time the very point in which the experimental solution of the whole problem is to be sought. Since the individual providence has only the inward perfecting of souls—their redemption and blessedness, for its aim, its operations can only fall within the world of mind, and must adapt itself to its laws and regulations. All this, however, is simply bare generality; the particular mode in which the existence of an individual providence is realised, remains uncertain; still given up to indistinct possibilities, and uncertain speculations.

This difficulty, which could never be relieved by mere speculation, or by the investigation of the general laws of

nature, has been solved in the most wondrous manner by a historical religious fact. This fact is the testimony of Christ to himself, and that of the greatest and most profound of the apostles regarding him. He is one with the Father, and he who sees him, sees the Father who sent him. And further, Paul affirms, He is the image (εἰκών) of the invisible God—the first-born of all creatures, the reflection of his glory—the express image (χαράκτήρ) of his person. The peculiar sense of this and all other similar expressions, nay, the character of the whole Christology of the New Testament, cannot be mistaken. It contains exactly what has hitherto failed us in the entire burden of our philosophy, and brings in simple clearness before us, exactly the element which we needed to complete it.

If the Old Testament—if heathenism in the narrow circle of its views, did not stand in need of “a Christ,” in order to be assured of the close and personal influence of the Godhead, we moderns assuredly need him; we, to whom the Godhead has become either a mere abstract law, or a shadowy generality, or at furthest has attained the form of an infinite wisdom, universal in its operation, but not adapted to the special wants of humanity. Christ, then, *i.e.* the divine power which appeared on earth, in the man Jesus of Nazareth, becomes to us the *comprehensible* divinity—the infinite brought home to our conceptions—the eye of God ever near, and ever resting upon us. That individual providence which we felt dimly to be a necessary postulate to our thought and our whole personal self-consciousness, becomes *in him* certain and comprehensible; for it has there become like to the human itself—a person-

ality allied to our own. God is mindful of us in him, loves and redeems us through him, for he has not regarded man as too insignificant to enter into a human form, and to become at once the chief and first-born of his brethren. If, therefore, the highest attributes of God can be only found in the province of moral ideas, and based upon universal grounds, they, on the other hand, find the conditions of their comprehensibility only in the supposition of the special personality of the Godhead. Christ is, so to say, the *actual ground and fundamental proof* that God, in the highest sense, is Love; *i.e.* a beneficent, individual, personal, providence. In him, therefore, lies the only comprehensible medium of its special operations for the welfare of man.

Here, also, we can understand how fully justified the New Testament is in insisting that access to, and union with, the Father is only possible through Christ; that he who denies the Son cannot have the Father. This holds good both objectively and subjectively. First, objectively, for the Godhead which steps forth from its infinity, and shows itself to us, can be no other, and is in no other way comprehensible than as it reveals itself to us, as putting off the form of the Infinite, and clothing itself in that of a human personality: and, secondly, subjectively, since no believer can exercise an unwavering faith in an individual providence, and no thinking man can justify this belief without acknowledging that Christ is the Divinity made manifest, and that he is the middle-point of all the influence which proceeds from the operations of providence upon the whole world of mind. Otherwise there is a

complete chasm between the idea of an individual providence and the infinity of the Divine mind; which infinity we are bound to believe in from the whole order of the universe, but which cannot satisfy us *as a faith*, just because we must appear lost in the magnitude of that universal operation. At the furthest we can only attain in this view to that resigned love of *the all*, and of God in all, which Schleiermacher, in his "Discourses on Religion," has pictured to us so *finely*; but still not without a half impression of sorrow and melancholy.

Accordingly, we do not see how speculation, once awakened to the importance of gaining a clear comprehension of the doctrine of providence, can separate itself from the acknowledgment of that great testimony respecting Christ, since it must confess that this furnishes the only real solution of it, and the only one which is strictly analogous with the other laws of the universe. A complete speculative theology can only be realised by a Christology; for it must demand such a supreme manifestation of deity, and seek for it amongst the facts of the world. Conversely, the fact of Christ's historical appearance, with all its world renovating influences, is the decisive test of the truth of this whole view. What was otherwise wanting in order to have the idea of providence confirmed, and made consistent at once with the universal laws of the world, and with human history, is supplied in the Divine Man. History itself, too, has once for all received its divine seal—its providential stamp; and the two extreme points in the investigation of *the real* (namely, the starting-point from the universe as a whole, and the return to the destiny of

the individual) are here brought into harmony, and made mutually to confirm each other.

Here, then, speculation can start upon a new series of facts and investigations. What has been usually termed philosophy of religion, and which consisted in a number of partly metaphysical, partly psychological and moral ideas, being now enlivened and enlarged by the absorption of a Christian element, is elevated above this confused mass of heterogeneous ideas, and contains altogether a new problem. The metaphysical, psychological, and ethical questions, must in the first instance be discussed and settled; the former to show that the general idea of a living and personal God is implied even in the nature of the world; the latter to expound the universal character of the religious consciousness, and the process of its purification, and at the same time to show, in the ethical process of the human will, the element which is more than human. The objective side of religion, on the contrary, the divine manifestation which meets the moral and religious wants of man, can only be found *in history*, *i.e.* in historical religious facts, or in the actual religious systems which the whole flow of time presents to our view. To gain a full comprehension of the hidden meaning of these, and draw from them that idea of an inner providence which our previous speculations had rendered necessary, would be the noblest problem of a philosophy of history; and it could not appear at all strange in the present connexion to explain the nature of that problem, as an attempt to show, in their historical form, the different phases of development, through which the consciousness of mankind (*i.e.* of different people,

and of different ages) has appropriated the hidden, but gradually manifested Spirit of God in Christ.

This purely historical confirmation of a divine providence in the world, can alone give completeness and objectivity to the idea of religious faith. Here both sides of that faith, the subjective human and the objective divine, are united and placed in due relation. For God is not only an object of faith, as is usually said; he operates faith *in us*, and gives in this very fact the most lively proof of his existence and care. This undeniable idea of a revelation, to which a thorough analysis of the religious facts in the consciousness of man must lead us, does not remain either confined within the narrow limits of individual intimations;—but we must come to the acknowledgment of a *connected and historical process of revelation*, which in large epochs slowly but continuously completes the religious education of mankind. If Kant, in view of the psychological proof, could break out into the remarkable words: “That reason cannot be so crushed by any abstract speculation that it will not be awakened out of its uncertainty, as from a dream, by the view of nature and the majesty of the universe, and be thus carried onwards from one degree to another, until it raises itself to the great unconditioned first cause of all,”—surely the very same remark will hold good in a still more peculiar and effectual manner in relation to the wonders and the majesty of the religious facts of history. Here facts present themselves, with which nothing emanating from human endeavour can be brought into comparison, in which that which is at first the most unapparent rises to supreme importance,

and in reference to which it would be just as shallow and irrational to attribute anything to human power, as it would be to do so in the case of the wise and beneficent operations of nature herself.

Wouldst thou then, in feeble irresolution, doubt any longer of God's presence? Wouldst thou seek the Divinity beyond the stars, just where he can never be found?—Then this close, this soul-stirring divine presence can heal thee. Wouldst thou despair of the future of humanity, which now seems to be hastening inevitably to the abyss of ruin by turning its highest blessing into a curse? Then let the past teach thee, that nowhere, and at no time, was the Spirit of God withdrawn.

These considerations, it is evident, will ever be more closely associated with psychological research than with any of the other sciences; and if we judge rightly, psychology alone will be able, at least on one side, to complete the great superstructure of these convictions. There is yet one member wanted to complete the idea of an individual providence. It was shown that providence works in general in the form of *Inspiration*, *i. e.* it incorporates the new ideas it has to develope into the process of history, by means of great and inspired men. But here there is yet an element of generality remaining; and the final question is still unanswered,—*How* are these providential operations combined and ordered? It is not the man of genius—the man called of God—the sinner who was estranged and is restored—it is not he that can be the medium of these providential arrangements. He needs the ever-present and ever-accompanying aid of the Divinity; and it is just be-

cause he needs it, and because his confidence in that help is inseparable from his religious consciousness, that he can be certain of its reality. A truly living faith can remove mountains, — that is, can change all the conditions of things from their very foundations. The result never fails — and the co-operating conditions, which are wholly independent of himself, are never wanting. No man of faith has ever doubted of them, and no one ever been disappointed. Providence works down to the most individual circumstances, otherwise its universal operation would have no value.

But the question is, In what form, and under what conditions does the Divine Omnipotence here exert itself? *How* does the Godhead step down from its infinity, and stoop to the individual wants of this our earth and of human destiny? This is the last question which Theism had to answer; a question which was partly solved by the well-grounded faith in the Godhead of Christ — but is still not yet *wholly* and *completely* answered. For the ordinary hypotheses of the ubiquity of the body and operation of Christ cannot here suffice; it throws us back once more into those abstract indeterminate nebulous conceptions, which always proved unsatisfactory, just for this reason, — that they are in direct contradiction to the spirit and meaning of the whole creation, — to the absolute and unbroken completeness of those divine arrangements which we meet in all that is visible around us. It is obvious that in this question the analogy of the universal laws of the world again ought to guide us.

And here we are again brought back to that solution which was before recommended by its coincidence with all


the analogies of nature, and which is calculated to supply the only link that is wanting in the idea of a universal providence. Why should not the inward mental influences which impel to these results be communicated by intermediate orders of the spirit-world? Why should not this all-present guidance of human destiny be entrusted to the care of more advanced and perfected minds? To neither question, indeed, can science give any peremptory and certain answer; but the whole must be left to individual experience, and a purely personal faith. Still science can decide, in general, upon the possibility, and in particular upon the probability of this solution. In both respects there can be hardly a more natural and obvious explanation; and, what is still more, there is no arrangement more consonant with the purposes of divine Love, which we see everywhere, than that which binds together humanity in both worlds by indissoluble ties, and brings the divine protection and blessing to us through human instrumentality.

In regard to the possibility of these views, anthropology and psychology can give a decisive judgment. We have heard their decision; it may be regarded as indisputably proved, that our mind possesses, behind the region of consciousness, a life full of hidden relations; nay, that signs here betray themselves which can only be ascribed to the working of a higher consciousness upon our own. The immediate conclusions to be drawn from this are clear; and it is not our present purpose to follow them to their more ulterior results.


With regard to the *probability* of these views, we can

appeal once more to the universal law of *continuity*, which is maintained throughout all creation. According to this law, there is certainly nothing irrational in holding that from the lowest form of the spirit-world, there is a sacred chain of upward and downward influences and connexions, which reaches even to the infinite mind itself, and thus solves the last enigma, which stood in the way of our faith in a universal and individual providence.

Perhaps it may be granted to some future philosophy, furnished with more ample psychological results, to gain a more penetrating view into these relations. Everything on such topics cannot be said at once, particularly such things as conflict the most directly with reigning prejudices. To overthrow these at a blow, would be both impossible and unwise, for in human culture, as elsewhere, the law of gradual progress still prevails. Let it now suffice to have shown the first premises and distant outlines of future truths, and thus make good the idea I first proposed to myself of writing merely a PHILOSOPHICAL CONFESSION.



APPENDIX.



APPENDIX.

I.

THE HISTORY OF THE CREATION, IN ITS RELATION TO THEISM.

I AM aware of the objection which might be made to my views, namely, that not by any means the whole of our naturalists and geologists agree in the belief that the various species of plants and animals, which appear in the later epochs of the earth's history, have arisen without any continuity or any transition from the older ones, as perfectly new creations. I am aware that credit is given to other explanations; and that, at the very best, the whole question is extremely dark and unsettled. This state of the case I have by no means overlooked; and however improper it might be thought to take any particular side in scientific controversies which belong quite to another department from our own, yet it may at least be allowed to submit the different degrees of probability to a logical judgment, on the general principles of evidence.

Cuvier, the founder of the whole modern science of geology, did not consider the hypothesis by any means untenable — that all the animals originated at one and the same time, but that they were differently dispersed over the various portions of the earth; and that, in consequence of having less adaptation to the means of life, many genera and species had perished, while others had remained and spread themselves over the earth as it

at present exists. Whether he always held firmly to this opinion, will be seen by and by. Geological discovery, up to the present time, leaves no kind of doubt, that at different epochs of the world whole races of animals have disappeared, and new ones been brought into existence. But one hypothesis still remains possible to account for this state of things, namely, that in consequence of the cooling of the earth, and other revolutions which arose out of it, the earlier races may have gradually been transformed into the later ones. Geoffroy St. Hilaire is well known as the chief defender of this view, in which he pointed, with deep philosophic insight, to a law of development proceeding from the more imperfect to the more perfect types, and maintained a principle of transformation lying in the species themselves.

Some of the modern materialists have maintained another theory, namely, that the geological epochs are all a delusion; but that, inasmuch as nothing more than a cycle of changes can be inferred from the peculiar combination of certain materials, and not any actually new creation or development, the earth has probably remained exactly the same from all eternity. Such a theory may possess some degree of boldness, and of logical sequence also; but whether it agrees with the facts of the case is quite another question.

I do not think I incur the charge of rashness, if I acknowledge that neither of these hypotheses has been fully satisfactory to me, because they both of them, more or less, do violence to the facts of the case. In deciding the whole question, we have only to consider whether the known laws respecting the transformation of organised beings offer us any ground whatever for the hypothesis, that the different species of animals of the early periods may have gradually transformed themselves in progressive order into their present state. Cuvier, it is well known, affirmed precisely the contrary, and proved it by pointing out the admitted law, that the osteological relations of any species (as for instance the number of its vertebrae and ribs) never change at all: as seen, for example, in all the divergencies of the dog

tribe. Starting from this fact, he sketched out, in his "*Discours sur les Revolutions de la Surface du Globe*," the two main points of his geological theory, namely, first, that the living creatures of the present creation have not sprung by gradual transformation from the analogous preadamite forms; and, secondly, that special differences are visible amongst similar organisms of different periods, which forbid us to imagine the later ones to have come down in a direct line from those of the past. Even though we should differ with him, therefore, in relation to the number and order of the great epochs of the earth, still this does not prevent us from regarding the main result of his investigation as unassailable.

The investigations of Agassiz are quite in conformity with these results, and we cannot be wrong here in following his guidance and authority. In doing so we shall show that even our boldest speculations have a solid basis in experimental facts. For the sake of brevity we shall quote the following passage from one of our best literary journals, in which the results of his palæontological researches are clearly set forth.

Agassiz has, by his investigations, drawn out this principle, that the different types of natural life have been represented originally only on their lowest forms,—those which resemble the present embryonic conditions. In regard to fishes, at least, he has been able to show the most remarkable parallels. Nevertheless, he does not think that any natural and connected relationship exists between all these different forms of the animal kingdom which one after the other have peopled the earth. So far from that, the great geological revolutions seem to have been accompanied by an entire annihilation of all the living beings, so that no single species can be found alike in any two consecutive revolutionary periods.

In opposition to St. Hilaire, he maintains that not *one*, but several different plans can be detected in organised life. Nature, he says, appears to have worked according to several types or patterns. He does not admit, however, the theory of the growth or development of new species out of the old. The

same immutability which he holds in relation to the present species (an immutability which may be looked upon as demonstrated), he maintains in relation to extinct species. Everywhere, when a new species appears, the whole structure and arrangement, he considers, are due to a specific exertion of creative power. Each one has been furnished with unchangeable attributes, in perfect harmony with their mode of life and habitat; and these attributes every animal transmits to its posterity, until a complete breaking up takes place, to make way for a wholly new plan.

Notwithstanding his doctrine of successive creations, Agassiz still holds that in all these revolutions, and in all the changes of the organic world, the trace of *one great plan* can be seen, to which the creative power has ever remained true. The organic development visible through the different geological epochs, according to his view, is a progression from the embryonic form to those at present existing. The present animals in their embryonic stage are really miniature types of those which inhabited the earth myriads of years ago. It is also remarked, that many animals in the first periods of their existence are like others which have reached their last stage of development. The insects, for example, when in the larva state, show all the properties of worms; and we are fully justified in regarding the latter as insects which have been stopped in their development.

Let us take, then, a general view of the results we have just indicated. We find, first, a series of ever-renewed creations, each beginning for itself, and wholly incapable of being explained by any principle of development from others; secondly, each one of these forms a separate and compendious world of organisation, of harmonious character and common type, exactly adapted to the general geological, physical, and atmospheric conditions of each epoch. Lastly, throughout all these single forms of creation one supreme world-plan may be dimly perceived; an observable progression from the more imperfect, raw, gigantesque organic forms, to the more perfect ones, and,

lastly, to the highest form of organic life yet known — to man himself. To what philosophic conclusions, then, are we led by these premises?

First of all, the general consideration presses itself upon us, that these prodigious facts, whose inner connexion and successive realisation stretch themselves through the process of incalculable periods of duration, must possess quite a different value, and have a far more important signification, in reference to our knowledge of the plan of the universe, than those events which are bounded by the narrow span of the present epoch. Here the metaphysical idea of the eternity and immensity of God comes near to us in all its deep meaning, and not simply measured by the small proportions which the present history of the world presents to us.

According to the same analogy, we are compelled to estimate the development of human history, and of the goal to which it is tending, by far more comprehensive periods of duration than has yet (chiefly in consequence of theological considerations) been ordinarily attempted. If we are justified in concluding, with any high degree of probability, from the fact of man being the latest development of the animal kingdom, that the goal and aim of the whole previous course of things lies in him, *i. e.* in the manifestation of the finite mind; it necessarily follows, that those enormous periods of time which have aided in bringing him into being, must exercise some influence upon his destiny and his mental development within the present epoch. It may, therefore, be rendered probable that the human race has lived through an infinitely longer *past* than has hitherto been assigned to it. Yet, notwithstanding this, we may be obliged to regard it as yet in the very earliest period of its youth, nay, in a spiritually embryonic state, far, far removed from its last goal, and from the condition of perfect mental development. For this there may yet be an immeasurable future before it; although this future, at least to a being possessing consciousness as its fundamental attribute, can only hover before it in a distinctive type, and through the medium of general ideas.

And this brings us to the consideration of the last portion of our "Anthropology," in which it was shown that humanity is at present upon a very low stage of mental development, but that there is no danger, either in the case of the individual or of humanity at large, of anything standing in the way of their full development. For both the one and the other, secure of their real immortality, can produce out of themselves the periods which they need, in order, through the working of God's Spirit, to correct the errors of their life, and approach nearer and nearer to spiritual perfection. Here, therefore, the broad view we have taken of the history of the universe, and its connexion with the individual mind, frees us from those dull and misanthropic theological opinions, which make the final decision of human destiny in the eternal world dependent on the character of the individual man, in the span-long duration of a life, which bears all the traces of a mere preliminary state of existence.

This view which we have taken of the universe sets aside, at the same time, several contracted metaphysical as well as theological notions. And although it does not form any part of our plan to discuss these points, yet we may be excused for briefly alluding to them.

The old notion of a "*Deus implicitus et explicitus*" — that is, of a Godhead which completes itself and comes to consciousness in the process of the world — is completely refuted. The geological history of creation and of the earth is the surest support of Theism: inasmuch as it is only imaginable under the supposition of an absolute Intelligence, perfect from all eternity, and pervading all the vast periods of time with the clearest consciousness. This idea of the divine essence, the most grand and sublime to which the human reason can rise (at least in a metaphysical, if not in a moral point of view), condemns and rejects *at once* all those pantheistic suppositions, which are as shallow and unsatisfactory, metaphysically, as they are contracted when viewed from the standpoint of physical science. They evince, in fact, a superstition not less gross than that of the heathen mythology, inasmuch as they connect the tem-

porary destiny of the earth, that insignificant point in the universe, with the eternal nature of the Deity, and make the former a complete reflection of the latter.

Just as these cosmological truths are adapted to bring us back from contracted views of the Deity, whether of a theological or philosophical character, so also do they enlarge our views of the world, and introduce an entirely new class of considerations respecting it. On the ground of experience, we cannot set aside the idea either of an eternal or a temporal creation, although both have, up to this time, stood in palpable contradiction to one another. The fact is, they belong to each other as complementary halves, and explain each other mutually; for if the idea of a series of creations, one after the other, is not any longer to be denied, yet in the whole of them we may see the outlines of one eternal plan, which goes through the entire series, and explains both their possibility and their order. The idea, accordingly, of an eternal pre-existence even of the individual creature has become necessary to the explanation of the facts actually before us. Whether this pre-existence consist merely in the form of ideal thoughts, or whether it includes some conceivable reality *beyond* the ideas — this question obviously transcends the limits of human investigation. To whichever of these alternatives one may incline, we must at least confess that it is a very anthropomorphical procedure, to bring over the purely human opposition between the *ideal* and the *real* from our own processes of thought, and attribute it to the Deity himself.

II.

THE ELEMENTARY ORGANISATION OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM, AND ITS RELATION TO PSYCHOLOGY.

I HAVE already remarked, that the greatest stress ought to be laid upon the question, as to whether anatomical results are in

accordance with the views I have propounded, and are able indirectly to confirm them. According to my views, it must be maintained that the structure of the nervous system presents us with a perfect reflex of psychical relations; and that consequently there must be various mental processes corresponding with the different functions which we find to exist in connexion with nervous activity—processes which psychology ought to discover, and which, when discovered, we should see to be in perfect correlation with physiology and anatomy. I must here fully subscribe to the happy expression of Forlidge, that the external functions of the nervous system are really mind becoming visible.

On this account the conclusion cannot seem strange, that in these psychical relations we may find the key to that most dark and enigmatical question,—I mean, the anatomical structure of the nerve-matter. At present it would be doubtless premature to attempt any such parallel, for it is only quite recently that psychology has begun, on the one side, to investigate the more inward processes of consciousness, having been contented so long with a mere enumeration of faculties; while, on the other side, both physiology and anatomy, by their own confession, are as yet far enough removed from drawing any definite conclusions from their researches into the structure of the nervous system. Whatever I have to communicate respecting this parallel, I must present rather as a preliminary attempt, which may be hereafter made good, than as giving any fixed and ascertained conclusions respecting it. The relation, however, which Rudolf Wagner has so acutely pointed out between the primitive nerves and the nerve centres, is too striking not to lead us to attempt a psychological interpretation, which bears very closely upon the distinction between the individual elements of sensation, and the elaboration of them into perceptions and notions. This distinction is *now* thoroughly well grounded, and goes far to reveal the mystery of the whole development of our consciousness. Whether it can be shown, however, to have its reflex in the structure of the nerves, is at present only conjectural.

I shall endeavour, therefore, under Wagner's guidance, to give a brief sketch of what is already ascertained in the region of nerve-physiology, and what he has himself been able to add to it.

1. The nerves of the brain are, anatomically, very similar to those of the spinal marrow. Both are the centre of numberless primitive nerve-bundles, which may be separated into individual nerves, and are thus found to run parallel with each other without anastomosing. There appear to be in the body special nerves for conducting outward impressions to the centre; and also special ones for conducting inward impulses from the brain and spinal cord to the periphery; although the capability of them to propagate both kinds of impressions, and in both directions, has been proved experimentally by Dubois-Reymond. The white matter of the brain and spine consists entirely of bundles of these conducting nerves, which, moreover, are never found to anastomose, but propagate all impressions *singly*. The nerves are accordingly divided into centripetal, or nerves of sensation; and centrifugal, or nerves of motion.

2. In the brain and spinal marrow these conducting nerves are connected with the other kind of nerve-substance, *i. e.* the cellular or grey matter.

3. External impulses come to perception only when they are brought, by means of the conducting nerves, into contact with the cellular matter. This fact would be of extraordinary importance, in relation to the parallel between physiology and psychology, if it could only be raised from an hypothesis to the rank of a physiological axiom. There are strong grounds in its favour, and it may be interesting to show the results which would flow from it.

The primitive nerves, as was remarked, never anastomose into each other; they show, in this way, a natural adaptation to propagate each single operation, as elements of sensation and volition, isolated and unmixed. But in the ganglionic cells they appear to come into mutual action and reaction; so that it is here, *first*, that the various simple operations are combined:

that is, either the single elements of sensation are fused into a conscious act of perception, or a single act of will is distributed over the several organs, which must co-operate in order that it may be carried out into a practical execution. Several conclusions may be drawn from this : First, that the well-defined distinction between sensible and motor nerves must be extended to the ganglionic cells. We should have to distinguish such cells, therefore, as those which subserve sensational and those which subserve volitional processes. Secondly, that every ganglionic cell, according to the number and importance of the primitive nerves which meet in it, is in a greater or less degree a *centralising* organ, that very thing, in fact, which psychology has hitherto only looked for in the soul itself. Still, we must only regard these relative centres of consciousness as the *elements*, out of which and within which the soul combines its more extended processes of consciousness, and the more varied series of perception and thought. It is clear that, under this view, it would become quite superfluous to look for any special central organ as the seat of the soul, over and above the whole sum and inner connexion of these relative centres of consciousness. Lastly, it follows that those ganglionic cells, being at the same time relative centres of consciousness, must be connected with each other by means of the intermediate nerve-fibre. We can here hardly overlook the still further consequence, that there is a third series of primitive nerves; that beside the sensible and motor, there is also another species of nerves, which is adapted to *combine* the higher acts of consciousness together.

4. Let us consider, then, what it is, in these principles of Wagner, which tends to support the hypotheses we have brought forward. The following facts are in the highest degree significant : "From all the ganglionic cells there are off-sets, which unite them with the primitive nerves, or with other cellular formations. Most of the ganglia show a great many of such off-sets. Whether there are any which only have one bond of connexion, is doubtful; it seems that there are none

wholly isolated. Again, the cells transmit impulses from one kind of nerve-bundle to another, that is, from the nerves of sensation to those of motion, and *vice versâ*: in this way reflex actions are originated. Other cells transmit the operation of the nerves to the gland-substance, in order to produce secretions from the blood. The secretion of tears and saliva (as the consequence of external objects) is explicable on the same principle." Once more: "Large masses of small cells (as in the case of the corpora quadrigemina and the optic thalami) are necessary in order to call forth the sensations of light and colour; so that these may produce such sensations, even *without* the co-operation of the eyes and the optic nerves, as is often the case in congestion of the brain. Similar masses are found in connexion with the nerves of hearing and smell."

From these facts it follows incontestibly, that the operation of the ganglionic cells, so far as the lower region of feeling is concerned, is independent and central; while the activity of the primitive nerves and commissures is elementary and subordinate. A similar relation appears to exist in reference to the organs of the higher intelligence. Wagner reports upon it as follows: "Millions of small connected cells, in layers of various thicknesses, line the outside of the hemispheres. Millions of fine fibres spring out of them, and form the white substance of the brain. These fibres conduct all the impulses of the senses to the cells round the surface; and carry away the impulses of the will from those cells to the periphery."

Wagner, therefore, calls these cells psychical cells, and remarks that, if we can speak of a seat of the soul *at all* in a physiological sense, these cells must be it, as they are the last point of connexion between the anatomical nerve-elements and the consciousness. At least it can be shown that, in the creation of perceptions, and other purely mental processes, these cells round the surface are in action. Whether they are so *to the very last point*, we cannot say, for there is still one objection remaining, namely, that in the unknown basis of the brain there

may yet lie some *single* organ of great importance, to which the cells at the surface act as attendants.

Wagner, however, cites the following facts to the contrary :—

1. Wherever these cells are largely disturbed, mental disturbances in proportion always take place. All pathological experiences confirm this result, particularly insanity.

2. That it is *only* when disturbances do take place in these cells, either directly, as in inflammation, brain fever, &c., or indirectly, as in lesion or pressure, that mental disturbances can uniformly be detected.

3. That no *more certain* cause of mental affection is known, as e. g. where any other parts of the brain are injured, without the sympathy of the cellular substance referred to being awakened by it.

- * 4. Well-known observations on animals, in which the upper part of the brain has been cut away in slices, confirm all this. Wagner has convinced himself, by observation, that the greater or less degree of idiocy, or insensibility in animals, depends on the extent to which the cellular surface has been removed.

5. According to his own and Huschke's observations, he has deduced the following principle: The increase of the convolutions, and their more vigorous folding, consist simply in the increase of the cells, which are embedded in the grey matter. The region of the forehead, and the sides and upper portions of the cerebrum, show more numerous convolutions in the case of men of high intelligence.

In conclusion, Wagner gives the following as the general result of his whole investigations: The brain is a highly complex organ; it consists of numerous prominent apparatuses and conducting wires, like a great network of telegraphs, whose millions of stations stand in connexion with one another, and which all have their central office in the consciousness. It is quite clear that the most recent anatomical investigations can show *no one single point* in which all the impressions converge, and from which the impulses take their start. To whatever extent the

atomistic philosophy requires this, it fails at present of support on physiological grounds.

We may also remark, as a corollary, that the doctrine of the perfect simplicity of the soul cannot be affirmed on anatomical grounds. The opposite view, on the other hand, gains strength, namely, that the soul is a real existence, involving a space-relation, like all other realities; and that the fact of an invisible pneumatical body, which has been such a stone of stumbling to the empirics of our day, is rendered in the highest degree probable, from the plain intimation of palpable physiological facts.

THE END.

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